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Abstract 
The focus of this thesis is to understand the initial formation of inter-firm relationships 
with the aim of establishing a long-term relationship in the offshore-wind sector. It is 
common to initiate relationships with pre-existing partners but less is known about how 
firms form relationships with strangers. This thesis attempts to answer a research 
question: ‘How and why new inter-firm relationships are built in nascent industries with 
highly uncertain business environments?’  
The research involves three longitudinal case studies (12 pairs of supplier-buyer 
relationships) of three offshore wind (OSW) suppliers and one OSW buyer, and their 
relationships with new partners in a highly uncertain market and political context. By 
examining the early-stage relationships between a supplier and multiple new customers 
this study provides insights into supplier selection in the OSW sector.  
It identifies the main motivations for OSW supply chain companies seeking new 
partnerships and how they benefit from the new relationships despite facing high market 
risk and political uncertainty. Furthermore, this research reveals how inter-firm 
relationships progress (or fail) from one stage to another under high market risk and 
political uncertainty. 
This study argues that the way the selective process is being managed is as important as 
the levels of compatibility and complementarity and makes theoretical contributions on 
how to achieve greater understanding and knowledge advancement of dynamic 
relationship life-cycle management, effects of compatibility and complementarity, 
uncertainty and time series dimensions are made. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the formation of new inter-firm relationships in the UK offshore wind 
(OSW) sector. Even though OSW energy is a renewable and secure source of energy 
(Pregger et al. 2011; Svanberg and Halldórsson, 2013) the OSW sector is still a relatively 
immature industry (Higgins and Foley, 2014) requiring significant cost reduction. It is 
believed that collaboration across OSW supply chains could yield significant cost savings 
(Gov.uk, 2012) but there is a lack of study on how OSW sector achieves supply chain 
innovation through formation of new inter-firm relationships (Arlbjørn and Paulraj, 2013; 
Svanberg and Halldórsson, 2013; Jensen et al. 2013). OSW sector with typically high 
market risk and political uncertainty characterises a unique challenge facing the initiation 
of any inter-firm partnership (Hamel et al. 1989).  
This thesis attempts to answer a research question: ‘How and why new inter-firm 
relationships are built in nascent industries with highly uncertain business environments?’ 
This study uses multiple case studies of OSW supply chain companies operating in the 
UK OSW sector, with the focus on nascent industry with high levels of market and 
political uncertainty.  The research involves three longitudinal case studies (12 pairs of 
supplier-buyer relationships) of three OSW suppliers and one OSW buyer, and their 
relationships with new partners in a highly uncertain market and political context. The 
relatively immature UK OSW sector is also characterised by many formations of a new 
relationship between firms with no pre-existing ties. Many of the companies in the case 
study are new entrants to the OSW market; therefore, the research also offers insights into 
the early formation and development of business relationships for exploring innovative 
collaborative advantage with firms from different sectors. 
Contributions are made to the supply chain and energy sector management literature in a 
number of aspects. Understanding how new inter-firm relationships are born and develop 
into long-term relationships has been recognised as an important research agenda (Villena 
et al. 2011; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012; Palmatier et al. 2013). New inter-firm 
relationships are formed through a selective process where organisational characteristics 
influence the likelihood of relationship formation (Powell et al. 2005). New inter-firm 
relationships are formed during the initial stages of an inter-firm relationship life-cycle 
from awareness to exploration, formation, etc. (Ford, 1980; Dwyer et al. 1987; Ring and 
van de Ven, 1994). Though the models of inter-firm relationship life-cycle proposed by 
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these scholars help to name the stages of an inter-firm relationship, less is known about 
how the relationship can progress from one stage to another over time (Lewicki et al. 
2006).  
This research reveals how inter-firm relationships progress (or fail) from one stage to 
another. Furthermore, it is common to initiate relationships with pre-existing partners but 
less is known about how firms form relationships with strangers. By studying the 
formation of new relationships between a firm and some new and existing partners, this 
study sheds light on their differences. It identifies the main motivations for OSW supply 
chain companies seeking new partnerships and how they benefit from the new 
relationships despite facing high market risk and political uncertainty. There has been 
extensive research on why firms enter alliances or partnerships: motivations include the 
chance to learn from one another (Hamel et al. 1989), enter new markets and technologies 
(Kogut, 1991), access complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001), enhance innovativeness 
(Shan et al. 1994), share risks (Ohmae, 1989), and improve performance in early stages 
of the relationship (Baum et al. 2000). 
Supplementary research has shown that a firm’s tendency to form relationships depends 
on the firm’s resources and external environment (Park et al. 2002), strategic and social 
position (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), and technical, commercial, and social 
capital (Ahuja, 2000). Others attempt to determine what firms can do to achieve 
meaningful and beneficial inter-firm relationships; common behaviours such as trust 
building, information sharing, and commitment have been identified (Kaufmann et al., 
2018; Mai Anh et al. 2018; Palmatier et al. 2013; Wilson, 1995; Anderson et al. 1987; 
Dwyer et al. 1987). In addition, both resource compatibility and complementarity 
between firms are also arguably the drivers for such behaviours (Mitsuhashi and Greeve, 
2009). 
By examining the early-stage relationships between a supplier and multiple new 
customers this study provides insights into supplier selection in the OSW sector. This 
study argues that the way the selective process is being managed is as important as the 
levels of compatibility and complementarities. To verify this argument, this study 
identifies production resources as observable criteria and company culture/philosophy as 
unobservable criteria used to determine match quality, and specifies that firms judge 
match quality as high when these criteria show complementary and compatibility, 
respectively. Further, the study analyses the selective process of several supplier-buyer 
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dyads in their early stages, where suppliers make investments in the relationship to 
improve match quality, and to build trust in order to increase the chances of winning 
further orders and developing long-term committed relationships with their customers, 
and customers’ efforts in searching for compatibility and complementarities. 
In the next section a review of the literature on relationship life-cycle theory and 
relationship constructs such as compatibility and complementarity are presented. This 
formed the basis for the development of a conceptual framework. The framework will be 
explored using a case study approach which will be detailed in Chapter 3. The theoretical 
contribution of this work will be the advancement of a framework and also to pinpoint 
theoretical contributions to specific constructs and categories within a relationship life-
cycle context. It will extend theory by identifying, confirming, modifying and rejecting 
key relational characteristics impacting on dyadic formation, development and evolution 
in uncertain market environments. The main contribution will be in the area of supply 
chain relational theory (further details are presented in chapter two). In short, the 
theoretical contribution is anticipated to be made achieve greater understanding and 
knowledge advancement of dynamic relationship life-cycle management, effects of 
compatibility and complementarity, uncertainty and time series dimensions. 
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2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
This chapter reviews the literature on the different theoretical approaches to modelling 
the relationship life-cycle with specific reference to changing dynamics, characteristics 
and power perspectives. An initial thread of an idea, the “relationship life-cycle” is 
proposed and then this idea is developed through a review of literature which utilises and 
applies it in different industrial contexts.  
The main unit of analysis (relational construct, dynamics and buyer-supplier relationship 
life cycle), guided the selection of papers, search strategy, inclusion and exclusion criteria 
and method of synthesis. The review process was driven by the following research 
question: How and why new inter-firm relationships are built in nascent industries with 
highly uncertain business environments? By focusing on the research question, key 
research areas and relevant publications were identified.  
To conduct a literature review, this thesis followed Denyer and Tranfield’s (2009) 
literature review process (see figure 1 below). 
Figure 1 Literature review process (adapted from Denyer and Tranfield (2009)) 
The field of study was mapped and the scope in terms of area and problem was set. This 
was then followed by the researcher forming a review panel made up of subject experts 
from both academia and practice to provide support and guidance. The following 
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keywords were clarified by leading experts in the field consulted by the researcher, these 
were:  
- Relationship life-cycle; 
- Supplier relationship; 
- Buyer-supplier relationship development; 
- Uncertainty; 
- Trust; 
- Information sharing; 
- Commitment; 
- Supplier perspective. 
The keywords were then entered into various databases such as Scopus, Springer, Web 
of Knowledge, ABI inform, Taylor and Francis and Emerald. The references and abstracts 
of the most highly cited articles were downloaded into EndNote, a reference management 
software program. The researcher then conducted a screening of abstracts to ensure the 
article’s relevance with the research objectives and identify duplicated articles. To ensure 
validity of the literature review it was necessary to apply a number of inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. Research articles were eligible for inclusion if they focused on the 
formation of a new relationship, involved nascent industries, studied the supplier 
perspective, evaluated supply chain innovations and applied life-cycle models in buyer 
supplier relationships. Exclusion criteria focused on papers that were in progress or were 
not written in English. There were a few rounds of snowballing from key papers found 
by the researcher and the researcher chose to include quantitative, qualitative and case 
study papers in order to have a diversity of epistemological approaches.   
After the explicit selection criteria came the evaluation of remaining articles, to which the 
researcher decided which were poor quality, to be removed and those with adequate 
quality kept. The papers resulting from the search were scrutinised for their quality in 
terms of their scientific rigor – suitable research methods being applied; credibility – well-
presented findings, and relevance – findings were useful for suppliers forming new 
relationships. It was then a process of extraction and synthesis of the articles in terms of 
what descriptive information they offered and what thematic information they provided. 
The next stage involved reporting on articles that shed light on what was known in the 
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research field, thus informing policy and practice, as well as what was not known and 
needed further exploration this informing the research agenda.  
The literature will be critically interrogated with the purpose of theoretically framing a 
model of relationship evolution. This will subsequently inform the conceptual 
development of theoretical categories for application to several case studies. The chapter 
will report the two main approaches to modelling life-cycle evolution. Then it will report 
various studies that have adopted the respective approaches with examples. It concludes 
with a framework to guide the case study research investigation.  
2.1 Life-cycle theoretical approaches –DSO theory 
In reviewing the previous academic literature on relationship life-cycle theory, it is 
apparent that there have emerged two prominent schools of thought. This literature 
primarily originated in the field of industrial marketing and purchasing but subsequently 
has been applied rigorously in the field of operations and supply chain management 
(Vanpoucke et al. 2014).  Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) suggest that relationships evolve 
in a rigid process moving from one relationship stage into another. This is commonly 
referred to as “DSO theory”. It states that the relationship life-cycle evolves over time 
through a total of five stages. These stages are progressed through slowly. At each stage 
there are differentiating characteristics, which are based on the properties of the 
relationship rather than the individual actors involved in the exchange. DSO explains that 
relationships will develop over time where trust and shared norms are developed over a 
predictable series of events happening in a set order. DSO theory offers simple 
propositions for each stage of the development of a relationship, where many relationship 
properties follow the same paths, rising and then falling methodically. For instance, 
relationship properties such as “trust” and “dependence” are low in the “exploration” 
stage, then rise in the “expansion” stage, climax in the “maturity” stage, and ultimately 
fall as the relationship dissolves. 
Buyer–supplier relationships can be seen as developing over time, through stages in 
which partners consider each other in different ways. Dwyer et al. (1987) propose a 
framework using exchange theory which is based on comparisons of a series of discrete 
transactions or relational exchanges. Macneil (1980) posits that inter-organisational 
relationships typically start with low norms and evolve gradually over time. Dwyer et al. 
(op. cit.) identify five distinct stages in a relationship: “awareness”, “exploration”, 
“expansion”, “commitment”, and “dissolution”; in the awareness stage, before interaction 
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between the two parties has taken place, a firm may position themselves to enhance their 
attractiveness to the other party. 
2.1.1 Awareness stage 
In DSO approach that has been selected for this investigation the initial stage of a buyer–
supplier relationship is noted by Dwyer et al. as the “awareness” stage and this is first 
defined as: “Party A’s recognition that party B is a feasible exchange partner”.  In many 
cases, the buyer might already be purchasing products or services from the seller, but then 
decides to move into a deeper relationship with the supplier, in order to accomplish 
internal goals, such as lowering their costs through a JIT system.  In the initiation stage, 
the buyer and supplier develop relation-specific routines so that they are better able to 
engage in supplier development activities (e.g. tacit knowledge exchange).  
Communication is important in the initial stages of development to establish social 
bonding and the actions of the partners begin to define the level of trust that will shape 
the future of the relationship. Wilson (1978) proposes that the initial stages of relationship 
development involve source legitimization and information exchange. In these 
interactions, partners seek common ground, on which to build social bonds and a trusting 
relationship. In a later work, Wilson and Vlosky (1998) argues that “trust”, “social 
bonds”, “mutual goals”, and “power/dependence” issues are more important in the early 
stages of relationship development 
2.1.2 Exploration stage 
After the interaction has taken place (for instance, a transaction), the relationship then 
progresses into the exploration stage. Once in the exploration stage, trial purchases will 
take place to test and evaluate each partner’s capabilities; this enables the partners to 
develop trust in one another as well as be jointly satisfied with each other’s performance. 
Next, in order to move to the expansion stage, partners need to view the potential rewards 
as sufficiently large to take the effort to start negotiating and interacting intensively. Once 
in the expansion stage, partners will then set up integration initiatives and indirectly test 
for their joint “goal compatibility”, “integrity”, and “performance”. 
The expansion stage involves increased “risk taking”, a growing “mutual dependence”, 
and stronger “commitment”. Jap and Ganesan (2000) expand on Dwyer et al.’s 
framework by studying the benefits, satisfaction and interdependence in each stage of the 
buyer–supplier relationship. They state that the exploration stage is very much a search 
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and trial phase whereby potential obligations and benefits are assessed, with uncertainty 
reduction and the potential benefits of continued interaction considered as central goals 
(Jap and Ganesan, 2000). The expansion stage implies an increased interdependence 
between the two parties and this turns transactions into long-term commitments, by 
infusing them with shared norms and values. 
In the exploration stage, Dwyer et al. (1987) suggest that there is a period of trial and 
testing of potential partners. Wilson (1995) suggests constructs such as “performance 
satisfaction”, “comparison level of alternatives” and “trust” are active constructs in the 
buyer–supplier relationship. If a buyer is already acquainted with a potential supplier, 
then it is easier to make judgements on such variables compared to if the potential partner 
is unknown. If the potential partner is unknown or untested, having a known reputation 
for performance and trustworthiness are key measures used to decide on whether to begin 
the process of relationship development.  
Social bonding begins when buyers and suppliers interact in the early stages, where initial 
interaction may begin the development of mutual trust. Wilson (1995: 16) comments: “… 
although uncertainty is high, trust begins as one partner earns the respect and trust of the 
other”. 
Dwyer et al. explain that during the exploration stage the relationship is in a fragile state 
as both parties have limited commitment and either could end the relationship very easily. 
The buyer gains awareness of the contribution the supplier can make to a relationship 
relative to alternative suppliers. During the exploration stage, Vanpoucke et al. (2014) 
find that buyers and suppliers tend to work together on a transactional basis, without any 
contracts or initiatives in place, and no guarantees made of a long-term relationship. The 
parties often would enter the exploration stage based on assessments of the traditional 
performance dimensions such as: “cost”, “flexibility”, “delivery” and “quality” of the 
products and services offered. They mention that trust is built by increasing 
communication levels through negotiations and developing small joint projects that are 
transactional in nature; this creates trust from the buyer who is then willing to move into 
the expansion stage (ibid.). They find ‘pattern starts with initiatives for logistics 
responsiveness, followed by knowledge exchange initiatives and finally initiatives to 
increase the use of common resources. Each of these initiatives are triggered by specific 
opportunities and are emergent in nature’. Thus, it is necessary to gain a greater 
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understanding of the triggers that help move a relationship from its early formation stages 
to a successful committed relationship.  
2.1.3 Expansion stage 
Miller and Friesen (1984) show that in the expansion stage the viability of the potential 
alliance is the main objective. This stage is said to be made up of resource structuring 
behaviours such as obtaining financing and hiring and training employees to implement 
marketing, sales, and operational duties (Rutherford et al. 2003). They do this to support 
their organisation’s business model. Zahra et al. (2009) suggest that organisations in the 
early stage of relationship formation develop alliances, in order to acquire critical 
resources from their partners.  Furthermore, the organizing of firm resources during the 
expansions stage helps both partners to develop flexibility and ways to adapt to new 
circumstances and competitive settings; however, it should be noted that managers should 
be careful not to commit resources in ways that cannot be reversed if changing conditions 
necessitate (Cainarca et al. 1992).  
Morrow et al. (2007) suggest that experimental resource allocation patterns are used by 
partners: “to identify potential valuable and rare operational and product configurations 
that can create a sustainable competitive advantage”.  Moreover, studies have shown how 
firms in the start-up stage concentrate on structuring their resource portfolio, to then 
bundle these resources to form capabilities on which the alliance’s business model will 
operate (Sirmon et al. 2011). 
2.1.4 Commitment stage 
As firms begin to mature, they are able to gain greater understanding of their internal and 
external environments. For mature firms to sustain competitive advantage they must 
continue to pursue innovation (Agarwal and Gort, 2002). One way of generating new 
innovations is to hire fresh human capital (i.e. the recruitment of executives with 
innovative and creative flair); also, managers need to have a supportive governance 
structure, that is designed to facilitate innovation, in the early stages of the life-cycle. This 
is to ensure that it is not prohibiting innovation (Miller and Friesen, 1984). Thus, a firm 
in the mature stage of relationship development must orchestrate its resources in a way 
that achieves a balance between “innovation” and “efficiency” (Sirmon et al. 2011). This 
will require managers to emphasize employee morale and commitment (Smith et al., 
1985). There is a need for a participatory approach to management and a proactive 
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approach when dealing with the firm’s external stakeholders (Jahawar and McLaughlin, 
2001).  
During maturity, it is likely that firms will explore new ways of orchestrating their 
resources to create new innovations or value. For instance, firms may want to exploit 
resources available in the alliance to increase the efficiency of their operations. By 
exploiting the resources available firms can restructure resources to identify and replace 
inefficient processes or capabilities with more efficient ones. On the other hand, they may 
want to explore the resources in the alliance, where they can structure their resources in 
a way that creates new knowledge and value and contributes to the development of new 
innovations.  
Furthermore, by pooling the resources of an alliance it is possible to create capabilities 
that supplement existing products and processes which can then aid the firm in finding 
opportunities to enter new markets. In the mature stage, a firm may want to use its 
resource pool to gain greater influence in its external environment and to strengthen its 
competitive position in the market (Smith et al. 1985). Through its dynamic managerial 
capabilities, a firm can leverage its resources for exploitation and/or exploration 
concurrently; this can provide the basis for entering a new growth stage (Adner and 
Helfat, 2003). Otherwise, if a firm fails to manage its resources in ways that create new 
value, they are likely to enter the decline stage of the relationship. 
2.1.5 Dissolution stage 
When the buyer–supplier relationship is in the decline stage, both parties will engage less 
in relation-specific routines and reduce relation-specific investments, making supplier 
development less effective (Dwyer et al., 1987). Drivers of dissolution have been studied 
where Hocutt’s (1998) study notes three ways a relationship can dissolve, specifically: 
buyer’s decision, supplier’s decision or a mutual decision. Chen et al’s. (2019) study on 
supplier performance and strategic relationship dissolution found that the likeliness of a 
relationship being terminated increases when a supplier with a reasonable and marginal 
history of performance commits the same mistake. Dissolution begins when a partner 
privately starts evaluating their dissatisfactions with the other partner and deciding that 
the costs of continuing the relationship far outweigh the benefits.   
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2.2 RV Life-cycle theory 
An alternative theoretical viewpoint on relationship development is suggested by Ring 
and Van de Ven (1994) and they propose their theory which is entitled: “RV”. The RV 
theory of relationship development is applicable to any type of organisational 
relationship, and not solely that of the buyer–supplier relational context. Compared to the 
previous DSO theory (which suggests that there are five separate stages which linearly 
progresses one at a time), RV posits that three steps occur within each stage of DSO 
theory. It aims to understand the relationship from the behaviour of individual managers 
of both organisations; furthermore, it is a cyclical process where each stage can be 
repeated until the relationship is terminated. In each stage of relationship development 
RV suggests that there will be repeated cycles of “negotiation”, “commitment” and 
“execution”, even when parties are not fulfilling their commitments, whilst the DSO view 
holds that relationships that fail are abandoned as they are difficult to revive and are seen 
as a liability. Another key difference between the two theories found by Jap and Anderson 
(2007) is that individuals are critical to successful relationship development (RV) 
compared to the DSO view that it is the properties of the relationship that are the more 
important factor. These authors also found the DSO view predictively valid but overly 
complex stating Rousseau et al’s (1998) model a simplification of it. Where Rousseau et 
al (1998) stated boundaries between expansion and maturity stages can blur from the 
development of trust, commitment and an assessment of alternatives. Furthermore, 
authors (Jap and Anderson, 2007; Rousseau et al., 1998) have maintained that not only 
can life-cycle stages by skipped or merged together but there can also be back and forward 
motion between stages, in particular, movement towards the dissolution stage. Further 
stating that relationships do not necessarily evolve in a linear fashion and do not need to 
include all stages. Instead of the typically linear path through all relationship stages 
Medlin (2004) suggests: “each relationship is somewhat unique, making quantitative 
analysis of relationship types according to lifecycle stage theoretically suspect”. 
In RV theory, there are three key steps to the relationship development. The first stage 
starts with (1) “negotiation” to begin the relationship. The negotiation phase involves 
partners developing joint expectations on their motivations as well as possible 
investments and risks of the initiative they are hoping to work on. This is then followed 
by (2) “commitment” to an agreement made by the parties. The commitment stage 
involves the parties coming to an agreement on future actions through a formal relational 
contract or informal psychological contract. The relationship is then assessed in terms of 
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its progress. In (3) the “execution” stage, the commitments discussed by both parties are 
performed and the parties will become more familiar with one another, which may lead 
to starting up a new integration initiative, and the parties would then follow all three 
stages again.   
According to Ring and Van de Ven (1994), formal and informal negotiation and 
commitment mechanisms should be in balance throughout the life-cycle of inter-
organisational relationships. For instance, in the negotiation stage, there is a need for 
formal bargaining; however, this should be accompanied with informal sense making. In 
the commitment stage, formal legal contracts should be accompanied by psychological 
contracts. They argue that when significant imbalances occur between formal and 
informal processes in repetitive sequences of negotiation, commitment and execution, the 
likelihood of dissolving the relationship increases. 
The dynamics of a relationship requires a processual understanding of how and why such 
relationships, develop, evolve and dissolve over time (Jap and Anderson (2001), thus 
developing a lifetime theory of business relationships is exceptionally difficult. Whilst 
inter-organisational research has subsided recently, there has not been enough research 
focus no how relationships evolve over time (Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Jap and 
Anderson, 2007), there is a lack of studies on the dynamics of business relationships 
(Eggert et al. 2006; Wilson, 1995). 
During a business relationship partners continuously monitor and assess the costs and 
value from being in business together, when one partner in the relationship feels they are 
not receiving a zero or negative output with no potential of reversal, the relationship 
begins to dissolve (Park and Ungson, 2001). Fichman and Levinthal (1991) found a 
relationship is at its most tenuous where the relationship can be terminated at any point, 
in comparison to a relationship in the expansion or commitment stages experiencing an 
escalated injustice from one partner will result in a bitter and disappointing relationship 
termination. Relationships that stall in development for months may be enough for the 
relationship to be discarded, while in other environmental settings a relationship that stalls 
for years may not be long enough. Thus, it is important to understand that relationships 
follow a non-linear path, moving back and forth depending on the level of activeness or 
passiveness.  
It is important study the dynamics of a relationship at the micro (dyadic and 
or/interpersonal) levels that determine the direction of organisations at the macro levels 
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(Rousseau et al. 1998;). While the DSO and RV theories provide useful insights into the 
evolution of business relationships, both theories do not go into depth on the factors that 
provoke changes in the “perceptions, attitudes, affects and/or behaviours of the actors 
involved in the inter-organisational exchange relationships” … “it is the changes (any 
progression or regression) primarily in the perceptions, beliefs, orientations, affects, 
mind-sets etc. of the boundary spanners (or alliance managers) that mark the 
beginning/end of the different phases of relationship evolution for, after all, it is the 
people not the inanimate organizational entities who make decisions” (Yaqub and 
Windsperger, 2016: 7). Jap and Anderson (2007: 273) comment: “Much about 
relationship dynamics remains to be explored and understood. For example, one un-
researched area involves the drivers that move the relationship from one phase to the next. 
What factors prod the relationship from an exploratory phase into build-up? From 
awareness to exploration? ……. How do firms manage to put aside a disappointing 
history to renew their relationships?” 
It is also important to note that to date there has been no empirical study providing an 
integrated and comprehensive explanation as why and how business relationships evolve 
over time. “Most of the (empirical) research endeavours have focused on what difference 
does it make when the beliefs, perceptions, affects etc. of the exchange partners change 
while assuming that ‘something’ creates and moderates the effects of these changes” 
(Yaqub and Windsperger, 2016: 8). As a result, there is still a need to examine the triggers 
that help move a relationship from one stage to the next, whether from the early stages 
(awareness to exploration) or in the later stages (commitment to dissolution). This thesis 
aims to contribute to business relationship theory by filling this research gap.  
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
Figure 2 below is the conceptual framework derived from the literature. The framework 
draws upon several key areas of buyer-supplier relationship formation and development. 
Two theories were integrated due to their varying nature in describing how a relationship 
develops over time, talking a relationship life-cycle approach. These include Dwyer et 
al.’s (1987) linear and discrete relationship life-cycle theory which breaks down buyer-
supplier relationships into five distinct stages of development, namely, awareness, 
exploration, expansion, commitment and dissolution. However, a relationship may not 
always travel in a linear direction, thus it was important to include Ring and Van de Ven’s. 
(1994) relationship life cycle theory that views relationship development as cyclical and 
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iterative. The conceptual framework posits that Ring and Van de Ven’s cyclical process 
takes place within each stage of Dwyer et al.’s relationship stages rather than being 
separate.   
It was also deemed very important to study the triggers that enable a relationship to 
progress or reverse from one stage to the next. The literature covered in this thesis focuses 
on specific relational constructs that help a relationship progress and development over 
time, these are identified as; trust, commitment, information exchange and governance. 
However, existing literature does not focus on other dynamics that can have an influence 
on these relational constructs thus effecting relationship development. These have been 
identified from the literature as relationship compatibility and complementarity. 
Compatibility is comprised of values, culture, work routines, product, process and 
personal relationships. Relationship compatibility can affect relational constructs such as 
trust, commitment, governance and information exchange. For instance, a relationship 
with high compatibility in values, culture, product and process can positively influence 
commitment and trust as well as improve information exchange between a buyer and 
supplier.  On one hand, a higher level of compatibility can lead to trust being established 
much earlier, helping progress a relationship through early life-cycle stages at a faster 
rate. The levels of compatibility between exchange partners can also affect the speed at 
which a relationship passes through Ring and Van de Ven’s. (1994) cyclical process of 
relationship development (e.g. the negotiate, commit and execute stages). For instance, 
high levels of compatibility can enable partners to negotiate, commit and execute on 
opportunities faster than a relationship suffering from multiple incompatibilities. 
Furthermore, when two parties engage in high levels of information sharing, they will 
have more information to understand compatibility that will influence the types and 
nature of work routines and personal relationships between a buyer and supplier. On the 
other hand, if a relationship is fraught with incompatibilities between the partners, the 
building of trust and commitment may take longer which in turn affects the speed of 
relationship development through life-cycle stages and could even see the relationship 
back tracking through stages.   
Another important dynamic is relationship complementarity – which encompasses 
technology, product, process, market knowledge, technical expertise and reputation. 
Relationship complementarity can increase the levels of trust or commitment in a 
relationship, for example, a partner with high levels of market knowledge, technical 
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expertise or technological capabilities can positively influence the amount of commitment 
and trust sought from their partner and therefore affect the speed of relationship 
development through life-cycle stages. This is also the case for Ring and Van de Ven’s. 
(1994) cyclical process where high levels of complementarity can speed up the negotiate, 
commit and execute phases of relationship development. However, when partners exhibit 
low levels of complementarity be it product, process, technology, expertise or reputation 
the building of trust or commitment as well as the willingness to exchange information 
becomes more challenging and may negatively influence the levels of commitment or 
information exchange in a relationship, causing the relationship to reverse or stall through 
life-cycle stages. In regards to Ring and Van de Ven’s. (1994) low levels of 
complementarity are likely to have a negative impact on the speed of a relationship 
passing through the cyclical stages of relationship development, such as negotiation, 
commitment and execution. 
Both of these relational dynamics have been integrated into the conceptual model as they 
help to explain the reasons why relationships may progress or fail to develop over time. 
The framework illustrates the key areas in relationship management highlighted from the 
literature review, i.e. relational constructs, complementarity and compatibility and their 
potential linkages/ influence on relationship stages, also considering the impact of 
uncertainty on relationship constructs and life-cycle stages. 
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Figure 2 Conceptual framework 
 
2.4. Relationship dynamics in life-cycle theory 
Whilst both the “DSO” and “RV” approaches have differences in their explanatory 
methods (“relational” v. “individual”) and structure (“one-time sequence” v. “repeated 
cycles”) both these standpoints refer to Macneil’s (1980) relational norms methodology 
and share similar predictions.1 Moreover, both theories study unfolding events in the 
development of a relationship rather than other theories that study the conditions at the 
time of finding (Arino and de la Torre, 1998). Knoppen and Christiaanse (2007) find that 
 
1 According to Macneil (1980), there exists a set of transactional as well as relational norms to understand 
an economic exchange between two partners. The former includes nine contractual norms, and the latter 
encompasses four relational norms, namely role integrity, solidarity, flexibility, and supra contractual 
norms. This set of 2 relational norms has been successfully used to explain the effectiveness of marketing 
relationships (e.g. Paulin, Perrien and Ferguson, 1997). 
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the relationship stage of the buyer–supplier interaction has an influence on inter-
organisational adaptation. however, they do not investigate the influence of relationship 
length or life-cycle in much detail. They conclude from their case studies that: ‘‘partners 
admitted that trust had grown over the years, by living through the good and bad times 
together” (ibid. p.217). The authors suggest that future research should adopt a 
longitudinal approach to studying relationship dynamics.  
Relationships can be dynamic as they are subject to change over time, specifically, 
relational constructs play an important part in a relationship’s performance and can 
change the life cycle of a relationship by speeding up, slowing down or reversing 
relationship development (Palmatier et al. 2013; Palmatier et al. 2007). This thesis 
examines compatibility and complementarity of relationships and their effects on buyer-
supplier relationship development, in particular, how they affect trust, commitment, 
information exchange and governance, changing the dynamics of a relationship. 
Both Dwyer et al. (1987) and Ring Van de Ven (1994) agree that relationships evolve 
through life-cycle stages at different speeds. For example, Dwyer et al. (op. cit.) state that 
the exploration stage may be very brief or include an extended period of testing and 
evaluation. Some firms move through relationship stages faster than others. Vanpoucke 
et al.’s (2014) study shows how some relationships take three years to “explore”, others 
stay for more than ten years in the exploration stage. Similarly, in the expansion stage 
some relationships need a little time to move on to the commitment stage, while other 
relationships need a lot of time. As such, all relationships move through the same stages, 
but at different growth rates with: “each relationship having its own development speed” 
(Vanpoucke et al. 2014). They find that relationship development follows a pattern of 
initiatives for logistics responsiveness followed by knowledge exchange initiatives and 
finally initiatives to increase the use of common resources. Consequently, it is necessary 
to understand triggers for moving from one relationship stage to the next and how this 
transition can be speeded up in order to reach a more committed long-term buyer-supplier 
relationship. 
A significant body of research has been published on supplier development. For example, 
in 2007, there were nine published papers on supplier development activities in operations 
and production related journals related journals (Araz and Ozkarahan, 2007; Carr and 
Kaynak, 2007; Chan and Kumar, 2007; Krause et al. 2007; Krause and Ellram, 1997; Lee 
and Humphreys, 2007; Li et al. 2007; Modi and Mabert, 2007; Rogers et al. 2007). 
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However, all of the above studies look at supplier development from a single point in 
time (snapshot) rather than taking a longitudinal approach or acknowledging the life-
cycle of the buyer–supplier relationship. While many of the studies focus on relational 
constructs such as trust, information sharing and commitment they do not consider the 
effects of these constructs on life-cycle relationship dynamics. Some studies look into the 
time contingent value of social capital, they include:  
i. Krause et al. (2007) who explore the relationship length between the buyer 
and supplier as a “measure” and suggest a simple positive linear 
relationship between relationship length and improvement. It is suggested 
(ibid. p.534) that path dependence is not captured in the evolution of social 
capital. They also point out with regard to relational capital that: “past 
transactions may alter the calculus for further transactions” as well as the 
“prior history of cooperation between firms”. These have an impact on 
buyer–supplier relationship outcomes. The authors do not factor in the 
path dependence of buyer–supplier relationships into their model. This 
could have been modelled by including a measure of relationship length 
or relationship life-cycle as a moderator between supplier relationship 
management and performance.  
 
ii. Kotabe et al.’s (2003) study explores two forms of knowledge exchange 
taking place between a buyer and supplier (that can be referred to as 
supplier development (Krause et al. 2000; Wagner and Bode, 2006)) and 
its effect on supplier performance (including relationship length as a 
moderator). The results of the study illustrate that relationship length does 
not moderate the link between “technical exchanges” and “performance 
improvements”; however, it does moderate the link between technology 
transfer and supplier performance improvements. This leads Kotabe et al. 
(2003) to argue that simple technical exchanges can enhance supplier 
performance, independent of the history of the relationship.  
 
iii. Wagner (2011) study explores the impact of the dynamic nature of buyer–
supplier relationships on the outcome of the supplier development 
activities. He proposes a model and then tests this on a cross-sectional 
sample using a quasi-longitudinal analysis. The aim is to illustrate how 
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different stages of the relationship life-cycle act to moderate supplier 
development activity as well as the buying firms’ performance. Wagner’s 
approach accounts for the life-cycle of the buyer–supplier relationship by 
including a squared term for “relationship length” as a moderator for the 
relationship between the buying firms’ supplier development activities 
and the improvement in the buying firms’ performance. Furthermore, they 
suggest that “the inclusion of a squared term for relationship length, as a 
moderator, is a much better reflection of the dynamic nature of buyer–
supplier relationships over the relationship life-cycle” (2011: 279). 
In the industrial marketing and purchasing literature much importance is placed on the 
dynamic nature of buyer–supplier relationships (Palmatier et al. 2013, Jap, 2001), where 
researchers have been encouraged to include the relationship life-cycle in their analysis. 
Various industrial marketing scholars have emphasized that many of the interactions 
between buyers and suppliers and their outcomes are contingent on the stage of the buyer–
supplier relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987; Frazier, 1983; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Medlin, 
2004; Wilson, 1995).  
Whilst there have been many different approaches to categorizing the different phases in 
the buyer–supplier relationship, in all relationship models the phases are characterized by 
the direction and strength of growth (e.g. initiation, maturity, and decline). The 
relationship life-cycle influences the development of relationship marketing constructs 
such as cooperation, information sharing, and trust (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Wilson, 
1995). Therefore, it can be intuitively proposed that supplier development would be more 
successful if the buyer–supplier relationship is at a stage where the levels of cooperation, 
information sharing, commitment and trust etc. are high (maturity) rather than low 
(initiation or decline).  
Wagner (2011) posits that supplier development has low impact at the early and late 
stages and high impact at the intermediate stages of the relationship life-cycle. This 
observation is also supported by Jap and Anderson (2007). They find that relationship 
factors such as information exchange or goal congruence are low in the exploration and 
decline stages of the relationship, whilst high in the build-up and maturity stages.  
Wagner’s (op. cit.) results show that the effectiveness of a buying firm’s supplier 
development activities is moderated by the relationship life-cycle. He mentions that: “… 
critical constituent and building blocks of supplier development are trust, communication 
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and information exchange, and relation-specific investments (time, resources, know-
how)”. He also mentions that establishing trust, strong communication, and information 
links, and building up relation-specific assets is time-bound (Fichman and Levinthal, 
1991; Jap and Anderson, 2007; Kogut and Zander, 1992).  Despite the view that relational 
constructs are not as important in the early stage of relationship develop, this study 
endeavours to consider the early stages in more detail. 
Wagner (op. cit.) points out that: “… prior to investing in supplier development activities, 
the buying firm should carefully assess the status of the buyer–supplier relationship, 
because the effectiveness of the supplier development depends on the life-cycle stage of 
the relationship”. Furthermore, he points out that the buying firm should not take part in 
direct supplier development activities (during the initial and decline stages of the 
relationship). He agrees with other studies that “direct” supplier development activities 
should be preceded with “indirect” supplier development activities (Krause et al. 2000; 
Wagner and Bode, 2006). 
When in the declining stage of relationship, direct supplier development activities should 
be replaced with indirect supplier development activities. Palmatier et al.’s (2013) study 
shows how trust, communication and investment capabilities influence commitment 
velocity by enabling the continual exploration (through communication) and exploitation 
(through investment) of opportunities. Palmatier et al. (op. cit: 14) also find that 
communication capabilities are: “most critical when industry turbulence is high”.  
Jap and Anderson (2007) hypothesize that relationship properties within the context of 
the partnership life-cycle would reach their highest level during the mature phase, and 
their lowest point in the decline phase. Firstly, the data shows that the mature phases tend 
not to coincide with the peak point in relationship development. The parties involved 
cooperate, work to the same schedule, and consider the future of the collaboration, but in 
spite of this, the mature phase of the relationship seldom features higher level relationship 
properties than the build-up; indeed, it often features slightly lower level relationship 
properties. 
This finding confirms the work of Cannon and Perreault (1999), who conclude that 
ongoing buyer-seller relationships do not necessarily have to be relationally close. They 
argue that the average buyer or seller is unlikely to choose the relationship type best suited 
to their circumstances. Rather, the parties involved improvise, and those who are 
successful find partially correct solutions at best. Extant research emphasizes the 
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importance of managing expectations, as unrealistic expectations formed without a 
mutual learning process can lead to unmet expectations, suspicion and damage to the 
partnership (Ariño and De la Torre, 1998). 
It has been suggested that relational properties can follow a different, unexpected pattern 
(Jap and Anderson, 2007). The properties upon which successful long-term relationships 
are based – complementary goals and high-level information sharing – tend to peak during 
the build-up phase, rather than during the maturity phase. After the establishment of 
congruent goals and an information exchange mechanism, it appears that routines take 
over. These elements can then gradually decline in a manner which is not detrimental to 
the mature relationship.  
Jap and Anderson (ibid.) conclude that goal congruence becomes differentially important 
as varying levels of ex post opportunism come into play. There is a lack of empirical 
differences between the maturity and build-up phases. This is in accordance with the 
findings of Rousseau et al. (1998) and Madhok and Tallman (1998). The latter suggest 
that organisations tend to underestimate the level of idiosyncratic investment required to 
produce an optimal relationship. In the event of an organisation’s eventual realization of 
the required level of idiosyncrasy, they tend to be reluctant to make the necessary 
investments, due to the difficulty of calculating their return on investments.  
Rousseau et al. (1998) suggest that the threshold between the build-up and maturity 
phases may be blurred, especially once the dyad has fostered a shared history and a 
relationship of trust and harmony. They break down the process for the formation of 
trusting relationships into three stages: building (forming/re-forming), stability and 
dissolution/decline.  
The formation of a relationship is another research area that informs how new supply 
chain partnerships are being created. The value generated from the formation of a 
partnership is boosted when partners bring different resources and capabilities to the 
relationship but share similar social characteristics. These social similarities are very 
important to relationship as they provide the base for the formation of relationship capital 
as well as socio-psychological and behavioural aspects of a relationship that help to build 
mutual trust and commitment, and encourage information exchange (Cullen et al. 2000; 
Heide and John, 1992).  
Jap and Anderson (2007) provide further insight into the processes of relationship 
solidification and dissolution. They identify the bonding process which takes place 
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throughout the life-cycle. It is shown that in the build-up phase, as a party’s idiosyncratic 
time and adaption investments are at their highest level, the consideration of alternatives 
(e.g. alternative suppliers) will be at its lowest point. In the decline phase on the other 
hand, we see these investments reach their lowest point, whilst the consideration of 
alternatives is at its peak.  
In sum, resellers tend not to actively seek many suppliers throughout the lifespan of a 
relationship, but rather they become active in this regard when the decline of a 
relationship presents the need to find new suppliers. This goes against the classical 
economics’ perfect information argument (i.e. agents are aware of their options), fitting 
instead with the concept of bounded rationality (i.e. agents remain imperfectly informed 
until need compels them to act). The decline phase is marked by a process of relational 
unravelling.  
Furthermore, Jap and Anderson (2007) find that the overwhelming majority of 
relationship properties are at a lower point in this stage than during any other. This 
pronounced difference may be caused by the many crucial differences that exist with the 
progression of the relationship (i.e. exploration, build-up, maturity, and decline). Two 
parties are needed to forge a relationship, but it only takes one party to bring it to a halt. 
Progression in a relationship entails the building of a shared history, whereas a 
relationship breakdown involves the management of that shared history’s effects. 
Building takes place against the backdrop of a shared context, and is collaborative, 
involved, and broadly transparent. 
Daugherty et al. (2006) find that firms involved in collaborative relationships achieve 
improved visibility, higher service levels, increased flexibility, greater end-customer 
satisfaction, and reduced cycle times. However, firms are struggling to achieve optimum 
levels of collaboration and benefits due to critical details such as selecting the right 
partner, matching inter-organisational needs and capabilities, and clearly defining 
standards and goals that are often overlooked (ibid.). Many studies suggest that 
collaborative relationships are associated with improved performance (Dwyer et al. 1987; 
Heide and John, 1990; Ganesan, 1994; Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Doney and 
Cannon, 1997; Monczka et al. 1998; Cannon and Perreault, 1999; Rokkan et al. 2003).  
A number of other benefits have been identified including: new product development; 
supplier co-design which can increase quality and knowledge; shorter time to market and 
more innovative solutions (Kamath and Liker, 1994;); inter-firm learning (Dyer and 
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Singh, 1998; Okada, 2004); learning networks (Chaston and Mangles, 2000); learning in 
alliances (Larsson et al. 1998); supply chain learning (Bessant et al. 2003) and supplier 
development (Dyer and Noebeoka, 2000; Rhodes and Carter, 2003; Sako, 2004). 
Partnerships provide opportunities for learning; for instance, March (1999) suggests 
exploitive and explorative learning: exploitive learning involves the development of 
existing knowledge including: “refinement, routinization, production and 
implementation” (i.e. improved quality, shorter lead-time, more efficient manufacturing). 
On the other hand, explorative learning includes innovation and new discoveries: “that 
involve variation, risk taking, experimentation” (dealing with more innovative processes 
and products). The balance between exploitive and explorative learning is not always the 
same in all relationships.  
Sobrero and Roberts (2002) explain how commodity supplier expectations focus on cost 
and differ from the expectations of a strategic supplier. Chaston and Mangles (2000) 
mention how the supplier manufacturing standard components and competing mainly on 
price need to be focused on assimilating existing knowledge (i.e. “exploitive learning”). 
However, Primo and Amundson (2002) have shown how supplier integration can also 
slow down the development (time) of projects; further, that recruiting new suppliers can 
foster innovation. It is argued that supplier involvement is more advantageous when 
designing more complex processes and products. 
Prevailing research has analysed the impact of socio-psychological and structural facets 
of partnerships to gain a better understanding of the performance of alliances (Aulakh et 
al. 1996). Interactive theorists pay attention to the: “pattern of interaction that facilitates 
and allows for the effective functioning of the alliance on a day-to-day basis” (Heide and 
Miner, 1992). “Structural features” provides an area of research which has analysed the 
ex-ante features of alliances, including the reasons why firms enter into alliances and the 
criteria used for partner selection (Hagedoom, 1993).  
Further research has shown that effective alliances are dependent on the selection of 
appropriate partners, where choosing partners that own necessary resources and who 
share similar economic and strategic goals is a critical determinant of alliance formation 
success (Sarkar et al., 2001). Supplementing the structural approach, there have been 
studies on the various socio-psychological factors that help build relationship capital 
(Cullen et al., 2000); further, relationship capital enables the alliance to develop potential 
value into actual collaborative economic rents (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). It is 
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important to consider the socio-psychological dimensions that highlight behavioural 
issues that are key to developing and maintaining relationships (Bradach and Eccles, 
1989; Johnson et al. 1996).  
Research has shown there is an association between the structural facets of partners, e.g. 
variety in resource profiles and social compatibility, and the socio-psychological factors, 
for instance, relationship capital, and have suggested there is a positive relationship 
between the two (Heide, 1994; Johntson et al. 2004) which affects the performance of an 
alliance both directly and indirectly.  
Parkhe’s (1991) explores the connection between interfirm diversity and alliance 
performance through the conceptualisation of interfirm diversity including: i. Type 1 
diversity (complementary resources and capability profiles) and, ii. type 2 diversity 
(social dimensions). Type 1 diversity includes differences between the alliance partners 
in terms of resources, capabilities and skills that generate value in an alliance. Type 2 
diversity relates to the social and cultural differences between the alliance partners, where 
differences between partners can have a negative effect on the quality of interaction 
between the alliance partners and hamper the combination and transformation of 
divergent pools of tacit knowledge into value for the alliance (Parkhe, 1991). 
Resource interdependence and social compatibility between alliance partners has been 
demonstrated to facilitate the achievement of joint goal and objectives (Parkhe, 1991; 
Aulakh et al. 1996). Research on strategic alliances has shown that they are able to 
provide each organisation with the opportunity to enhance organisational learning (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992).  
For all alliances, the first stages are most crucial as this requires the careful selection of 
potential alliance partners (Hitt et al. 2008). Firms that favour one alliance partner over 
another may do so due to the value that their combined resource sets can generate. 
Moreover, having access to complementary resources enables a firm to create novel 
innovations and sustain competitive advantage.  
It is of rare occurrence that firms have sufficient internal resources to maintain 
competitive advantage (Sirmon et al. 2011). Thus, it is important for firms to analyse 
potential partners based on the level of resource complementarity before entering an 
alliance. Furthermore, once an alliance has been formed, the relationship between 
partners must be sustained and managed in a way that allows for further value generation 
from resource pools.  
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When the competitive rivalry in a market is high, it is likely that firms face high levels of 
uncertainty. To deal with high levels of uncertainty, firms require continuous change and 
dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003). Often in markets of high 
competitive rivalry, firms need to maintain competitive advantage by introducing new 
capabilities and innovations rather than incremental improvements. If firms are not able 
to develop novel innovations internally, they may have to gain access to such 
complementary resources through strategic alliances (Harrison et al. 2001). Previous 
research that has reported on relationship dynamics and relationship life-cycle theory can 
be found in Appendix 1. 
2.5 Relationship characteristics 
2.5.1 Compatibility 
Compatibilities between businesses have been discussed extensively in the supply chain 
management literature. “Compatibility gives match quality through similarities—
capabilities can be combined to create value because they are similar or share a standard 
interface” (Mitsuhashi and Greeve, 2009: 977). Compatibilities in products, markets and 
technologies between two firms can be referred to as the level of business relatedness 
(Koh and Venkatramen, 1991). Studies have found that those alliance partners with 
similar skills sets and capabilities may be the subject of exploitation rather than 
exploration (Madhok, 1995).  
It has been found that compatibility in organisational cultures and capabilities between 
alliance partners influences the ability to realise the synergistic1 potential of an alliance 
(Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Moreover, compatibility in culture and capabilities may 
provide an initial idea of potential benefits for partners; however, the real value in the 
alliance is generated through a dynamic process of interaction and integration. During 
this process partners can assess the other’s resource in order to plan to move from market-
based exchanges toward a more collaborative relationship (Koza and Lewin, 1998). 
Similarities in values and objectives of partners have been found to lower coordination 
costs and provide expectation management and behavioural control (Chung and Kim 
2002). Where suppliers are seen to be helpful and friendly, unique and flexible by their 
 
1  In operations and supply chain management synergy means “cooperation," and also sunergos, meaning 
("working together") is the combined working together of two or more parts of a system so that the 
combined effect is greater than the sum of the efforts of the parts. In operations, the term describes a hoped-
for or real positive effect resulting from different individuals, departments, or companies working together 
and stimulating new ideas that result in greater productivity (Madhook and Tallman, 1998). 
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counterparts the more likely they are to have relational ties and emotional connections 
which increases the likelihood of a committed longer-term relationship (Clauss and 
Tangpong, 2018). Evans (1963) proposes a “similarity” hypothesis which posits that the 
degree of similarity in an alliance is positively associated with favourable relationship 
outcomes. When a partnership shares similar values and bonds, the relationship becomes 
more stable and results in greater levels of tolerance through a “social glue” (that helps) 
to tide over temporary periods of disequilibrium” (Madhok, 1995:121). When alliance 
partners do not share the same values, goals, and cultures, the alliance can fall into a 
vicious circle of mistrust and conflict. However, Holtgrave et al. (2019) found that if top 
managers have trust in their suppliers’ competence and goodwill, they are more likely to 
cooperate in the face of conflict. 
Incompatibility in a relationship can be down to the partners’ inability to develop a 
harmonious relationship, thereby hampering partners’ collaboration effectiveness (Sarkar 
et al. 1997). An example of the impact of incompatibilities is seen where culture clash 
has caused many mergers to fail as the partners are unable to work together seamlessly 
(Wilkof et al. 1995). Without sharing similar values, norms, and cultures, it is seen to be 
particularly problematic to try and mix the cultures to make an alliance succeed as 
incompatibilities between partners hamper their role socialisation and make it difficult 
for staff from each organisation to work together (Smith and Barclay, 1997). 
Sarkar et al. (2001) studied organisational compatibility across two dimensions, cultural 
compatibility and operational compatibility, and find that they both positively affect 
alliance performance. They (ibid.) state that the cultural compatibility refers to: “the 
congruence in organisational philosophies, goals and values”, whilst operational 
compatibility relates to the congruence in the partners’ procedural capabilities.  Their 
study explores compatibility using two measurements, namely, “cultural compatibility” 
and “operational compatibility”. Whilst cultural compatibility refers to the similarity in 
organisational philosophies, goals, and values, the area of operational compatibility refers 
to the similarity in the partners’ procedural capabilities. 
This doctoral study defines business compatibility as the similarities between partners 
that create value through combining their values, culture, and routines. Compatibility can 
help to reduce uncertainty. Uncertainty and market risk define the formation of any 
relationship (Hamel et al. 1989). To remove uncertainty when initiating a relationship, 
firms may focus on signals from their potential partners once they feel that their 
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relationship venture may work. Examples can be seen in the banking industry where 
partners with similar social status are sought (Podolny, 1994) or in the technology-driven 
industries where patents are seen as signals of the quality for a firm. 
2.5.2 Complementarity 
Firms form relationships with new partners when there is complementarity. 
Complementary resources are not identical, yet they simultaneously “complement” each 
other (Hitt et al., 2001). Complementary resources allow firms to combine acquired 
resources with their own resource sets, thereby creating a resource bundle that provides 
unique and difficult-to-imitate value (Harrison et al., 1991). Virtually inimitable value 
may be the most important criterion or condition for firms to satisfy in efforts to create 
competitive advantage (Barney, 2001). Additionally, actions to gain access to 
complementary resources allow firms to learn new and valuable capabilities (Hitt et al. 
2000; Hitt et al. 2001). Other studies have defined complementarity as the degree of 
similarity on certain organisational variables and the convergence of their economic 
motivations (Park and Ungson, 1997).  
Complementarities have also proven important in strategic relationships. In fact, 
developing partnerships with firms that have complementary resources is a primary 
means of creating value with this strategic action. Research shows that both partners seek 
relationships to gain access to complementary resources (Hitt et al. 2000; Inkpen, 2001). 
Normally, relationships are established because firms do not have all of the resources 
necessary to compete effectively in particular markets (or they do so because of the 
uncertainty and the desire to share the risks).  
Unfortunately, poor management contributes to the breakdown of relationships. Business 
relationships generally provide firms with access to their partner’s resources. As such, 
firms often search for partners with resources that they lack (Gulati et al. 2000). In support 
of this conclusion, Stuart et al. (2011) finds that a firm’s resource profile is an important 
component of the relationship formation process. For example, Stuart’s results show that 
younger and smaller firms without cutting-edge technologies form alliances with larger 
firms with leading technologies. Doh (2000) argues that firms without specialized 
resources search for alliance partners who have them.  
This complementarity of resources is a key factor for the development of any alliance, 
creating mutual interdependency, and “… it facilitates the formation, development, and 
collaborative effectiveness” of alliances (Parkhe, 1991: 580). The merging of two 
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companies through a strategic alliance offers opportunities for enhancing resource pools, 
when the capabilities of an organisation is not sufficient on its own to competitive 
successfully. Moreover, alliances provide more stability than acquisitions when a high 
level of uncertainty in the market exists due to alliances providing strategic flexibility and 
reduced trading risks (Wright et al. 2001).  
New interfirm relationships enable partners to access the other firm’s resources that they 
may otherwise lack (Gulati et al. 2000). It has been found that an organisation’s resources 
and capability profile are key factors in the new interfirm relationship formation process 
(Stuart, 2000), likewise Doh (2000) finds that organisations without specialised resources 
search for alliance partners who have them.   
Hitt et al.’s (2000) study of international interfirm partnerships finds that partners seeking 
alliance formation need to learn new capabilities. In relationships where partners do rely 
on each other in terms of their resource sets, this is less likely to result in opportunism. 
Furthermore, resource interdependence is likely to reduce the chances of opportunism in 
an alliance where both partners perceive that there is “value” in the relationship (Stump 
and Heide, 1996). Through developing resource interdependence, alliance partners are 
more likely to create relationship capital by engaging in faithful acts that increase their 
dependence to each other.  This signals their expectations for relationship continuity and 
also to committing resources to the relationship whilst maintaining an open dialogue and 
communication within the partnership. Interfirm relationships deliver opportunities for 
organisational learning where each partner can gain access to knowledge and new 
capabilities from their counterpart (Inkpen, 2001). However, the more dependent a 
supplier or buyer is on their partner, the more likely they are to experience coercive or 
non-coercive behaviour (Huo et al. 2019). 
Firms can form such strong ties among partners whereby tacit knowledge can be 
transferred though problem solving, mutual interdependence and observations in alliance 
activities, which are crucial to the development of competitive advantage (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998). These alliances offer prospective firms the chance to gain skills and 
capabilities that they would not have had if an alliance was not formed. This is often seen 
as strategic complementary. Complementary resources are a major factor for creating 
value in an alliance (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Park and Russo (1996); however, 
whilst not been able to prove that “integrative joint ventures” (using complementary 
resources) led to high joint venture failure rate, thus showing that differences in skill sets 
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facilitate learning between alliance partners. A successful partnership reinforces learning 
processes reduces the likelihood of knowledge fading rapidly and instead they effectively 
sustaining it (Powell, 1987). 
Extant research has shown that resource complementarity is vital to the success of an 
alliance (Johnston et al. 2004). Complementarity comprises uniqueness and symmetry; 
uniqueness is achieved through the mix of valuable resources and symmetry where the 
similar capabilities provide interdependence between the partners. According to the 
resource-based view the value of complementarity is dependent on the heterogeneity and 
imperfect mobility of resource and capabilities (Barney, 1991). There are both static and 
dynamic outlooks within the resource-based view (RBV) explaining how economic rents 
are generated and sustained (Lado et al. 1997).  
The static view can be illustrated by Barney’s (1991) argument that complementarity 
resources need to be rare, inimitable, valuable, and non-substitutional for competitive 
advantage, while the dynamic view explains that uncertain and constantly changing 
environments reduce the rent creating abilities of resources, thus emphasizing flow and 
the dynamic gathering of capabilities over static resource stocks (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989). Moreover, a firm’s complementarity resources and capabilities are not always 
enough to sustain competitive advantage; the resources required may be out of the direct 
control of the firm in which case an alliance would need to be established. Dyer and Singh 
(1998) argue that firms forming an alliance to gain access to complementary trans-
organisation strategic assets alliances will improve their capabilities through the flow of 
learning and stock of resources. 
The value of complementarity has been studied but not in the OSW sector. Harrison et al. 
(2001) assessed resource complementarity (and compatibility) by measuring the 
differences between firm levels of research and development intensity, capital intensity, 
administrative intensity, and debt intensity. Their study find that resource 
complementarity was positively associated with performance for all these four variables. 
Harrison et al. (1991) describe complementarity as the differences in skills between two 
firms. The main premise of these arguments is that each firm will have specific areas of 
strength that may compensate for the weaknesses of their potential partner (Harigan, 
1985; Lorange and Roos, 1992). Displaying and sharing complementarities, whether 
these be associated with market knowledge, experience or resources they tend to increase 
the chances of partners forming relationships, that will directly benefit from them.   
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There are challenges when operationalizing this definition since the resources and 
capabilities of firms typically have multiple dimensions (e.g. products, technology, and 
markets) and multiple levels of analysis. This study defines business complementarity as 
resources that give competitive advantage to the organisation holding superior resource 
built up through its various alliances (Barney, 1991). Such resources may include those 
that are tangible (e.g. products, technology, and processes), and intangible (e.g. market 
knowledge, technical expertise, and reputation).  
2.5.3 Relationship capital 
Partnerships forged between firms and suppliers who develop a good partnership quality 
tend to be many-featured and goal-oriented, with a high cultural compatibility existing 
between the parties involved. In a partnership based on a collaboration in which risk and 
reward are shared by both businesses, both partners stand to enjoy long-term strategic and 
operational benefits (Gaur et al. 2011; Lahiri and Kedia, 2011; Lahiri et al. 2012).  Studies 
have shown that the performance of an alliance is not only based on the direct effects of 
structural components such as resource complementary and alliance compatibilities, but 
also by the indirect impacts of specific characteristics that are seen as mediating 
behavioural variables (Aulakh et al. 1996). These studies have argued and found 
empirical support for the positive effect that relationship variables have on alliance 
outcomes and the connection between “partner characteristics” and “relationship capital” 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Stump and Heide, 1996).  
The social components represented in relational capital serve as coordinating mechanisms 
and determine the quality of a relationship. Furthermore, studies show that competitive 
advantage is only realised when relationships move from being a transaction-based 
exchange into a long-term relationship (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Sarkar et al. (2001) 
categorize relationship capital into three key elements, specifically mutual trust, mutual 
commitment and information exchange and these differentiate “relationship based” 
efforts from more “arms-length” approaches (Heide and John, 1992). Saleh et al. (2019) 
confirm that cultural similarity between buyers and suppliers facilitates communication 
and knowledge sharing that enhance commitment and build trust in the relationship. 
This research also feeds into the comprehension of the role played by interpersonal 
relations in the development of high-quality inter-organisational relationships. The 
management literature indicates a growing awareness of the need to consider factors at 
both individual and organisational levels (House et al. 1995). Certain academics argue 
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that interpersonal relationships forged across firm boundaries are critical to the 
development of inter-organisational cooperation and relationship development (Larson, 
1992). Others, meanwhile, would argue that organisational strategies and systems are 
formed by factors extraneous to the relationships between individuals (Williamson, 
1991).  
In accordance with RV, this investigation will explore how even a stable, well-crafted 
customer relationship can perform at a significantly higher level, when a trusted party 
represents the seller, irrespective of the state of the inter-organisational relationship. Due 
to the vital importance of effective, efficient collaboration with external parties in the 
functioning of supply chains (Bidault and Salgado, 2001), a great deal of SCP research 
has been focused on the examination of the nature and roles of key partnership 
components such as trust, commitment (Johnston et al. 2004), and mutual adaptation 
(Mukherji and Francis, 2008). One aspect of supply chain partnerships into which little 
research has been conducted – with a few notable exceptions (Fynes et al. 2004; Fynes et 
al. 2005) – is how the quality of the partnership, defined as the perceived realisation of 
anticipated outcomes resulting from interorganisational collaboration, can impact on 
performance. 
A high-quality buyer–supplier partnership with a firm basis in shared trust, collaborative 
problem solving and integrity in the fulfilment of clearly defined commitments, 
empowers its members to avoid the need to create complex, lengthy contracts. This is an 
expensive process which can yield difficult-to-monitor, unenforceable agreements (Fynes 
et al. 2004, 2005; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Firms that can call upon high-quality 
contracts with their suppliers are best placed to respond pragmatically to unexpected 
changes, to conceptualize and execute effective solutions to organisational problems, and 
to achieve reductions in monitoring costs; all of which can yield a positive economic 
impact (Ryu et al. 2007). A firm’s supply chain will generally comprise multiple parties 
(e.g. Harland et al. 2004; Hult et al. 2004), which would suggest a need for empirical 
research into the nature of partnerships between local firms and their suppliers, and the 
impact of these partnerships on performance (Cousins and Lawson, 2007; Stuart, 1997).  
It is argued by some scholars that the relationship between the various partnership 
dimensions of exchange partners and overall performance may be contingent on 
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extraneous variables1 (Carson et al. 2003; Fynes et al. 2005; Krishnan et al. 2006). For 
example, Carson et al. (2003) argue that the impact of trust levels on performance in 
vertical R and D collaborations improves in line with the client’s capacity to comprehend 
the tasks involved. In a similar vein, the findings of Lahiri, Kedia, and Mukherjee (2012) 
suggest that better buyer–supplier partnership quality can drive improvements in 
performance when the management quality of the local firm is at a high level. These 
studies collectively argue that the benefits to be gained from higher levels of partnership 
quality can increase or diminish, depending on certain conditions. Gaur et al. (2011) 
suggest that there is a need for identification and greater understanding of the boundary 
conditions of relational governance.  
Research suggests that partnership quality and to a lesser extent relational governance are 
critical factors in inter-firm collaboration (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lee, 2001; Lee and 
Kim, 1999). Awan (2019: 21) study states “relational governance has a key role in 
ensuring the continuation of relationship as a means to support suppliers, resulting in 
improvements in social performance and innovation performance.” Tight partnerships 
based on a foundation of mutual trust and commitment can facilitate reductions in 
transaction costs (Zaheer et al. 1998), and can positively influence performance 
outcomes. Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that a firm’s critical resources can span the firm’s 
boundaries, and can be held in inter-firm resources and processes.  
High partnership quality is a vital prerequisite to the continuity of any stable exchange 
relationship (Jap and Anderson, 2003). A close relationship between a buyer and a 
supplier which is firmly based on trust, cooperation and the mutual sharing of risks can 
deliver beneficial performance effects. Indeed, extant research shows how the quality of 
inter-organisational relationships can have important performance implications for the 
interested exchange partners (Gaur et al. 2011; Lee, 2001; Lee and Kim, 1999).  
Increased inter-organisational trust, for example, can positively influence firm 
performance (Gaur et al. 2011; Zaheer et al. 1998). Trusting relationships between 
exchange partners can obviate the need for traditional governance mechanisms, which 
can be expensive and difficult to implement. Improved partnership quality between a 
focal firm and its suppliers can potentially allow the by-passing of formal contracts, which 
can represent a major financial overhead and drain on human resources for businesses 
 
1 These are variables the influence the outcome of an investigation, though they are not the study 
variables that are actually of interest. 
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(Williamson, 1991; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). A close buyer–supplier relationship 
can also allow the buyer to focus more of their attention on core competencies, without 
the distraction of monitoring the partner firm for opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 
1985, 1991). 
Existing literature suggests that relationships involving a higher partnership quality tend 
to be associated with the mutual sharing of financial risk, trust, commitment, mutual 
pragmatism, reciprocity, and resilience (Lahiri and Kedia, 2012; Wu et al. 2006). In one 
recent study, Lahiri and Kedia (2011: 3) demonstrate how close partnerships of this kind 
between the focal firm and its suppliers can offer: “… customer satisfaction, enhanced 
perception of fairness and justice, customer loyalty, relationship satisfaction, repeat 
transactions and business continuity”. Firms engaging in purely transactional 
relationships with their suppliers may not enjoy the same benefits. Proponents of the 
relational capital approach to supplier management argue that close partnerships between 
a firm and their suppliers can be difficult to replicate due to the effects of partner-specific 
causal ambiguity (Dyer, 1996; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab, 2008). 
Hult et al. (2006) argue that four competitive priorities are crucial to the critical analysis 
of partnerships, namely: speed, quality, flexibility (Clauss and Tangpong, 2018) and cost. 
A high-level partnership quality between the focal firm and the supplier will allow good 
performance in each of these areas for both parties, providing a competitive advantage 
that would be difficult for a stand-alone partner to match (Cousins and Lawson, 2007). 
When a relationship is built upon trust and good communication enabling close 
cooperation to exist between a focal firm and its suppliers, each party can better 
understand the other’s goals and expectations. This ultimately improves the partnership. 
Improved supplier performance also serves to improve cycle time and customer order fill 
rate. If a good relationship exists between the two partners, both are likely to enjoy the 
performance-enhancing benefits of a familiarity with the other party’s knowledge-base.  
The lack of good partnership quality between a firm and its suppliers meanwhile, tends 
to lead to transactions being conducted at an arm’s-length basis. Transactional 
relationships of this kind generally fail to provide suppliers with the potential to exceed 
their regular capacities and offer a higher level of service to the focal firm. Collaborative 
measures to encourage on-time deliveries and a higher product quality from the supplier 
tend to facilitate long-term improvements in performance, and this could also confer 
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benefits onto the end-user, who may experience increased delivery performance and 
product quality. This results in increased customer satisfaction.   
Existing studies into the relationship of partnership quality with performance support this 
argument. For instance, Narasimhan and Jayaram (1998) suggest that the higher the 
quality of a buyer–supplier partnership, the better its operational performance will be. 
Krause, Handfield, and Scannell’s (1998) research into reactive and strategic supplier 
development, meanwhile, suggests that a strategic focus on supplier development can 
yield a number of operational benefits including reduced order cycle times, higher 
product, and service quality levels and improved delivery reliability. Furthermore, 
embedded relationships in which trust, the open sharing of detailed information and joint 
approaches to problem-solving can hold numerous advantages over purely transactional 
relationships, including increased adaptability, improved capacity for coordinated 
solutions to organisational problems, lower monitoring costs, and better economic results 
(Dyer, 1996; Dyer and Chu, 2003). 
2.5.4 Trust 
Interfirm trust has been argued to be a critical element of economic exchange (Ring, 1996) 
and necessary for the development of sustainable alliances (Johnston et al. 2004). Trust 
is considered a major factor in the success of inter-organisational relationship 
development and it is viewed as a central organising construct (McEvily et al. 2003; 
Michalski et al. 2019). A significant body of research suggests that trust builds slowly in 
inter-organisational relationships and that it develops out of experience; however, it is 
argued by some authors that trust can also be developed quickly and easily (Ghoshal and 
Moran, 1996) or it can be very high from the beginning of a relationship (McKnight et al. 
1998). High levels of trust within an alliance help parties to become more willing to take 
risks on the other’s behalf.  
In their study of the dark sides of inter-organisational relationships, Soda and Usai (1999) 
find that there are issues associated with close inter-organisational relationships; for 
example, opportunism can start to prevail between partners or they may refrain from 
healthy competitive practice. RV theory also find that if both partners of a relationship do 
not mutually benefit from it then there can be concerns over equity and this also can ruin 
the relationship. Mellewigt et al. (2019) suggest low opportunism cannot be achieved 
through relational governance mechanisms in isolation but through a combination of 
relational governance mechanisms and formal contracts that are coordinated and 
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monitored. Villena et al. (2019) found that the negative and positive effects of trust 
become more pronounced when environmental uncertainty surrounding buyers is low.  
Much extant literature has identified the many ways in which mutual trust has a positive 
impact on inter-organisational relationships. Mutual trust enables firms to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour (Bradach and Eccles, 1989) in an alliance as “behavioural 
repertoires are biased toward cooperation” (Hill, 1990: 511) which guides a shift of the 
partners towards longer-term collaboration efforts. Trust has been found to have 
implications for the governance of inter-organisational relationships; for example, 
hierarchical governance can be substituted by mutual trust (Dwyer et al. 1989).  
Trust can also aid bilateral governance through joint endeavours, shared beliefs and 
mutual concern (Heide, 1994). Mai Anh et al. (2018) suggest that when a supplier trusts 
the buyer information exchange, joint decision making and benefit/risk sharing can be 
increased, leading to radical innovations. It has been recognised to deliver cost reductions 
and has value enhancing properties (Madhok, 1995). Trust has also been found to have 
implications for market performance and the efficiency of organisations (Bleeke and 
Ernst, 1991); for example, mutual trust reduces monitoring costs and it allows alliance 
partners to pool their array of different resources and capabilities effectively (Dwyer and 
Singh, 1998). Higher levels of trust have been linked to more shared activities between 
the buyer and supplier, as compared to a more transactional relationship (Martins et al. 
2018). 
Trust is the fundamental building block of buyer–supplier relationships and is included 
in most relationship models. Dwyer et al. (1987) define trust as: “a party’s expectation 
that another party desires coordination will fulfil obligations and will pull its weight in 
the relationship”.  Corsten and Kumar (2005) posit that trust results in greater openness 
between suppliers and retailers and thus greater knowledge and appreciation of each 
other’s contribution to the relationship.  
Nyaga et al.’s (2010) study finds that trust has a significantly greater impact on 
commitment and satisfaction with the relationship for buyers than for suppliers. They also 
find that antecedents of trust such as information sharing are most important to suppliers, 
while the outcomes of trust (e.g. satisfaction and performance) are most important to 
buyers. However, Dwyer et al. (1987) and Jap and Anderson (2007) agree that relational 
characteristics such as trust and goal congruence develop in a similar way throughout the 
relationship and gradually evolve. Kaufmann et al. (2018) study preventing initial trust 
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loss and (prebreach) and promoting subsequent trust repair (post breach) through 
interorganisational and interpersonal relationships suggesting interorganisational trust 
repair helps turn a once adversarial relationship to a collaborative relationship. 
Furthermore, initial interpersonal ties can help avoid initial trust loss whilst adversarial 
interpersonal ties intensify the extent of interorganisational trust loss.  
On the other hand, Ring Van de Ven (1994) suggests that the differences in the speed of 
relational development originate from uncertainty and the reliance of trust amongst 
parties during the life-cycle of the relationship. Therefore, managers need to emphasize 
activities that build trust. While trust building actions may be more difficult for suppliers 
to demonstrate (McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000), there is need for both buyers and 
suppliers to continuously look for such opportunities. However, using trust as a variable 
does not always offer a predictable outcome; Anderson and Narus (1990: 54) comment: 
“… when asked about their perceptions of their firm’s trust in a working relationship, 
informants give a present state report; that is, they answer on how much their firm trusts 
the partner’s firm at the current point in time”. Thus, it is important to account for time 
when using trust as a variable in relationship research. For example, Morgan and Hunt 
(1994) study focuses specifically on two relational constructs: “trust” and “commitment”; 
however, they use only the customer’s perceived level of these constructs to capture the 
current state of an exchange.  
There are limitations of such a static perspective as Grayson and Ambler (1999: 139) 
note: “… that the length of the relationship changes, the nature of the associations 
between relational constructs,” and “the exact nature of these relational dynamics remains 
elusive”.  Dwyer et al. (1987) argue that trust removes the need to cover all contingencies 
in a formal contract for sustained commitment. For instance, informal communication in 
the form of trust is seen as a mechanism to hedge against incomplete contracts. They state 
that relational mechanisms should be present in an inter-organisational relationship to the 
extent that they reduce opportunism, which does not imply that formal and informal 
mechanisms should be in balance in a relationship as suggested by Ring and Van de Ven 
(1994). 
2.5.5 Previous ties/path dependence 
It is noted that history regulates the potential performance of inter-firm relationships by 
influencing how partners perceive relationship dynamics, structure the performance of 
the relationship and set time horizons (Grewel and Dharwadkar, 2002). Relationship 
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history is said to be a hard-won asset where firms that have had a troubled past are more 
likely to try and renew the relationship rather than start a new one, which corresponds 
with RV theory.  Previous ties and experience between partners can strongly influence 
the present performance of an alliance (Nelson, 1995).  
It is commonly found that firms tend to prefer to renew existing relationships rather than 
start new ones as there are potentially more risks in establishing the relationship. DSO 
theory takes a contrasting view that when firms have experienced a troubled relationship, 
they are much more likely to abandon rather than revive it; for example, “they move 
toward the commitment phase or dissolve it along the way” (Cannon and Perreault, 1999, 
p.456).  
DSO theory states that regression, i.e. when a relationship moves backwards one stage, is 
possible, when a relationship moves from “expansion” back to the “exploration” stage; 
however, when a relationship reverses from a committed stage to expansion there are 
likely to be psychological scars and conflict regarding the high costs involved in reviving 
the relationship.  Existing research considers the path dependence of relational 
development patterns across the relationship life-cycle phases (Jap and Anderson, 2007).  
To address this subject, it compares the progress paths through the life-cycle (as 
prescribed by DSO) with “aberrant” patterns (renewal, saving, and reconsideration), and 
consider how the paths which lead to a life-cycle stage could affect inter-organisational 
outcomes, exerting an influence extraneous to and simultaneously with the current 
relationship stage. Jap and Anderson (2007) find that relationships which follow DSO’s 
predicted progression through the life-cycle phases are positively related to performance. 
2.5.6 Governance 
During the formation of an alliance, the partners’ governance structures are especially 
important in order to provide the right incentives to ensure that the alliance can deliver 
ongoing innovative improvements (Zahra et al. 2009). During each stage of the 
relationship, “life-cycle” resource orchestration actions are vital to alliance success and 
must be emphasized in different ways depending on the stage of relationship 
development. Thus, in specific stages of relationship development, differing resource 
orchestration processes are required. For example, the resources available to a firm in the 
expansion stage can differ from the resources needed in the maturity/growth stage; this 
stresses the need for management understanding of how best to orchestrate resources 
depending on relationship stage to create value in the alliance.  
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Furthermore, while a manager may be responsible for a set of resources in the exploration 
stage, they may no longer have responsibility for these resources once the relationship 
moves to the expansion stage. The movement from one stage to another may also have 
an impact on the governance structures in place at each stage; new structures as well as 
incentives may need to be developed to maintain alliance performance. This is 
particularly important when considering how managers structure relationships with 
alliance partners; the dynamics involved between managers when a relationship is 
moving from one stage to the next can provide insights on how a firm’s operation and 
governance structures affect firm performance. 
Another area in which life-cycle literature can be improved is how life-cycle stages are 
linked with managerial depth. For example, research could provide insights into how 
governance structures change depending on what development stage the alliance is in; 
more specifically, what type of information flows are required and how communication 
between managerial levels may change as the firm progresses through its life-cycle. 
Sirmon et al. (2011) suggest: “… how managers address internal communications in each 
stage may dictate the richness of information that can be used to structure, bundle, and 
eventually leverage the firm’s resources to develop competitive advantages”. 
2.5.7 Commitment 
Commitment has been described as the “enduring desire to maintain a relationship” 
(Moorman et al., 1993: 316). Partners that are committed to a relationship take on a long-
term orientation where they ignore the opportunity to work with alternative partners or 
take up short term opportunities in favour of reinforcing the continuing relationship 
(Dwyer et al. 1987). When organisations signal to their partners the willingness to work 
together over the long term, it is more likely that partners will make relationship-specific 
investments, not only to enhance the level of commitment shown to their partner but also 
to increase the value and competitiveness generated in the alliance (Anderson and Weitz, 
1992). Commitment has been conceptualized by Sarkar et al. (2001) as “the degree to 
which both parties are willing to invest requisite resources into the alliance”. Furthermore, 
Anderson and Weitz (1992) define commitment as the: “desire to develop a stable 
relationship, a willingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain the relationship and 
the confidence in the stability of the relationship”.  
Morgan and Hunt (1994) define commitment as: “an exchange partner believing that an 
ongoing relationship is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it”. 
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Commitment results in mutual gain for both suppliers and buyers in a supply chain 
relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992), where performance improvements are often 
made possible when firms commit to long-term partnerships (Krause et al., 2007). 
Prahinski and Benton (2004) discover that commitment has a direct and positive impact 
on performance, whilst Jap and Ganesan (2000) find that retailers’ perceptions of their 
suppliers’ commitment influenced the retailers’ evaluation of supplier performance and 
their satisfaction.  
Nyaga et al.’s (2010) study finds that buyer commitment seems to be driven mainly by 
intangible attributes (e.g. trust) while supplier commitment seems to be driven more by 
tangible attributes (e.g. information sharing); however, suppliers in Nyaga et al.’s (2010) 
study explain how commitment does not necessarily lead to improved performance. Even 
if they have a trusting relationship with the buyer it boils down to “pay off”, where buyers 
may look for alternative suppliers if expectations about price, performance, or service are 
not met. Thus, while trust leads to greater commitment, the impact is greater for buyers 
than for suppliers. Clauss and Tangpong (2018) suggest buyer commitment is driven by 
four primary supplier attributes, namely, flexibility, helpfulness, uniqueness and 
helpfulness – these help suppliers build relational ties with their buyer and forge a more 
committed long-term relationship. 
Gundlach et al. (1995) acknowledge three types of commitment, which they explain are 
crucial in the development of any alliance relationship, denoted as instrumental, affective 
and temporal dimensions. Instrumental commitment is defined by Gundlach et al. (1995) 
as: “… affirmative actions taken by a party that creates a degree of self interest in the 
relationship”. Affective commitment is defined as: “… an affective attachment to the 
goals and values of an organisation, the role one plays in relation to those goals and 
values, and to the organisation for its own sake, which should be considered separately 
from the relationship’s instrumental worth”.  
Lastly, temporal commitment has been described by Moorman and Zaltman (1992) as the 
intention to maintain a valued relationship in the future, bearing in mind the durability 
and consistency over time as suggested by Dwyer et al. (1987). Research has shown that 
the efficient communication of information between alliance partners increases 
commitment; further, when dependence, trust and communication levels between 
partners is high, commitment is positively affected (Wu et al. 2004; Coote et al. 2003). 
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2.5.8 Information exchange 
Communication certainly has a crucial role to play in any inter-organisational 
relationship. Effective communication must be achieved in spite of numerous potential 
challenges, including cultural differences. Multiple-level communication between 
organisations may be required by certain partners. For instance, a group of engineers from 
one firm may be required to work with a group of engineers from a partner firm, over a 
significant period of time, and one group may have to travel to the other’s base in order 
to do so, necessitating successful communications throughout the process. Information 
exchange between two partners is vital to the success of an inter-firm relationship; 
communication helps partners to align their interests, goals and values (Mohr et al. 1996; 
Whitehead et al. 2019).  
The success of an inter-firm relationship is very dependent on the ways in which partners 
communicate information to one another; it is vital that information is shared between the 
partners in a timely manner, and that the information needs to be at a specific level of 
quality (Mohr and Nevin, 1990). Organisations are increasingly dependent on other 
external organisations knowledge and expertise in order to innovate and improve supply 
chain performance (Zacharia et al. 2019). The sharing of information in an alliance allows 
partners to realise the mutual benefits that may be available but also helps reduce any 
misunderstandings between the partners and removes uncertainty (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
Sarkar et al. (2001) have conceptualized reciprocal information exchange in relation to 
formal and informal communication of meaningful and timely information (Anderson 
and Narus, 1990), whilst Mohr and Spekman (1994) theorize about “collaborative 
communication” in relation to its quality, extent and participation. 
Information sharing has garnered greater research attention in recent years, but most 
studies have investigated the types of information shared and the gains from sharing 
(Croson and Donohue, 2006). Furthermore, these studies make the assumption that the 
institutions sharing information are willing to do so; however, a willingness to share 
information can be predetermined (where the data to be shared are specified in a contract, 
with templates used to describe the data format) or spontaneous (where the process is 
voluntary and non-predetermined). Nyaga et al.’s (2010) research finds that information 
sharing has a much greater influence on supplier commitment in comparison to buyer 
commitment. Suppliers are likely to be committed to relationships with buyers who share 
information since information sharing helps the supplier to provide products or services 
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more efficiently and effectively. A buyer sharing important information signals their 
commitment to the supplier, and encourages the supplier to commit to the relationship in 
return. This is consistent with Whipple et al.’s (2002) research that information sharing 
does impact buyers and suppliers differently. Information sharing in a supply chain can 
occur in two ways. It can occur internally, for the effective planning of purchases and 
company growth, leading to flexibility and coordination and a sense of ownership, and 
externally, sharing information with supply chain partners to enhance demand planning, 
physical flows, and financial work processes (Rai et al. 2006). It can also prevent 
information distortion, resulting in problems such as the “bullwhip effect”.  
In the supply chain context, a willingness to share information is a trade-off between 
efficiency and the responsiveness of the information resources. What information is 
shared often depends on the economics and technology, while the questions of with whom 
and when require that social involvement be taken into account. Communication between 
partners improves performance by uncovering points of similarity, aligning goals, 
resolving problems and providing opportunities for joint value creation, and increasing a 
customer’s revenues or reducing its costs (Mai Anh et al. 2018; Palmatier et al. 2013; Jap 
and Anderson, 2007; Mohr et al. 1996).  
In dynamic environments, accumulated knowledge and established information exchange 
processes allow partners to be responsive to changing conditions, such that suppliers can 
continue to create new value for customers and contribute to relationship growth. 
Otherwise, an inability to exchange knowledge and information causes the relationship 
to stagnate, problems to fester, and partners to miss opportunities (Ulaga and Eggert, 
2006). Joint communication capabilities also allow the customer to leverage the supplier’s 
know-how to improve existing and develop new products, whilst offering effective 
communication to produce results in timely and cost-efficient ways (Ulaga and Eggert, 
2006).  
Following this logic, Palmatier et al.’s (2013) study shows how bilateral communication 
capabilities positively affect commitment velocity because as conditions change (e.g. 
competitive actions), those exchanges that are better at sharing information are more 
adaptable, enabling them to identify new opportunities and better avoid conflict, which 
are critical to sustaining and growing a relationship. It has been argued that 
communication and the development of norms provide a dynamic basis for the emergence 
of trust, continued interaction, goal alignment and satisfaction (Dwyer et al. 1987). Min 
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et al. (2005) find that joint effort, such as planning, goal setting, performance 
measurement, and problem solving, is essential for successful collaborative relationships, 
and is closely related to information sharing. 
Communication has been found to be a direct corridor for commitment (Coote et al. 2003) 
where direct effects of relationship characteristics, such as communication quality, have 
been found to have a positive influence on commitment (de Ruyter et al. 2001). Coote et 
al. (op. cit.) also find that communication has a positive impact on trust and is also a very 
important factor to building successful relationship exchange. When coming up with 
solutions with respect to design issues, it is vital for buyers and suppliers to commit to 
greater information sharing and especially to be willing to share sensitive design 
information. Furthermore, when more functions of each of the buyer and supplier firms 
communicate effectively rather than the traditional sales/purchasing functions, the 
supplier’s quality performance is said to improve drastically (Carter and Miller, 1989).  
Information sharing can differ across partners. Whipple et al., (2002) explain how 
suppliers are more interested in timely information because suppliers rely on information 
from customers in order to start internal planning processes. On the other hand, buyers 
are more interested in accurate information because if a problem arises buyers need 
accurate information to adjust plans properly. It is vital to ensure effective communication 
between alliance partners as a study by Newman and Rhee (1990) finds that many 
supplier product problems are due to the lack of effective communication. This is 
reinforced by Lascelles and Dale’s (1990) study which finds that poor communication 
undermines the buyer’s efforts to achieve higher levels of supplier performance. 
2.5.9 Uncertainty 
In a risk-fraught environment, future events have outcomes of a set probability, i.e. the 
probability of an event occurring is measurable by a certain probability distribution 
(Milliken, 1987). The condition of uncertainty, unlike the condition of risk, refers to a 
difficulty or impossibility in predicting future events (Gaur et al. 2011; Milliken, 1987; 
Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). It is broadly agreed that risk and uncertainty are generally 
involved in supply chain relationships (Hult, Christopher, and Ketchen, 2010).   
Environmental uncertainty is another factor, alongside risk, which could influence an 
SCP’s partnership quality. “Environmental uncertainty” refers to the potential for a firm’s 
external environment – technology, consumer preference and competitor behaviours – to 
be characterized by unpredictability, unforeseen change and a lack of pattern (Fynes et 
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al. 2004). The possibility of unforeseen changes creates a need within firms for to capacity 
comprehension of and response to environmental changes. Changes within unpredictable 
environments can take place over a short time-scale, which means firms must be able to 
rapidly recalibrate their strategies and implement alternative rules of engagement. 
Environmental uncertainty comprises factors extraneous to the supply chain, whilst 
supply chain or supply-and-demand risks are inherent within the supply chain. 
Environmental uncertainty entails factors of a strategic nature, such as product or process 
technology modifications, changing consumer preferences and so on.  
Supply chain risks, meanwhile, are of a largely operational nature. Supply chain risks 
include demand and lead-time variability, supply time unreliability and order cancellation 
rate fluctuations. As a result of these attributes, it is generally possible to estimate supply 
chain risks through probability or likelihood estimation, whilst environmental uncertainty 
estimates are essentially impossible to calculate. Supply chain risks and environmental 
uncertainty can cumulatively cause severe disruptions at various points of the supply 
chain, significantly affecting a firm’s ongoing operational capacity, from the accurate 
fulfilment of customer orders to the successful delivery of crucial services to the end-
customer. The negative impact of supply chain risks and environmental uncertainty can 
also extend to the relationship between a focal firm and its supplier, and the potential of 
that relationship to provide benefits for the focal firm.  
The effectiveness of a strategy for collaboration is defined to some extent by the 
environmental dynamics which form the context for the exchange partnership (Fynes et 
al. 2004; Holweg et al. 2005; Krishnan et al. 2006). There are two established opposing 
viewpoints concerning the impact of environmental uncertainty on exchange 
relationships. One extreme argues that when faced with considerable uncertainty, firms 
will cooperate more closely to reduce the risks from an increase in uncertainty (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). The opposite school of thought, based on TCE, posits the view that, 
when faced with uncertainty, firms seek to maximize their flexibility by developing a 
greater independence from inter-firm relationships (Heide and Miner, 1992).  
Extant research suggests that perceived environmental uncertainty significantly 
influences organisational processes (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998; Williamson, 1985), 
whilst external, environmental unpredictability has been shown to cause significant 
information processing demand for companies (Tushman and Nadler, 1978). TCE-based 
reasoning indicates that uncertain circumstances can present an obstacle to the post-
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performance evaluation of the exchange partner, especially where transactions have 
deviated from the focal firm’s expectations (Fynes et al. 2004; Williamson, 1985). Before 
the event, in an environment in which uncertainty is prevalent, the parties involved in the 
exchange can find difficulty in forming long-term, trust-based relationships requiring 
mutual commitment and drafting, high levels of negotiation and the monitoring of 
complex contracts (Williamson, 2008). 
Whilst the literature concerning inter-organisational partnership has been almost 
unequivocal in heralding the positive effect that higher partnership quality will have on 
partnership performance (Lahiri and Kedia, 2011), the contingency perspective takes the 
perspective of the disruptive role of uncertainty on the nature of the relationship between 
partnership quality and performance. Furthermore, certain academics would argue that 
excessive closeness in a partnership can also produce negative effects on performance. 
(Krishnan et al. 2006; McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer, 2003).  
This research argues that increased levels of environmental uncertainty can constrict and 
disrupt the effectiveness of partnership quality as a relational resource, an asset which can 
improve organisational performance by promoting more effective sharing of knowledge, 
improved commitment between partners, greater cooperation and reductions in the 
transaction costs which are generally inherent in the implementation of monitoring 
mechanisms (Krishnan et al. 2006; Lado et al. 1997). It is proposed that conditions of 
heightened uncertainty can render these benefits unattainable. 
Uncertain conditions necessitate comprehensive and accurate monitoring of the external 
environment. High partnership quality can potentially involve excessive and often 
groundless reliance on external data collected by the exchange partners. Due to the 
limiting effect of uncertainty on a firm’s information processing capacity, imprecise or 
incomplete information can lead to poor decision-making under uncertain conditions. 
Krishnan et al. (2006: 898) note that certain exchange partners respond to uncertainty 
with inaction, “culminating in their alliance failing to respond to demands of its 
environment”.  
Inter-organisational dependence without a firm basis in diligent checks can also lead to 
strategic blindness, which restricts capacity for optimal scanning and analysis of the 
external environment (McEvily et al. 2003). In light of these factors, high levels of 
uncertainty can be shown to increase the risk of opportunistic partner behaviour and the 
consequent reduction of value in a transactional relationship’s shared resources (Gaur et 
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al. 2011). Failures to identify pertinent contingencies in an uncertain environment can 
cause difficulties in the coordination or relationships between a focal firm and its 
suppliers, which can produce a negative effect on the focal firm’s capacity to assess 
supplier performance (Williamson, 2008).  
Environmental uncertainty can cause disruption and distortions in communications and 
monitoring, and can severely influence the partnership quality-performance relationship 
as a whole. Stable environments meanwhile, can facilitate improvements in the sharing 
of information, evaluation of performance and the assessment of mutual objectives 
between firms – that is to say, lower levels of environmental uncertainty are conducive 
to better judgement of the external environment by exchange partners, which has a 
beneficial effect on partnership quality. This research proposes that the positive 
relationship between partnership quality and supply chain performance will be weaker in 
instances of higher environmental uncertainty. 
Jüttner, Peck, and Christopher (2003: 204) posit a definition of supply chain risks as a 
“… variation in the distribution of possible supply chain outcomes, their likelihood, and 
their subjective values”. Variations or disruptions of this kind have an effect on inter-
organisational flow of information, materials and products. Wagner and Bode (2006) 
categorize the sources of supply chain risk into five classes: 1. demand side; 2. supply 
side; 3. regulatory, legal and bureaucratic; 4. infrastructural; and 5. catastrophic. 
Considering the sources of these categories, they note that “… while the first two risk 
source categories deal with supply–demand coordination risks that are internal to the 
supply chain, the latter three focus on risk sources that are not necessarily internal to the 
chain” (Wagner and Bode, 2006: 310). This doctoral investigation will look at two 
specific categories of supply chain risk: regulatory and infrastructural; these are the key 
demand and supply risks considered to be internal to the supply chain. The research will 
examine the impact of these risks on partnership quality in an SCP relationship. 
2.6 Buyer and supplier perceptual differences 
Most researchers in the field of buyer–supplier relationships agree that perceptions from 
both buyers and suppliers should be studied to gain insights into their relationships. It 
should be noted that measures obtained from one firm in a buyer–supplier relationship do 
not provide a valid assessment of dyadic relationships. John and Reve (1982) find that 
buyers’ and suppliers’ perceptions are highly similar when focused on structural issues, 
in comparison to more subjective relational issues. Mismatched commitment can result 
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in dissatisfaction, conflict, opportunistic tendencies, and the ending of the relationship 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Gundlach et al. 1995). Furthermore, Whipple and Frankel 
(2000) find that trust is ranked as the most important factor in alliance success by buyers, 
while their dyadic supplier counterparts rank trust as the second most important factor for 
success after senior management support.  
Calabrese (2000: 61), whose study focuses on automakers, suggests that to improve their 
supplier base, they should not only focus on: “cost reduction or quality improvement, but 
they should also involve the suppliers as a whole, starting from the weakest aspects like 
product and process innovation processes”.  McIvor’s (2001: 241) study in the electronic 
industry reveal how there is close co-operation in product development; however, this is 
not in respect to price reductions and allocation of benefits between supplier and 
customer, as the main benefits “were obtained by the customer.”  
Most research literature is focused on the buyer perspective while there are relatively few 
studies made from the perspective of the supplier (Rota et al. 2002; Chung and Kim, 2002; 
Blomgren, 1997). The need to study the supplier perspective is due to suppliers often 
being involved in several dynamic supply chains where they supply to numerous 
customers in different settings. Furthermore, the majority of the literature is focused on 
organized networks (e.g. supplier associations) or large suppliers using extensive 
networks made up of many actors and tiers.  
Maffin and Braiden (2001) comment that the same frameworks and typologies are not 
able to be used to analyse small suppliers’ relationships and low volume production. A 
theme which receives significant attention in articles presenting the view of the supplier 
(as opposed to the buyer’s view), is the problems experienced by suppliers in a supply 
network context; and the lack of benefits conferred onto the supplier. Work on these 
issues includes Peckham et al.’s (2003) study into the contractor’s perspective on 
partnerships in the construction industry, and Johnsen and Ford (2005)’s study of a first-
tier supplier’s perspective on a customer’s supply network in an automotive industry 
context. My thesis will discuss further positive issues relating to supplier perspectives on 
working as part of a supply network. Of the relatively few articles addressing this area, 
there are none found that clearly seek to structure the research field, nor provide any 
attempt at a classification of relevant issues or perspectives. 
When analysing the relationship from the suppliers’ perspective, Stjernstrom and 
Bengtsson (2004) note that there are demands for price reduction, where high demands 
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put high pressure on the supplier to lower their costs. This reduces their ability to catch 
up with technological developments. Vagueness regarding customers’ expectations of the 
supplier can lead to a lack of trust. There could be unequal relations between parties, due 
to the different degrees of dependence, and this does not provide a beneficial basis for 
cooperation. Furthermore, there can be imposed restricted opportunities to collaborate 
with the customers’ competitors, in situations where the customer regulates in contracts 
with the supplier.  
This practice so far limits the possibilities for exchanging knowledge between 
competitors and reduces the customer base needed for cost reductions. A number of 
studies have investigated the field of buyer–supplier relationships in operations 
management (Bozarth et al. 1998; Carr and Pearson, 1999; Carter et al. 1996; Hartley et 
al. 1997; Krause, 1999; Shin et al. 2000; Tan et al. 2002). For instance, Terpend et al. 
(2008) reviewed 151 empirically based articles on buyer–supplier relationships over 20 
years. They find that only six studies had gathered empirical data on both buyer and 
supplier perspectives. Authors were typically quoting cost or time constraints as the 
reason for choosing either to focus on the buyer or the supplier (Mohr and Spekman, 
1994). Moreover, it has been acknowledged by many authors that there is a lack of dyadic 
responses in buyer–supplier relationship research (Monczka et al. 1998; O’Toole and 
Donaldson, 2002; Nidumolu, 1995; Stump and Sriram, 1997).  Finally, Forker et al. 
(1999) collected dyadic data and find that significant differences between the buyers and 
suppliers are common with respect to their views on relationship development.  
2.7 Summary: research gaps and questions 
 Relationship life-cycle perspectives explicitly show that relationship establishment is a 
“development process” and that relationships follow a path dependent trajectory (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994: 112), although in a distinct clear-cut sense. It is important to 
understand the underlying condition as to how and why relationships are formed, 
particularly under specific contexts such as high uncertainty in nascent industrial sectors 
and their impact on the relationship development process. Relationship “stages” are used 
by researchers as epistemological devices to describe differences over time in a 
continuous process; nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that a relationship changes 
straightaway at a fixed boundary when it transfers from one stage to the next. 
Whilst inter-organisational research has subsided recently, there has not been enough 
research focus on how relationships evolve over time (Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Jap 
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and Anderson, 2007), there is a lack of studies on the dynamics of business relationships 
(Eggert et al. 2006; Wilson, 1995). It is important to note that to date there has been no 
empirical study providing an integrated and comprehensive explanation as why and how 
business relationships evolve over time. Consequently, the following research question 
aims to fill this research gap: 
- RQ1: How and why are new inter-firm relationships built in nascent industries 
with highly uncertain business environments? 
In contrast,” relationship-age” perspectives use age as a continuous proxy for progress 
through developmental stages (Hibbard et al. 2001; Jap and Anderson, 2007; Lusch and 
Brown, 1996). The relationship age approach differs from the relationship life-cycle 
perspective as it assumes that all relationships move through the development cycle at the 
same rate (i.e. ignoring temporal heterogeneity). Thus, using age as an indicator for 
relationship development, this implies that all ten-year old relationships are at the same 
development stage, ignoring any differences in growth rates (Eggert, Ulaga, and Schulz, 
2006). Further, relationship can experience a revival or second growth where, for 
example, a new product is introduced (Ellram, 1991). 
A life-cycle view recognises that relationships move through stages at different rates 
where relationships trajectories are divided into discrete segments. All relationships 
within one stage embody the same developmental state until they move into the next 
homogenous state. Research on relational dynamics also addresses a key gap noted by 
Lewicki et al. (2006: 991), that little attention is paid towards “conceptualising and 
measuring relationship development over time”; instead, most research “has taken a static 
‘snapshot’ view” of relationships. This thesis studies the impact of relational dynamics 
on the acceleration or deceleration of a relationship. Due to a lack of research on new 
interfirm relationship formation, this thesis focuses on relationships in their early stages 
of development and seeks to identify specific relational triggers and barriers towards 
relationship development. As a result, the following research question will be answered: 
- RQ2: What are the major triggers and barriers in the early stages of relationship 
development?  
Buyer supplier relationships can develop through the building of trust and commitment 
due to specific resource offerings (complementarities) from one party or the other that 
improve performance. This thesis focuses on the types of complementary resources a 
supplier or buyer may offer to their partner as well as the types of resources that are valued 
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from both the supplier and buyer. Furthermore, how these resources can promote further 
investment in the relationship, speeding up the development process through its initial 
formation stages and helping the relationship develop into a longer-term alliance. In this 
sense, the following research question was formulated: 
- RQ3: How are complementary resources valued by buyers and suppliers such that 
they are willing to invest in new relationship formation? 
There is a lack of research on the effect of compatibility on new inter-firm relationship 
development. This thesis examines how compatibilities in culture, values, 
product/process innovations can increase the levels of trust, information exchange and 
commitment, speeding up relationship development. On the other hand, it is important to 
understand how relationships can stall due to incompatibilities, and how these 
incompatibilities can be overcome by one party or the other in order to build trust and 
commitment, moving a relationship beyond its initial stages of development. Therefore, 
it is important to answer the following research question:  
- RQ4: What are the major issues related to compatibility and how are 
incompatibilities overcome?  
This chapter reviewed the key relationship management and life-cycle theories and the 
associated categories, constructs and characteristics. This literature was critically 
interrogated to build a framework (figure 2) that is theoretically grounded in relationship 
evolution from the development of social capital and related resource-based constructs 
(Barney, 1991).  The evolution from transactional to relational exchange was clearly 
identified. To clarify, this chapter was structured to show the key theories discussing the 
formation, development and evolution of relationships in nascent and uncertain industrial 
market contexts. There are limitations with both theories (i.e. they tend to be over 
positive, emerging in stable environments, time and cost enablers are favourable to 
collaborative relational development) as well as less positive and darker sides to relational 
development that are not considered by the literature.  In spite of these limitations from a 
critical review of the literature a conceptual framework with associated categories was 
developed to guide the development of case studies. Case studies were theoretically 
informed and chosen to advance the framework and to provide a theoretical contribution 
to key relational drivers and constructs in the framework. It is anticipated theoretically 
that the work will contribute to relationship management and life-cycle theory in supply 
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chain contexts at the dyadic level. The next chapter will discuss the methodological 
approach guiding this doctoral research investigation. 
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3. RESEARCH APPROACH 
3.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the methodological approach guiding this doctoral research investigation 
is outlined. Furthermore, the methods of data collection are presented, along with the 
protocols enabling reliability, validity and data robustness. As well as justifying the 
research method and choice of cases, the details of participants interviewed are presented 
including what checks were implemented to ensure they were suitably informed to 
participate in the study. Finally, the limitations as well as practical restrictions to such an 
investigation are presented. The chapter begins by exploring the philosophical issues of 
building research in operations and supply chain management. Following a review of key 
literature, the purpose of this chapter is: 
1. To detail the research strategy adopted, including the population and sampling 
procedure, the data collection process, and the data analysis techniques used. 
2. To discuss the methodological challenges faced in each design method, and the 
steps taken to resolve them. 
3. To determine the degree of research quality by applying three tests: construct 
validity, external validity and reliability. 
4. To outline the measures taken to ensure an acceptable response in the face to face, 
longitudinal interviews conducted. 
3.2 Research Strategy  
There is a growing need for case studies in business and management research. In 
comparison with traditional forms of business research, it is important to recognise that 
case studies are concerned with exploration and explanation rather than prediction (Yin, 
1984).  
Yin states: 
Case study research is one but of several ways of doing social science 
research. Each strategy has peculiar advantages and disadvantages, 
depending upon three questions; 1) the type of research question; 2) the 
control an investigator has over actual behavioural events; and 3) the focus 
on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena.  (1984: 13) 
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3.3 Philosophical issues  
In making a case for a priori philosophical considerations in research designs Scott (2005: 
2) reasons that “to argue against the need to foreground philosophical concerns is to 
suggest that the issues of validity, reliability and truthfulness should not be central to the 
work of the researcher.” He shares this view with many other scholars who believe that 
philosophical issues underpin the methodological decisions that are made even if they are 
not explicitly acknowledged. Indeed, in the context of supply chain management, it has 
been argued by Solem (2003) that the philosophy of science adopted for studying plays a 
significant role on the research questions posed, the research strategy adopted and the 
methods and reasoning approaches used. 
3.3.1 Interpretivism vs. Positivism Juxtaposed  
The research methods literature apportions different strategies to executing research 
works. As suggested above, these approaches are normally underpinned by an assortment 
of philosophical thoughts. Scholars most persistently, for better or worse, distinguish 
between qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Qualitative approaches are 
generally allied to the interpretivist school of thought (Howe, 1988; Ponterotto, 2005). 
The distinguishing features that set different philosophical thoughts apart are related to 
how the world is viewed (ontology) and the manner by which this world can be 
understood (epistemology). An interpretivist ontology rests on the assumption that human 
beings do not passively react to an external reality but, rather, impose their internal 
perceptions and ideals on the external world and, in so doing, actively create their realities 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Suddaby, 2006). Reality in this case, in comparison to the 
empiricist (or realist) ontology, is not objective and exterior, but is socially constructed 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2008), culturally embedded and given meaning by people. 
Consequently, the interpretivists believe that knowledge is tied to the individual, largely 
tacit in nature, context specific, subjective and contestable.  
This epistemological position given, the qualitative research approach is tasked with 
appreciating the different constructions and meanings that people place upon their 
experience (ibid). The focus is on achieving an in-depth understanding of a situation 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2008), as Tucker et al. (1995: 384) put it a qualitative research 
focuses on the “context of discovery rather than the context of justification.” Qualitative 
research is associated with inductive reasoning; the researcher seeks to understand 
naturally occurring phenomena in their naturally occurring states (ibid). The objects of 
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description are unfolding social processes rather than the social structures that are often 
the focus of quantitative research (Van Maanen, 1979). Thus, in order to proceed with 
research into the social world which is informed by epistemological principles of this 
kind, Bryman (1984) argues, “research methods are necessary which facilitate an inside 
view.” Methods associated with the interpretivist paradigm include focus groups, 
unstructured interviews, textual analysis and ethnographic case studies (McEvoy and 
Richards, 2006). 
Quantitative approaches on the other hand are underpinned by the positivist philosophy. 
Contrary to interpretivist’s attachment with the social actor’s meaning making prowess, 
positivism stresses experience as the preeminent source of knowledge. It emphasises a 
reality which is independent and external of the mind. This belief relies on the existence 
of reliable knowledge about the world, knowledge that we, as humans, strive to gain 
(Jonassen, 1991). This ontological perspective leads to an epistemological assumption 
that knowledge is only significant if it is based on observations of this external reality 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). Emerging from this objectivist stance is a view of 
knowledge not as a construction of the social actors but rather as the truth. In essence, the 
positivists claim that knowledge can be proven to be true as long as this knowledge can 
be established by systematically observing and measuring quantifiable objects or 
phenomenon that affect objects (Indick, 2002). Consequently, knowledge can be 
understood as a context free entity that can be codified.  
Whereas qualitative research concerns mostly with theory building, the overall purpose 
of quantitative research is to explain, and to be able to predict the relationship between or 
the invariant succession of objects and events (Smith, 1983). Quantitative research is 
commonly associated with deductive thinking. The task of deduction is to test a theory 
by deducing one or more hypotheses from it (Blaikie, 2007). The investigator and 
investigated are independent entities therefore, the investigator is capable of studying a 
phenomenon without influencing it or being influenced by it (Sale et al. 2002). The 
quantitative researcher is preoccupied with developing law-like principles that can be 
generalised (Bell and Bryman, 2007) across different contexts. Surveys are seen as 
instruments for the elucidation of research which makes such positivist epistemological 
assumptions (Bryman, 1984), though structured interviews, randomised controlled trials, 
systematic reviews, statistical analysis of official data (McEvoy and Richards, 2006) and 
experimental designs (Lee, 1992) are also often recognised as exhibiting the same 
underlying philosophical premises. 
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3.3.2 Critical Realism and Case Study Approach 
Critical realism is rapidly emerging as a viable paradigmatic alternative for conducting 
social science research (Wynn Jr and Williams, 2012). As a school of thought, it is a fairly 
contemporary if not provocative philosophical position and owes much of its celebrated 
status to philosopher and thinker Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1978). It is a philosophy of 
science that is founded upon a priori or necessary truths about the nature of the world 
(McEvoy and Richards, 2006). The critical realists, in stark contrast to the positivists, 
believe that the social world exists as an open and structured system independent of our 
thoughts and impression. An open system is one where more than one “mechanism” will 
operate at any one time (Houston, 2001).  
The structured reality can be differentiated into three organically related domains: the 
real, the actual, and the empirical. The real refers to the “intransitive” dimensions of 
knowledge in which actual structures, causal powers (Downward and Mearman, 2006) 
and liabilities reside. The actual domain refers to what actually happens when these causal 
powers and liabilities are activated and produce change (Fairclough, 2005). Causes act 
“transfactually”, but because society is open, causes, though operating consistently, may 
not reveal themselves in empirical regularities because of countervailing influences 
(Downward and Mearman, 2007). Thus the empirical domain is the subset of the real and 
the actual domains that can be experienced and observed (Fairclough, 2005). This being 
the case, reality therefore cannot be fully apprehended and must be examined imperfectly 
and probabilistically (Coyle and Williams, 2000). Therefore as Blaikie (1991: 121) 
summarises, “this is an epistemology of laws as expressing tendencies of things.”  
Notwithstanding, the empirical level is akin to the access point of the transitive dimension 
(Downward and Mearman, 2007). Knowledge, then, can be viewed as a social product, 
actively produced by means of antecedent social products albeit on the basis of a continual 
engagement, or interaction, with its (intransitive) object (Patomäki and Wight, 2000). 
While critical realism shares with positivism the notion of a mind independent reality, it 
takes issues with positivistic methodologies on two grounds as highlighted in McEvoy 
and Richards (2006). In the first instance, it shows their exclusive focus on observable 
events while failing to take full account of the extent to which these observations are 
influenced by prior theory. Secondly, it shows the basis that they deal with relationships 
between the various elements of social systems as though they are ‘cut off’ from external 
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influences in a “closed system” and fail to take account of the interactions between 
mechanisms and the contexts in which they occur. 
Furthermore, while critical realism acknowledges the value of subjectivity of both 
researcher and researched (Downward and Finch, 2002) dominant in the interpretivist 
tradition, they are critical of interpretivists who fail to relate discourses to the underlying 
social structures (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). For critical realists, therefore, the 
ultimate goal of research is not to identify generalizable laws (positivism) or to identify 
the lived experience or beliefs of social actors (interpretivism); it is to develop deeper 
levels of explanation and understanding (ibid). Thus, adequate explanation requires “ontic 
depth”; that is, moving beyond the immediately postulated level of events and/or texts 
(Downward and Mearman, 2007). In other words, critical realism wants to get beneath 
the surface to understand and explain why things are as they are, to hypothesise the 
structures and mechanisms that shape observable events (Mingers, 2000; 2004).  
The logic that underpins critical realism is called “retroduction” (McEvoy and Richards, 
2006). Retroduction is not so much a formalised logic of inference as a thought operation 
that moves between knowledge of one thing to another (Danermark, 2002). It is a mode 
of analysis in which events are studied with respect to what may have, must have, or could 
have caused them (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). In critical realism the concept of cause 
is tied to emergence from the interaction of “human agency” and “structures” (Downward 
and Mearman, 2007). Thus retroduction of causes requires elaboration of the “innate 
psychological mechanisms” as well as wider “social mechanisms” that influence people’s 
action and behaviour (Houston, 2001).  However, although advocated as the 
methodological guidelines for theory creation, Lee (2002) believes that few critical 
realists have used retroduction for theory construction. This is because, he argues, 
“retroduction is too undeveloped to be used as a way to identify causal mechanisms and 
structures from which to construct theories or explanations” (ibid: 793). Furthermore, it 
does not indicate how the causal processes should be delineated and articulated, that is, 
the analytical and literary form the theory should take (Lee, 2002). While this may be the 
case on the one hand, on the other there is mounting recognition of the compatibility 
between critical realism case study research (Easton, 2010; Tsang, 2014).  Indeed, 
according to Easton (2010), abduction (Kovács and Spens, 2007), as espoused by critical 
realism, is a closely related process which has been suggested as appropriate for case 
research. 
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3.3.3 A Critical Realist-Inspired Case Study Approach 
Case research has consistently been one of the most powerful research methods in 
operations and supply chain management, particularly in the development of new theory 
(Voss et al. 2002). Case studies are a favoured strategy when “how” and “why” questions 
are required, when the researcher has little control over events, and when the research 
focuses on contemporary phenomena within real-life context. It is defined as a form of 
empirical enquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident,” 
and is “preferred in examining contemporary events…when the relevant behaviours 
cannot be manipulated” (Yin, 1994: 23). Therefore, it provides for a more natural, in-
context study of the interplay of multiple factors, such as those shaping the dynamics of 
buyer-supplier relationships; in a form of natural experiment, as opposed to a laboratory 
experiment. Scholars have recognised the utility of case research in illuminating complex 
social phenomena.  For example, Benbasat et al. (1987) argue that case research is 
particularly pertinent when a phenomenon is broad and complex, when a holistic, in-depth 
investigation is needed, and when a phenomenon cannot be studied outside the context in 
which it occurs. These descriptions chime well with the nature of the problems this thesis 
seeks to disentangle, particularly given the dearth of empirical studies that have taken a 
life-cycle approach to inter-firm relationships under uncertain contextual environment.   
Case research uses various philosophical lenses. Distinguishing between explanation and 
description as the predominant purpose of a study, Craib (1992) provides a useful way to 
rationalise the employment of critical realism as the underpinning philosophy for a case 
research. He argues for the importance of explanation in comparison to description noting 
the increasing emphasis on description; “this concentration on description rather than 
explanation has grown out of a general scepticism about the possibility of explanations” 
(Craib, 1992: 26). According to Dobson (2012), the requirement for explanation suggests 
that there is an underlying truth that is amenable to explanation and suggests a realist 
stance on the part of the researcher. A critical realist perspective used as a lens for case 
research would also challenge conventional thinking and assumptions and investigate any 
hidden agendas that may exist in a particular context (Gorski, 2013). Hidden agendas are 
more likely to be an issue under uncertain conditions.  
The study of buyer-supplier relationship from a critical realist perspective is rare. Ryan 
et al. (2012) argue critical realism can help to understand business relationships and 
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networks as developing processes. Based on critical realism, business relationships are 
regarded as real entities, such that their structures and properties can be observed and 
theorized, and their progresses can be studied. Adamides et al. (2012: 1) demonstrate how 
the critical realist approach to research methodology is able to contribute to supply chain 
research “by providing explanations for specific supply chain and logistics related 
phenomena.”  Whilst, Rotaru et al. (2014) use case study to illustrate the adoption of the 
theory of swift, even flow.  
In their paper, Aastrup and Halldorsson (2008) argue case studies in logistics can be 
justified from a critical realist perspective. Using critical realis, it is possible to deepen 
our understanding of the reality of logistics activities and performance by especially 
revealing how working of generative structures and mechanisms are linked to realities 
(e.g., actual events and experience) occurring in a logistics system. They argue especially 
in an inter-organisational setting (buyer-supplier the a more complex level of analysis is 
required such that a deterministic view on behaviour become handicapped while a critical 
realist perspective can help better understanding agenda and objectives of different social 
agents. Whilst, Adamides et al. (2012) study a perishable supply chain using the 
retroductive reasoning from the critical realist perspective, and demonstrated that the 
critical realist helps understand the dynamics of supply chain of perishable goods 
3.3.4 Linking the Research Questions with Critical Realism  
A critical realist inspired case study is appropriate for this thesis as it seeks to explain the 
dynamics of the buyer-supplier relationships under conditions of uncertainty. The first 
port of call in the aforementioned statement begins with an examination of the research 
questions. The relationship between research questions and methodology is well 
articulated in the literature. For instance, Yin (2013) links research questions to types of 
research designs. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) are more pragmatic suggesting that 
research methods should follow research questions in a way that offers the best chance to 
obtain useful answers. For the critical realists, the choice of methods should be dictated 
by the nature of the research problem (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). For instance, 
accentuating the critical realism position, Olsen and Morgan (2005) suggest that 
retroduction seeks to find out why events have happened in the way they did? Downward 
and Mearman (2007) for their part claim that retroduction is useful to address questions 
such as ‘Why X?’ with an implicit alternative ‘and not Y?’ Lawson (2006) on the other 
hand argues that more interesting questions are asked in social science of the explicit form 
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‘Why X rather than Y?’ Therefore, given the epistemological principles of critical realism 
(Wynn Jr and Williams, 2012; Ryan et al. 2012), Easton (2010: 123) argues that “the 
[research] question must be of the form ‘What caused the events associated with the 
phenomenon to occur?” In the main, causal research questions of the critical realist type 
seek “to explain how and why specific, complex events occur in a particular context” 
(Wynn Jr and Williams, 2012: 804). The main research questions are restated below: 
- RQ1: How and why are new inter-firm relationships built in nascent industries 
with highly uncertain business environments? 
- RQ2: What are the major triggers and barriers in the early stages of relationship 
development?  
- RQ3: How are complementary resources valued by buyers and suppliers such that 
they are willing to invest in new relationship formation? 
- RQ4: What are the major issues related to compatibility and how are 
incompatibilities overcome?  
An inspection of the research questions and the associated aims reveals that these reflect 
the logic of retroduction. The first question, when dissected, seeks to illuminate the 
mechanisms at play in building complex inter-firm relationships under the contextual 
condition of uncertainty. The other three questions are of the form “What caused the 
events associated with the phenomenon to occur?” as recommended by Easton (2010). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that critical realism offers a compatible paradigm to 
substantively address the nature of the questions posed in this research.  
3.3.5 The Emergent Nature of Buyer-Supplier Relationship 
A further justification for employing a critical realist case study in this thesis could be 
provided by unpacking the emergent nature of the buyer-supplier relationship. There is a 
need for specific research approaches to be applied, such as critical realism, in order to 
understand the complexity and dynamic changes of inter-firm relationships and their 
processes, as they develop over time (Ryan et al, 2012: 300). The authors state “Critical 
realism is well suited to addressing the central questions of structural change and 
transformation in industrial relationships and networks.”  
The unit of analysis in this thesis is taken to be the relationship which can also be viewed 
as emergent from the specificities of its parts in interaction with the context. This is to 
suggest that relationships are discriminated on the idiosyncrasies of the buyers and 
suppliers under the contextual conditions of a given transaction. As discussed above, the 
68 
 
notion of emergence is central to the critical realist philosophy. In addition to being 
independent of human activities, material entities exist by virtue of internal and necessary 
relations between constituents which generate their internal and external powers (Archer, 
2000). For instance, the power of water to quench a thirst is not a property of either of its 
constituents in isolation, hydrogen or oxygen, but emerges only as a property of the water 
molecule, H2O, as an irreducible whole (Allen et al. 2013).  
In a similar relational line of reasoning Archer (2000) argues that social structures such 
as roles and institutions have associated relations, rights and responsibilities and that 
certain social positions exists precisely because of their place in a network of relations, 
carrying with them necessary relations. Putting this reasoning in the context of this thesis, 
it can be argued that buyers and suppliers are social positions which are necessary and 
internally related. These positions allow the undertaking of transactions or alternatively 
assign a greater degree of bargaining power to one constituent and not the other. The 
rights and responsibilities of buyers and suppliers are variously shaped by norms, be it 
more formally in the shape of contractual agreements or through relational governance. 
However, because of bounded rationality and the increasingly uncertain environment in 
which transactions take place, there are greater opportunities for actors to behave 
opportunistically.  Thus, the dynamics of buyer-supplier relationship are complex 
phenomena that emerge from interactions between causal mechanisms and contexts that 
may or may not often reveal themselves in empirical tendencies. Therefore, addressing 
the research questions entails explaining these underlying mechanisms that influence 
behaviour in buyer-supplier relationships.   
In summary, the decision to adopt a critical realist-inspired case study approach was 
partly driven by the explanatory nature of the research, and due to the need for rich 
qualitative information to enable an in-depth understanding of the nature of the 
relationships between buyers and suppliers that would not otherwise be revealed in 
empirical tendencies by the use of purely quantitative methods. Thus, to achieve this, a 
case study methodology was adopted with a view of accessing detailed accounts of 
suppliers’ interactions with buyers and vice versa.  
3.4 Research quality 
3.4.1 Validity and Reliability of Critical Realist Case Research 
The validity and reliability of critical realism-inspired research are increased by 
triangulating results, using several methods and perspectives (Ellram, 1996). In social 
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science triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse 
viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic (Olsen and Ellram, 1997). Denzin (1970) 
offers a useful taxonomy distinguishing between: (a) data triangulation; (b) investigator 
triangulation; (c) theoretical triangulation and (d) methodological triangulation. However, 
it has been noted that a conflict of paradigms can occur when combining both quantitative 
and qualitative methods in one research project. Whilst a researcher can take a specific 
philosophical approach and use the methodology of another approach to reinforce the 
outcome, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) propose using data collection methods from one 
paradigm to avoid any issues.  
Critical realism is seen as an underlying philosophy that addresses paradigmatic paradox 
associated with triangulation. In the critical realist tradition the utility of triangulation is 
seen in the methodological type (Seale, 1999; McEvoy and Richards, 2003) or as 
Downward and Mearman (2007) prefers, mixed method triangulation (MMT). 
Methodological triangulation, as the name suggests, involves the combination of different 
methods of analysis (Downward and Mearman, 2008). Within-method triangulation 
occurs when different varieties of the same method are combined (Yeung, 1997).  
According to Risjord et al. (2002) methodological triangulation is premised on three 
rationales: completeness, abductive inspiration, and confirmation. Moreover, McEvoy 
and Richards (2006) believe that these are equally compatible with a critical realist 
rationale. Triangulation yields completeness because quantitative methods can further 
develop findings derived from qualitative research and vice versa (Risjord et al. 2002). 
Thus, it offers more complete understanding by bringing together the information gained 
from different perspectives and prompting interrogation of emergent contradictions 
(Olsen and Ellram, 1997). Given that both quantitative and qualitative methods can be 
employed to reveal different facets of the same reality and also to examine reality from 
different perspectives, McEvoy and Richards (2006) conclude that completeness is 
compatible with a critical realist perspective.  
Abductive inspiration is the use of one method to generate ideas that are tested by another 
(Risjord et al. 2002). It is very similar in meaning to the critical realist concept of 
retroduction (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). Further, Golicic and Davis (2012: 728) stated 
“critical realism reconciles the independent, objective nature of the physical world (i.e. 
realism) with the sensory experiences whereby we know about that world (i.e. critical)”. 
Indeed Olsen and Morgan (2005) agree that methodological pluralism involving a 
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combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is central to retroduction. It is 
purported to produce a more reliable and highly confirmed result than either method could 
yield alone (Risjord et al. 2002). Hence as Downward and Mearman (2007: 16) puts it, 
mixed method triangulation adds validity for it “enables a nexus of mutually supportive 
explained propositions in which the whole stands distinct from its parts.” 
The use of triangulation for the purpose of confirmation comes closest to the original use 
of the term, which describes a set of techniques that are used to locate a fixed position 
(ibid). This implies that different methods are combined to provide complementary 
insights into the same empirical phenomenon with the aim of enhancing the validity of 
representations (Modell, 2009). In realist terms this suggests that this approach can 
examine convergence on, and tentative confirmation of, a real tendency (Oliver, 2012). 
McEvoy and Richards (2006) find this approach appealing from a critical realist 
perspective as it is based on the assumption that there is a tangible social reality. It is 
triangulation for the purpose of confirmation which is employed in this thesis making use 
of qualitative interviews, documentary sources and some quantitative data.  
Furthermore, by studying participants in their work environment, this study aims for 
internal validity and relevance to the group participants involved. The study involved 
supply chain managers into the questionnaire design process to confirm face validity. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) describe face validity being achieved when the phenomena 
studied is valid for the research participants themselves. The results should be valid for 
all suppliers and buyers, while there is emphasis on specific sectors results valuable for 
all manufacturers forming new relationships in uncertain and nascent industries.  
Another common methodological issue in the research addresses the problem of 
generalisation (e.g. external validity), of findings beyond the present study. For example, 
if resource complementarity has sped up relationship development for one organisation, 
are the results equally valid in another organisation? By choosing a multiple case study 
design in this research, the aim was to generalise a particular set of results to other 
organisations, while at the same time maintaining some unique features of each 
organisation.  
3.5 Applied research methodology 
As mentioned by several researchers, the area of formation of new inter-firm relationships 
and the effect of compatibility and complementarity on relationship life-cycles is under-
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researched (Vanpoucke et al. 2014; Jap, 2001: Sarkar et al. 2001). The proposed research 
is therefore taking place at an explanatory stage of this research area.  
In order to deliver further understanding of how buyer–supplier compatibility and 
complementarity affect the relationship life-cycle, this research requires knowledge to be 
extracted from supply chain managers who are involved in relationship development with 
a new partner. It is therefore important to gain the participants’ perception of the processes 
and situation, as their decision making is based on that perception.  
3.5.1 Operationalising the Case Study Research 
For research in business and management topics, especially in the social sciences arena, 
there are several research methodologies that can be employed. An important factor to 
consider in the design of case study research is the number of cases the research should 
incorporate. A set of options for conducting case study research is listed in Table 1 below 
along with the advantages and disadvantages of each option. 
Option Advantages Disadvantages 
Single cases Greater depth. Limits on the generalisability of 
conclusions drawn. Biases such as 
misjudging the representativeness 
of a single event and exaggerating 
easily available data. 
Multiple Cases Augment external validity, 
help guard against observer 
bias. 
More resource needed, less depth 
per case. 
Retrospective 
cases 
Allow collection of data on 
historical events. 
May be difficult to determine cause 
and effect, participants may not 
recall important events. 
Longitudinal 
cases 
Overcome the problems of 
retrospective cases. 
Have long elapsed time and thus 
may be difficult to do. 
Table 3 - Types of cases (Voss et al. 2002: 203) 
Given the research objectives, a multiple case study method was selected as being most 
suitable for this research. A complex phenomenon such as relationship development 
could be better understood if the context of actions was also studied. Compared to single 
case studies that provide an in-depth understanding of a particular condition (Walsham, 
1995), the multiple case study method allows the analysis of phenomena in diverse 
settings, permitting cross-case analysis and increasing the generalisability of the findings 
(Yin, 2013). Furthermore, the research involved a longitudinal approach, which was 
retrospective, using archival and historical data but and was complemented by real-time 
data. 
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During case selection, this research needed to select cases which could provide detailed 
evidence on each of the framework’s categories and constructs. Therefore, they were 
purposively sampled. They were all newly formed relationships in the early stages of 
development with high uncertainty due to the nascence of the OSW sector. These sectors 
provide high variance in the antecedent triggers catalysing relationship development. 
Other factors guiding the sampling were the high-quality access to data, previous work 
experience in these sectors, former projects with these firms and a large number of strong 
network connections built up over time (prior to the doctoral investigation). This research 
used “theoretical sampling” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), recommending that cases may be 
chosen to “replicate previous cases or extend emergent theory”, or to “fill theoretical 
categories and provide examples of polar types” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). This is founded 
on “replication” reasoning for the use of multiple case studies rather than a single case 
(Bryman, 1988; Yin, 2013). 
3.5.2 Case Selection 
The three cases including 12 pairs of relationships in total are selected for the following 
reasons. Two cases involve several dyads in their early stages of development, while one 
case involves a triad in their early stages of development. Two of the cases are taken from 
a supplier perspective, whilst one studies the perspective from the buyer’s and supplier’s 
side. For most of the cases, one partner is an experienced player in the industry they 
operate in, while their counterpart is a new entrant in the market, in some cases, both 
partners are new to the OSW industry. This makes the research more interesting as it 
enables the researcher to compare the different approaches firms take to relationship 
development. The cases study the relationship dynamics involved in the formation of new 
buyer–supplier relationships, in particular, complementarity and compatibility, as this 
research area is not well researched. The relationship under study involves partners from 
different industries (steel/OSW) as well as geographic locations, enabling this research to 
study circumstances where compatibility and complementarity are rare.   
The three cases and their associated sets of relationships chosen for this research face 
highly competitive environments where there is a need for a broad range of suppliers and 
where firms are forced to press for quality improvements and make supply chain cost 
reductions. The literature illustrates ample precedent for the case methodology and 
verifies its applicability in business to business, buyer–supplier relationship, supply chain 
management, and logistics research (Bonoma, 1985; Ellram, 1996; Johnston et al. 2004; 
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Meredith, 1998; Perry, 1989). The study has followed a qualitative methodological 
approach that is guided by Ellram’s (2002) case study framework. The framework Ellram 
(2002) presents illustrates a positivistic approach to case study research; however, this 
research aims to draw similarities with the chosen methodology. To fulfil the 
requirements of multiple case study research highlighted by Ellram (2002), three 
multinational companies in two different industries were chosen. Two of the case studies 
involve the analysis of relationship development over time from the supplier’s 
perspective, while one case studies relationship development from both buyer and 
supplier perspectives. The number of cases studied is regarded to be a large sample for a 
qualitative study. This is justified by the number of interviews undertaken with numerous 
staff from multiple levels of the company hierarchy, responsible for different interactions 
and activities with their supply chain partners. 
To enhance the applicability and robustness of the findings and gain a deeper 
understanding of contingent factors, purposeful sampling of multiple cases covering a 
broad spectrum of industrial activity and diverse set of contexts are selected (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Further, the generalisability of my findings is justified by 
selecting cases from different industries and product categories, following Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) guidelines. An important selection criterion was the ability of the participant from 
the buyer or supplier firm to describe the relationship trajectory through their in-depth 
knowledge of the history of the relationship.  
Following Ellram (1996) when conducting case study research, multiple case studies 
should be in the number of six to ten cases. However, a qualitative approach involves an 
in-depth inquiry into each case; with this in mind, having a large sample size would 
present challenges of processing such large amounts of data. While it could be possible 
to provide data from a large sample size, it would mean losing depth and also trackability 
of the data that would weaken the analysis. Thus, a sufficient number of cases is required 
in order to compare data within each case and provide suitable conclusions; also, covering 
a number of different industries increases the validity of this study. Each interview was 
initially scheduled to last a duration of 60 minutes with an additional 30 minutes 
considered for the beginning and end of the interview including greetings and winding 
down of the meeting, as well as other practical considerations.  
Case selection started after the researcher attended global OSW conferences and national 
events promoting OSW development for the UK alongside joining several regional and 
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governmental bodies associated with UK OSW industrial development. The attendance 
at numerous networking events, both in the UK and Europe, enabled the researcher to 
establish a large network of experts across the OSW supply chain. Through these events 
the researcher was able to gain details of individuals and companies that were key players 
in the OSW sector, with the potential to provide good data, on industry, organisational 
and individual levels. The researcher had also applied and won internal university 
research funds for a short-term local development project with a sea port aiming to serve 
the OSW market and attract OSW manufacturers and associated supply chain, UK and 
international. Securing the short-term project with the port enabled the researcher to be 
introduced to various high-level executives in the OSW industry by attending both private 
and public events. Personal introductions afforded the researcher access to OSW 
companies as well as key governmental figures involved in the UK OSW industrial 
strategy and local councillors. Through these introductions the researcher had a testing 
bed for the pilot study, with access to a range of OSW experts to test and validate the pilot 
study. 
The research started with convenience sampling based upon the researcher’s networks 
and contacts made during conference attendances and working on the short term funded 
project. The key participants that were contacted had to fulfil certain requirements such 
as being directly involved in the development of the relationship with the partner firm. 
The participants job role was also a criterion for selection where, they would need to hold 
a position relating to supply chain, operations, logistics, product development or have 
regular contact with the partner company.  
This allowed the researcher to apply a snowball sampling technique to identify and gain 
access to companies by discussing potential case companies with a number of individuals 
involved at executive levels in the OSW sector whether company based or in government.  
The case companies were selected for the product sector they are operating in (OSW) as 
well as their significant size, worldwide and multinational presence. The companies 
selected along with their respective relationships also varied significantly in terms of 
number of employees and annual turnover. Thus, the methodology requirements of a wide 
research area were covered.  
When deciding on which companies to choose from the researcher cross-checked the 
company in terms of whether it spanned elements of the conceptual framework. For 
instance, the case companies selected had to offer certain complementarities in the 
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relationship they were looking to form, such as, thorough knowledge of the market or 
technical expertise on a specific product or process, having a strong reputation in OSW 
or being able to discuss in detail, the personal relationships that existed between the 
companies. The case companies and respondents were also selected based upon their 
knowledge of the governance structures within the company and the types of information 
exchanged between partner companies. 
Further variation between the cases included the length and age of the relationship as well 
as the stage of development.  Cases in their early stage of development were chosen where 
partners would typically be initiating and forming new relationships with strangers; 
however, cases involving relationships with prior ties were chosen to show variety, but 
also to examine how companies would reignite old relationships and start new initiatives 
together. The cases were also chosen for their variety in the products that were being 
exchanged between partners. For example, for the OSW cases, products would be new 
products in their prototype stage, whilst the steel industry would involve mature products, 
but would be introducing new services and product/process developments alongside their 
products. The case companies were selected as they met the required characteristics of 
the study.  
In each of the cases, the researcher contacted senior members of staff, usually managing 
directors and supply chain directors, through meeting them at conferences as well as 
introductions via existing contacts developed during the start of the study. After first 
contact, the researcher developed a personal relationship with the senior staff members 
that enabled the researcher to exert significant influence on the selection of participants. 
In each case access was negotiated with the senior staff members which enabled the 
identification of relevant staff that would be able to contribute to the research. Primarily, 
for each case, there would be several members of staff spanning multiple levels of the 
company hierarchy that would be suggested to the researcher, who would be involved in 
a specific relationship with a specific partner firm. 
The senior level members of the case companies were keen to grant access to the 
researcher, as they were interested in the issues of developing successful, long-term 
relationships with their prospective partners. They were also keen to understand how they 
could reignite existing relationships that had fallen into decline. The staff members 
wanted to take part in the research to discuss and identify the challenges faced when 
setting up joint initiatives with new supply chain partners, and further, to work with the 
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researcher to identify solutions as well as record major events in the development of their 
relationship with a specific partner. Access was negotiated with several staff in each 
organisation to be undertaken over a period of three years initially, but extendable if 
necessary. It was negotiated that access to the company was granted based on strict 
anonymity with non-disclosure agreements put in place, which facilitated open and frank 
dialogue with the participants. 
The study primarily focuses on suppliers and buyers based in the UK and their 
relationships with supply chain partners, both in the UK and overseas. Considering 
Ellram’s (2002) multiple case study framework, a total of three case companies were 
chosen; two of the cases involve relationship development from the supplier’s 
perspective, while the other case (triad) is from the buyer’s and supplier’s perspective. 
All three of the cases primarily operate in the OSW sector. In each case, the focal 
company’s relationship with multiple supply chain partners is studied. Most of the cases 
were chosen due to their involvement in the OSW sector, a sector which is not well 
investigated due to its nascence, and therefore presents opportunities to provide new 
insights in relationship development and advance supply chain research. Two of the cases 
involve suppliers in the OSW sector who primarily operate in the steel sector, a mature 
sector. These cases enable the researcher to provide insights into the steel sector and 
variability into how supply chain relationships develop in different sectors with differing 
levels of maturity.  
The research involves three longitudinal case studies (table 2 below) (12 pairs of supplier-
buyer relationships) of two OSW suppliers and one OSW buyer/supplier, and their 
relationships with new partners under a highly uncertain market and political context. 
One supplier/buyer (MOCO) manufactures gearbox applications that are supplied to 
OSW OEMs who manufacture wind turbines. MOCO is also studied as a buyer case 
where they have several relationships with suppliers of components for their gearboxes 
(figure 3). The second focal firm supplier is a major structural steel producer (TACO), its 
customers include OEMs and turbine tower manufacturers in OSW markets (figure 4). In 
each case, the unit of analysis is the buyer–supplier relationship and not the individual 
companies. The last focal firm supplier is a major UK-based reinforcement steel supplier 
(BRCO); its customers manufacture concrete gravity solutions for the UK OSW market 
(figure 5). Therefore, paired retrospective data from multiple managers of both the 
supplier and buyer sides of the relationship are collected to capture the relationship 
evolution over time (Pettigrew, 1990; Pentland, 1999).  
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 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Focal firm MOCO TACO BRCO 
Country UK UK UK 
Sector OSW OSW / Steel OSW / Steel 
No. of employees 1,000 (2017) 11,000 (2016) 1092 (2016) 
Revenue £500 million 
(2016) 
£2 billion 
(2014) 
£369 million 
(2013) 
Perspective Supplier/Buyer  Supplier Supplier 
Life-cycle stage Early stages Early stages Early stages 
No. of relationships 
studied 
5 3 4 
Political and market 
uncertainty 
High High High 
Table 4 Focal case companies 
 
 
Figure 3 Case 1 setting 
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Figure 4 Case 2 setting 
 
Figure 5 Case 3 setting 
3.5.3 Interview Guide Development 
This study uses a multiple case study approach where the process of data collection 
involved semi-structured interviews which were conducted in three participating 
companies located in the UK in the OSW sector. When collecting data via interviews, a 
lot of preparation and time was required to develop an interview guide that guided the 
researcher through the interview process in an effective manner. The following sections 
describe the development of the interview guide and its testing, through means of a pilot 
study to produce the final interview guide used for data collection in this study. 
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3.5.4 Quality of Semi-Structured Interview Data 
Whilst the methodology chapter of this study has described the quality of research, this 
chapter studies issues associated with the quality of the data collected. When conducting 
semi-structured interviews, it is important that credibility1 and dependability2 are 
reinforced by the researcher, confirming that the participant and the researcher both have 
a shared understanding of the terms and definitions used. Credibility can be warranted by 
the researcher checking for face validity on the spot, to determine any differences in 
meaning between the researcher and the participant.  
Apart from conducting the interview by probing and asking specific question set out in 
the interview guide, it is also important for the researcher to strengthen the dependability 
of the research by recording any environmental circumstances or background information 
on the participant to place responses or potential bias in context of the research. 
It is hard to reach full generalisability across an entire population when adopting the semi-
structured interview technique; however, Saunders et al. (2012) state that case studies 
undertaken with considerable rigour can often be used in more different contexts than 
studies that lack rigour in the research process. The rigour of the research is emphasised 
by identifying the logical connection between the methodological underpinning and semi-
structured interviews, as most appropriate to answer the research question.   
3.6 The Pilot Study 
In order to authenticate and develop the arguments raised in the literature review chapter 
and the overall objective of the research question, it is necessary to undertake a 
preliminary pilot study. The pilot study helps the researcher to gather feedback from the 
participants, and provides insights as to how the interview guide should be developed. By 
undertaking a pilot study, it is possible to eliminate errors and potential 
misunderstandings and enables the researcher to test the questions in the interview guide 
for logic, relevance and suitability (Robson, 2002). Saunders et al. (2012) argue that the 
 
1 The credibility criteria involve establishing that the results of qualitative research are credible or believable 
from the perspective of the participant in the research. Since from this perspective, the purpose of qualitative 
research is to describe or understand the phenomena of interest from the participant's eyes, the participants 
are the only ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the results (Saunders et al. 2012). 
 
2 To address the dependability issue more directly, the processes within the study should be reported in 
detail, thereby enabling a future researcher to repeat the work, if not necessarily to gain the same results. 
Thus, the research design may be viewed as a “prototype model”. Such in-depth coverage also allows the 
reader to assess the extent to which proper research practices have been followed (Yin, 2013). 
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conclusion of the pilot study analysis can provide initial findings that can enable the 
further development of these questions or the introduction of new questions.    
As this study is adopting a qualitative approach, it aims to identify common themes and 
establish whether the topic area chosen is worthy of a research investigation to contribute 
further to the specific research topic studied. When choosing the participants for the pilot 
study, it is important to conduct the pilot with at least two different participants that are 
representative of the group of participants who will be used for the main part of the study 
(Gillham, 2000). The participants interviewed should hold similar positions and have 
similar backgrounds and experience to the main research interview participants. Thus, for 
the pilot study used in this research, several known participants were chosen due to their 
experience working in OSW. In-depth interviewing offered the most potential of the 
different methods of data collection for developing relationships and developing the 
researcher’s skills for subsequent research.  
3.6.1 Pilot Study Cases 
Three face-to-face interviews were undertaken with suppliers in the OSW sector. The 
pilot study participants have a background in the respective industries at different 
hierarchical levels. The three OSW supplier/buyer interviews were undertaken at the 
workplaces of participants, all located in the North of the UK. One interview took place 
with the supply chain manager of a large multi-national steel producer that served a 
number of industries but had decided to enter the OSW industry. A product manager from 
a large UK reinforcement steel supplier was interviewed; the company had developed a 
new product with which to enter the OSW sector. Another interview was conducted with 
the key account manager from a multinational supplier of OSW gearboxes. 
3.6.2 Data collection and Analysis of the pilot interviews 
The analysis of the pilot interviews will consider each case individually and begin to 
detail the settings of each case and then to look for patterns and themes that relate to the 
research question. Once each case is analysed, it is then possible to analyse the cases 
together in order to identify common patterns and themes. Significant attention is required 
to signals in the interview process that will help to develop the interview guide. The 
analysis of each case aims to provide the researcher with an idea of response patterns on 
questions and whether the participants provide enough suitable data or struggle to on 
specific questions. The sample size used in this study is small and so the use of 
Cresswell’s (1987) scheme is not pursued intensively by means of data analysis. It is 
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limited to presenting the case context, describing and analysing the case, and more 
emphasis is put on the interview process itself.  
3.6.3 The UK OSW Sector Pilot Cases 
The first pilot interview was conducted with the 55-year-old product manager of a UK 
reinforcement steel supplier that is headquartered and has several factories across the UK. 
He had been in the company for over 10 years working in several roles and was now 
responsible for selling a new product specifically targeting the OSW sector, a sector that 
they had previous experience in. The interview took place in the manager’s office that he 
shared with the supply chain manager. The manager gave a tour around the steel 
production plant explaining the numerous processes involved in their new product. The 
preliminary interview lasted over an hour and involved the researcher asking mostly 
open-ended exploratory questions about the relationships the firm had with numerous 
customers.  
To assist in answering questions regarding the impact of organisational change, numerous 
propositions and hypotheses can be generated from the case study. Through the 
development of hypotheses or propositions, a basis for further enquiry can be formed that 
can assist in helping to develop concepts and build grounded theory (Glaser and Straus, 
1967; Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 15). Grounded theory is defined as the discovery of 
theory from data that is systematically obtained and analysed (Glaser and Straus, 1967). 
3.6.4 UK OSW Case Context 
Even though OSW energy is a renewable and secure source of energy (Pregger et al. 
2011; Svanberg and Halldórsson, 2013) the OSW sector is still a relatively immature 
industry (Higgins and Foley, 2014) requiring significant cost reduction. It is believed that 
collaboration across OSW supply chains could yield significant cost savings (gov.uk, 
2012) but there is a lack of study on how the OSW sector achieves supply chain 
innovation through formation of new inter-firm relationship (Arlbjørn and Paulraj, 2013; 
Svanberg and Halldórsson, 2013; Jensen et al. 2013).  
The OSW sector with typically high market risk and political uncertainty characterises a 
unique challenge facing the initiation of any inter-firm partnership (Hamel et al. 1989). 
The OSW Developers Forum (OWDF) published a vision in early 2012 for “... The UK 
to be the centre of OSW technology and deployment, with a competitive supply chain in 
the UK, providing over 50 per cent of the content of OSW farm projects” (Crown Estate, 
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2012). More recently, the industrial strategy aims to deliver levels of UK content in UK 
OSW farms which are similar to those achieved by the North Sea oil and gas industry, 
where more than 70% of capital expenditure is through UK-based suppliers. 
The OSW industrial strategy highlights that a threat to the UK OSW supply chain is the 
presence of well-established competition in other countries, as well as the threat of high 
competition for the location of top tier supply chain companies. European ports have 
already been gearing up to serve the OSW market and have begun to host clusters of 
supply chain companies, despite their domestic markets being much smaller compared to 
the UK market.  
The supply chain has indicated that developers and top tier manufacturers could give more 
effective signals about project scope and timescales, and that reliable demand signals are 
needed on an on-going basis. Without this, it is difficult for the supply chain to invest in 
new facilities or equipment as the capital cost of new plants is high. It is vital that there 
is greater visibility of the size and timing of market demand to allow the UK supply chain 
to plan and be ready to deliver and give confidence to overseas manufacturers to establish 
facilities in the UK. 
The UK’s Climate Change Act 2008 (2008 Act) is a landmark piece of legislation – the 
world’s first. That Act created a legally binding target for the UK to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by at least 34% by 2020, and at least 80% by 2050, taking 1990 as the base 
year. The UK has committed to legally binding EU targets to produce 15% of energy 
from renewable sources by 2020, which is equivalent to an eight-fold increase in 
renewable energy consumption from current levels. To achieve this, around 35GW of 
new renewable energy capacity is required by 2020 and OSW will be a primary driver for 
this.  
The UK is world leader in the exploitation of OSW; in June 2013, the UK had an installed 
wind capacity of over 3.3GW and a further 1.3GW under construction (RUK, 2013). 
During 2012, the UK installed 73 per cent of Europe’s additional offshore capacity 
(EWEA, 2013). The UK Government’s £100bn round three programme will require the 
construction of 7,000 wind turbines, an unparalleled opportunity to develop an industrial 
supply chain, with the aim of supporting economic growth and long-term employment.  
Under a strong growth scenario, the sector could deliver in the order of £7bn each year 
Gross Value Added (GVA) to the UK economy (excluding exports) and over 30,000 full 
time equivalent UK jobs by 2020, as well as £7–18bn in estimated net exports by 2030 
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(OSW Industrial strategy, 2013). However, there is much pressure on the UK government 
and industry to reduce the cost of energy. Consequently, the UK government has set the 
industry a target of reducing OSW costs to £100 per MWh by 2020 that assumes a 29 per 
cent decrease on the £140 per MWh cost of projects at the final investment decision stage 
in December 2011. 
Another significant challenge is that currently British workers produce only a third of the 
components in the supply chain, with many of the jobs generated by the new 
developments being overseas in Denmark and Germany, where the turbines are made. To 
realise the economic benefits of the OSW sector in terms of jobs and growth and to 
maintain political commitment, there is no doubt that UK content levels need to be 
increased.  
The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2013) states that the OSW sector 
presents three key opportunities for the UK. Firstly, that the manufacturing potential is 
significant and will create jobs in both construction and operational phases. Secondly, 
this process contributes to the regional rebalancing of the UK economy. Third, Britain 
has a natural advantage in developing this technology due to its shallow waters.  
The key informants are key account managers from the supplier firms personally involved 
in the relationship under study. Altogether, six informants were involved in unstructured 
interviews, (three for MOCO, two for TACO and one for BRCO).  
3.7 Data Collection Approach  
As the unit of analysis is the inter-organisational relationship between the buyer and the 
supplier, multiple managers on both the buyer and supplier side were required to take part 
in separate interviews. Participation involved taking part in unstructured and semi-
structured interviews where participants who had been in a company for a relatively long 
time were encouraged to talk about novel concepts. Information on relationship 
trajectories were collected in a retrospective and inductive way, enabling a focused data 
gathering process (Leonard-Barton, 1990). To avoid participant bias that can lead to 
confusion about cause and effect relationships (Leonard-Barton, 1995), the data was 
triangulated by using multiple data collection techniques, such as, multiple interviews and 
review of documents (Jick, 1979). According to Pettigrew (1990) and Pentland (1999), it 
was important to make an explicit distinction between the two different data collection 
steps in this research, starting with the evolution of surface levels to deeper levels of data 
collection and analysis. 
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Firstly, an unstructured interview with the key informant was conducted as well as the 
review of relevant documents (e.g. contracts, reports, presentations and publicly available 
data).  This would provide a graphical representation of the chronology of events that 
took part within each buyer–supplier relationship. Based on the definitions of Dwyer et 
al. (1987) and Ring and Van De Ven (1994) of relationship stages and the chronology of 
the events, it was possible to determine the beginning and end points of each stage of the 
relationship.  This was validated by presenting the relationship life-cycle to the managers 
interviewed. 
Secondly, semi-structured interviews were conducted with multiple managers involved 
in the relationship. The interviews were conducted face-to-face and were structured per 
the chronology of major events, where the available documents were re-examined to 
check whether the information given in the interviews were supported by the documents. 
A second round of interviews with the initial company contact took place in order to 
produce a more in-depth description of the evolution of the relationship. The researcher 
asked the manager to introduce me to any other colleagues that were involved in the 
relationship with the supplier. Finally, the researcher asked the buyer to introduce me to 
the supplier’s managing director or sales manager. This way, the researcher was able to 
interview several people involved with setting up and developing supplier development 
initiatives between the buyer and supplier, on both sides of the relationship.  
As suggested by several authors in the logistics and supply chain field, triangulation is 
applied throughout the study, combining both qualitative and quantitative research 
designs (Jick, 1979; Mentzer and Flint, 1997). Triangulation improves validity and rigour, 
and leads to a better understanding of the phenomena that are studied. Therefore, the 
research design of this study involves multiple case studies and documentary evidence 
alongside the collection and analysis of quantitative data. Thus, the survey instrument is 
constructed through case study protocols; they are then used again to interpret the findings 
of the quantitative analysis. 
Competent and proficient data collection for a multiple-case study involves careful 
organisation and planning due to the extensive time and resource commitments required. 
For most case research studies that are exploratory, the triangulation of data (i.e. multiple 
data collection methods) is required; depending on the research question and unit of 
analysis, specific data collection methods will be adopted. Triangulation of informants 
was also employed where different informants were asked the same questions. Multiple 
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data collection methods can include documents, observations, interviews, and archives, 
and can be qualitative or quantitative, or both. Furthermore, using multiple methods 
enables the merging of multiple sources of evidence that enriches the research findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and provides a more accurate picture of events (McCutcheon and 
Meredith, 1993). 
In order to gain access and collect data from participants, this study started by analysing 
documents and archival reports; they were then followed up by interviews that provided 
a more detailed data from each case. The reliability of information could be verified 
through a combination of methods. Further, a major strength of case study data collection 
is an opportunity to use many different sources of evidence (Romano, 1989). Yin notes: 
“The most important advantage is that any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely 
to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of 
information, following a corroboratory mode” (1989: 97). 
The use of documents in data collection enables: (1) verifying the correct spellings and 
titles or names of organisations that may have been mentioned in an interview, (2) 
verifying other specific details that can be supported with other sources; and (3) making 
inferences that might lead to further investigation (Yin, 2013: 87). Documents can take 
the form of newspapers, letters, agendas, minutes of meetings, articles, and company 
reports. For this research, the collection of various documents was undertaken before 
starting the interview process. These documents included company reports, press 
releases, company presentations, and news reports.  
Collecting longitudinal data on inter-organisational relationships can pose serious 
problems (Anderson, 1995). To do so, researchers are required to collect data over several 
periods about the same set of relationships with identical partners. This task is almost 
impossible to carry out which can explain why longitudinal research is still an exception 
when analysing dynamic interfirm relationships. Previous research has overcome this 
challenge by collecting data regarding business relationships at one point in time, then 
classify the relationships by their stage of development and use this data for quasi-
longitudinal analysis (Anderson, 1995). In this case, participants could classify their 
relationship stage themselves; however, the participants would need to be familiar with 
the concept of the relationship life-cycle (Jap and Ganesan, 2000: 234).  
It is widely acknowledged by scholars and managers that relationships between firms 
evolve over time and are dynamic in nature. Dwyer et al. (1987) argue that relationships 
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will function differently as they evolve over time (e.g. expand, mature, decline); as a 
result, change is typical (Jap and Anderson, 2007; Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Relationship 
life-cycle perspectives explicitly distinguish that relationship establishment is a 
“development process” and that relationships follow a path dependent trajectory (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994: 112), although in a distinct clear-cut sense. Relationship “stages” 
are used by researchers as epistemological devices to describe differences over time in a 
continuous process; nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that a relationship changes 
straightaway at a fixed boundary when it transfers from one stage to the next. 
In contrast, relationship–age perspectives use age as a continuous proxy for progress 
through developmental stages (Hibbard et al. 2001; Jap and Anderson, 2007; Lusch and 
Brown, 1996). The relationship–age approach differs from the relationship life-cycle 
perspective as it assumes that all relationships move through the development cycle at the 
same rate (i.e. ignoring temporal heterogeneity). Thus, using age as an indicator for 
relationship development implies that all ten-year old relationships are at the same 
development stage, ignoring any differences in growth rates (Eggert, Ulaga, and Schulz, 
2006).  
Further, relationships can experience a revival or second growth where for example, a 
new product is introduced (Ellram, 1991). A life-cycle view recognises that relationships 
move through stages at different rates where relationships trajectories are divided into 
discrete segments, and that all relationships within one stage embody the same 
developmental state until they move into the next homogenous state. Research on 
relational dynamics also addresses a key gap noted by Lewicki et al. (2006: 991), 
specifically, that little attention is paid towards “conceptualising and measuring 
relationship development over time”; instead, most research “has taken a static ‘snapshot’ 
view” of relationships. 
3.8 Data Analysis Approach 
The study focuses on buyers and suppliers operating in the UK. Following Ellram’s 
(2002) framework for multiple case studies, in total three focal companies involving 12 
pairs of relationships were chosen for the study. Data was collected by undertaking semi-
structured interviews with supply chain directors, supply chain managers, business 
development managers, and product managers. The objective was to cover all hierarchical 
levels in the focal organisations, to disseminate their different views on the role of 
compatibility and complementarity in relationship development. The researcher 
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constructed the interview guide using open-ended questions, specifically to derive long 
answers from the participants. Each interview conducted followed a certain structure that 
allowed comparison between the interviews and cases.  
3.8.1 Data Analysis Strategy 
From the review of OSW industry literature, an initial framework was developed to guide 
the analysis of strategic models and buyer–supplier conceptual development. Figure 6 
illustrates that a conceptual framework was developed from the resulting theoretical 
constructions and previous research, together with exploratory interviews undertaken 
with OSW industry researchers and academics. The emerging conceptual structure covers 
the main features (aspects, dimensions, factors, and variables) and which relationships 
are of importance to the data collection process. The conceptual structure enabled the 
researcher to frame research questions to determine the approach to data collection. 
Subsequently, conceptual categories were coded to aid the mix of data collection 
techniques used. The conceptual categories were decided in advance; thus, the process 
involved sifting through the data collected and assigning them into specific categories.  
The representation of data was mapped out in diagrammatical form, employing a 
systematic approach (Lowe, 1992) to the analysis of qualitative data, known as the 
“qualitative coding matrix” (QCM). The research process involved the development of 
reflective questions in order to apply the critical realism approach, known as the critical 
realist research spiral, made up of four research tasks, namely: Designing, Investigating, 
Analysing and Explaining (Ryan et al. 2012). 
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Figure 6 Case study data analysis strategy 
The process of analysis, synthesis, and interpretation of qualitative data was repeated for 
each case to find causal links or relationships. Explanations of categories were undertaken 
and then compared with the previous analyses until all primary research had been 
completed. Subsequently, by comparing the different cases, relevant categories and their 
associated properties emerged.  
3.8.2 Data Analysis Method 
Thematic analysis is a theoretically flexible approach: this is because the search for, and 
examination of, patterning across language does not require adherence to any particular 
theory of language, or explanatory meaning framework for human beings, experiences, 
or practices (Clarke and Braun, 2013). Thus, “through its theoretical freedom, thematic 
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analysis provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich 
and detailed, yet complex, account of data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 78).  
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data. It involves the search for and identification of common threads that extend 
throughout an entire interview or set of interviews (Morse and Field, 1995). A theme 
therefore captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, 
and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set. Themes 
or patterns within data are identified in one of two primary ways: in an inductive or 
“bottom up” way (Frith and Gleeson, 2004), or in a theoretical or deductive or “top down” 
way (Boyatzis, 1998).  
In an inductive thematic analysis approach, coding and analysing themes to determine 
outcomes is achieved without using a predetermined framework. In this sense, the data 
drive the interpretation rather than trying to match the data to the researcher’s analytic 
interest (Kirk, 2011). In contrast, a “theoretical” thematic analysis would tend to be driven 
by the researcher’s theoretical or analytic interest in the area, and is thus more explicitly 
analyst driven (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
In this thesis, the categories were fixed as a result of the literature review. Rather than 
emergent phenomena, the main value of the data analysis was to evidence the categories 
established a priori. Therefore, thematic analysis was used more as a confirmatory rather 
than exploratory tool; the initial coding scheme can be found in Appendix 2. 
Consequently, a theoretical analysis was deemed more appropriate. This research 
followed the generic six-phase approach of Clarke and Braun (2013) for the conduct of 
thematic analyses and these include: (1) Familiarisation with the data; (2) Coding; (3) 
Searching for themes; (4) Reviewing themes; (5) Defining and naming themes; (6) 
Writing up.  
3.8.3 Familiarisation 
Familiarisation of the data was an ongoing process. All interviews were recorded and 
points of substantive interest were noted down during the interviews. The interviews were 
transcribed immediately after they had been conducted; this ensured that the content of 
the responses was absorbed when the information was still fresh. Once all the interviews 
and transcription had taken place, all the materials were re-read; nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that the analysis was conducted as a gradual and incremental process as data was 
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collected. This approach ensured that the data was “intimately familiar” (Clarke and 
Braun, 2013). 
3.8.4 Coding and Theming 
In order to establish systematic rigour to coding process, the data analysis process adopted 
the QCM. The QCM is shown in figure 7 and provides the discrimination between data 
sources and various interpretations which could be made by the different parties (e.g. the 
researcher, perceived wisdom of the academic community, and the participants 
themselves) (Graham, 1998). The data sources used in this studied and mentioned above, 
are open to a range of different interpretations. Lowe (1991: 8) identifies three: 
1. Pre-understanding 
2. The participant’s view as the research unfolds 
3. A priori constructs.  
 
Figure 7 The Qualitative Coding Matrix (QCM) 
(adapted from Lowe (1991: 9) 
For each stage of the research process, the data sources and interpretations are coded with 
a unique symbol and alphanumeric code (refer to figure 8), which allows the reader to 
penetrate the researcher’s intuition and judgement as they move from analysis to synthesis 
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and finally interpretation (Graham, 1998). The process of discrimination between data 
sources and interpretation occurs at three levels of the research process: 
1. Analysis “open” coding 
2. Analysis/ synthesis “axial” coding 
3. Synthesis/ interpretation “selective” coding. 
(Lowe, 1991: 9) 
Coding was hand-guided by the research question and the theoretical framework 
established a priori. Drawing on the resources provided by grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967), data was coded in three separate phases. Firstly, to generate initial, low-
inference codes (i.e. open codes), key words from the participants’ transcripts were 
identified that chimed with the established categories. The three types of open codes are 
shown in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8 Explanation of open codes 
(adapted from Lowe (1991)) 
These categories were extracted from the literature and codes were organised to 
illuminate, on the one hand, the central features applicable during the different stages in 
the life-cycle of relationship formation (see appendix 2), from awareness to dissolution. 
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On the other hand, codes were assigned to factors that accentuate the basis of successful 
relationships (see appendix 3).  
Figure 9 illustrates the effects of the “open” codes when they are overlapped on the text. 
The extract is taken from an interview with the supply chain manager at the first case 
study company. The number inside the circle represents the sequential chronological 
order that the issue was raised in the interview.  
 
Figure 9 Participant remarks – coding illustration 
The beginnings of the next stage ‘axial’ coding starts to emerge. Data is categorised on 
the basis of the conceptual framework and research questions. Secondly, based on the 
same taxonomy, a high-inference coding process (i.e. axial coding) was adopted in which 
similar codes were grouped into broader categories. Within each primary code, sub-
categories were created by using codes from the original list and by breaking down 
complex codes into sub-categories (Ferguson and Islam, 2008). “Axial” codes were 
created by the researcher using their own verdict on the “open” codes that had similar 
characteristics.  
Finally, memos were used to elaborate on the categories and establish theoretical 
connections among codes (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). Interesting quotes from the 
participants were retained as appropriate. These were kept in tabular format against the 
categories they referred to, indexed by the participants from whom the quotes were taken. 
All participants were assigned a key and kept separately from the main findings, only key 
coded terms were used to link quotes with participants.  
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The ‘open’ coding was then combined with the initial starting lists of codes and shown in 
diagrammatical form in Figure 10. Within each category and sub-categories there are 
arrows identifying the beginnings of logical relationships between the open codes. The 
abbreviations relate to the participants interviewed (e.g. SCM is the supply chain 
manager, D is the director, TPE is the technical product expert and KAM is the key 
account manager). 
 
Figure 10 The footprint effect of open codes 
‘Axial’ codes are created by the researcher using his own judgement on those ‘open’ 
codes which have a logical relationship with one another. A single ‘axial’ code is often 
created from several open codes which have logically similar characteristics. Towards the 
end of the ‘axial’ coding phase the logical relationships of one ‘axial’ code with another 
is drawn in the form of a diagram. The final stage of the coding process is ‘selective’ 
coding. These codes are upgraded ‘axial’ codes which have been drawn together from 
different sources where triangulation can be established. Interviews are then triangulated 
with evidence taken from field notes of direct observation, company reports and 
document analysis. 
To assess what relationship stage partners were in, this research employed an instrument 
was based on Jap (2001) and Jap and Ganesan (2000). Managers involved in the 
interviews were presented with the statement, “Relationships typically evolve through a 
number of phases over time. Which of the following best describes your firm’s current 
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relationship with (named customer/supplier)?” Managers could then check which 
description best applied to their relationship. It was important that the instrument 
employed gave enough description of each stage for the participant to correctly identify 
and classify their existing relationship. Furthermore, the descriptions were developed so 
as not to reveal all the dynamics involved in each stage (see appendix 4). 
The participants were asked to classify which stage of the relationship their organisation 
was currently in. But also, if the relationship had already existed at the time of the 
interview, the participant was asked if they had been involved in the formation of this 
relationship and if so, how many years ago. They were then asked to classify their 
relationship over the period of time they had been involved in the relationship. This 
introduced the threat of retrospective bias, but is minimised when participants were asked 
to report on concrete facts or events, when questions were simple and non-detailed, or 
when the phenomenon did not occur in the distant past (Miller et al. 1997). Participants 
were only included in this research if they had personally managed the relationship in 
question. 
3.8.5 Retroduction 
Retroduction started with describing the cases and the main issues within these 
relationships concerning events, activities, exchanges and attitudes towards their new 
business partners across a timeline. This required interviews to be undertaken on the 
business’s premises with supply chain managers, key account managers and other key 
actors involved in the supply chain relationship. The purpose of the interviews was to 
investigate and record the relational constructs involved in the buyer-supplier relationship 
and gain insights on the types of compatibility and complementarity that were prevalent.  
On-site interviews and observations were used to capture a consistent description of the 
environment the company was operating in, (e.g. under high uncertainty), as well as the 
specific attitudes of staff towards the relationship in question. The participants activity 
related to supply chain and logistics was closely observed by the researcher for a period 
of three up to twenty-four months. After that, a systemic “binding” of the findings took 
place at the supply chain dyadic relationship level, this amalgamated the data obtained 
from interviews, other sources and in different forms for evaluation in order to develop a 
rich depiction of the context, situation and relationship. 
Once the writing up of the case description was complete, involving drawing a timeline 
of major events taking place in the relationship that would typically cover the relational, 
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compatibility and complementarity constructs. A deconstructive process was undertaken 
in order to extract and analyse differences between the organisations as well as analytical 
resolution of the issue were preceded by a stage of reflection to explain the behaviour 
observed in accordance with existing theories.  
The data was then analysed through extraction and analysis of the similarities and 
differences between the partaking companies. It was then possible to identify the causal 
mechanisms that explained the evolution of the relationships over time, using abduction 
and theoretical resolution. For the cases studied, when the relationships arrived or moved 
on from a particular relationship life-cycle stage a major event was recognised where the 
conditions, such as compatibility (e.g. values, culture, personal relationships) and 
complementarity (e.g. product, technology, market knowledge, technical expertise) were 
identified and related to social structures (e.g. trust, information sharing and governance), 
thus generative mechanisms were identified and theorised.  
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4. DATA ANALYSIS  
The data analysis for this research study is structured in two main sections: the within-
case analysis and the cross-case analysis.  
4.1 Within-Case Analysis 
The within case analysis studies 12 pairs of relationships in detail, analysing various 
relational constructs and the effect of compatibility and complementarity on relationship 
life-cycle stages.  
4.1.1 Case #1 
This case studies MOCO (focal company), major player in the offshore wind industry 
supplying gearboxes to its customer SACO, an offshore wind turbine OEM. It also studies 
MOCO’s relationships with four of its gearbox component suppliers VICO, COCO, 
SKCO and OTCO. 
The case is primarily informed by the following participants: 1-0-1 as MOCO’s UK 
director; 1-1-2: MOCO’s key account manager; 1-1-3: MOCO’s supply chain director 
and key account manager; 1-1-4: MOCO’s technical product manager. As well as 
industry experts including; 1-2-1: Director, UK OSW Industrial Strategy, UK Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills; 1-2-2: OSW UK Manufacturing Advisory Service 
consultant; 1-2-3: OSW consultant; 1-2-4: Director, Team Humber Marine Alliance; 1-
2-5: Deputy Head of Renewable Energy at Department for International Trade; 1-2-6: 
Market Intelligence Manager, Renewable UK; 1-2-7: Information Manager, Renewable 
UK; 1-2-8: SICO business development manager and 1-2-9: Director of Concrete gravity 
foundation supplier. Further details on the participants interviewed for this case can be 
found in the data collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
MOCO’s case is studied from both the supplier and buyer perspective. MOCO is a 
designer and manufacturer of gearboxes to both onshore and offshore wind sectors, 
installing 14,000 units worldwide with significant capabilities in the service side of 
gearboxes, involving repairs, spare parts, field service. MOCO is headquartered in 
Finland where it has two manufacturing units, with two assembly facilities in the UK and 
US; service workshops in Australia, Germany, Finland, UK, and Canada; three locations 
in the US; and sales teams/offices in Spain and Italy. MOCO employs over 500 employees 
globally. SACO is a company based in South Korea, a turbine OEM that was new to the 
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OSW sector. They have strong design and technical experience in numerous industries 
and are a well-known brand in electronics with over 270,000 employees worldwide.  
Interviews and access to MOCO were initiated with previous meetings and personal 
relationship development with the Director of UK Business Innovation and Skills 
offshore wind industrial strategy. The researcher met the director of UK Business 
Innovation and Skills (Participant 1-2-1) when attending a UK offshore wind conference 
in Manchester and then again at a global offshore wind conference in Glasgow. The UK 
Business Innovation and Skills director showed interest in the researcher’s study and 
suggested MOCO as an excellent case of UK-based manufacturing attracting overseas 
customers. Through several email exchanges and telephone conversations a meeting with 
MOCO’s director was scheduled.  The researcher’s first meeting with MOCO involved 
travelling to their facility in the North of England.  
To answer the research question of this thesis, it was necessary to contact employees that 
had significant experience dealing with customers and suppliers; in this case, the first 
point of contact was the director, who would grant the researcher access to the staff 
involved in the relationships with MOCO’s customers, in particular, the key account 
managers for MOCO’s current customer SACO. The first interview was arranged with 
the director of MOCO, referred to as participant 1-0-1; on the same day, the researcher 
also interviewed the key account manager, (referred to as participant 1-1-2) for MOCO’s 
current overseas customer, SACO.  Participant 1-1-2 played a high-level role in the newly 
acquired organization and was solely responsible for the relationship between MOCO and 
their sole customer SACO. It was vital to establish a personal connection with the 
participant to provide an atmosphere where questions based on relationships with supply 
chain partners could be answered honestly and openly. A recorder was used and a 
transcription produced. The interview involved asking the respondent for their personal 
views on numerous constructs such as trust, information sharing, communication, and 
more, as well as their perspectives on the development of the relationship between the 
two companies from inception until present time.  
Each preliminary interview lasted approximately one hour, in which the participant was 
asked to respond to various questions outlined in Appendix 5. Follow-up interviews were 
then conducted three and six months after the last, where the participants would provide 
answers to the same questions and feedback on any developments and major events that 
had taken place. These follow-up interviews would last between 30 minutes and one hour 
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in duration. The interviews were conducted from early 2013 until the end of 2014. It was 
clear during the interview that the participant had significant knowledge and experience 
with the ins and outs of relationships with major customers, in fact their sole customer. 
After the first participant interview, the second participant walked straight into the room 
and sat down. The second participant was the director of MOCO’s supply chain. Before 
the interview started the participant was reminded that the interview would be recorded 
and would be confidential subject to a non-disclosure agreement. The interview provoked 
many emotive suggestions from the participant and their personal relationship with many 
of their suppliers.  
In early 2009, a market analysis was undertaken by MOCO that identified that the rail 
and wind sectors were two markets that MOCO was not in and should be in. MOCO 
entered the wind market through learning about inspections and repairs and learning about 
the problems with competitors’ gearboxes, although at the time MOCO were not 
manufacturing gearboxes for wind turbines. MOCO’s experience was built on 
maintaining and servicing gearboxes that had been manufactured for onshore turbines. 
Later in 2009, MOCO acquired DACO’s OSW gearbox facility in the North of England. 
DACO was a well-established British manufacturer for gearbox applications in military, 
oil and gas, and other sectors. MOCO made the investment to acquire DACO’s OSW 
facility and engineering capabilities as a means of entering the UK OSW market. Not 
only was the facility close to the UK OSW market, but it also had a strong reputation for 
making reliable, high-quality gearbox applications. The acquisition gave MOCO the 
necessary resources and capabilities to design and manufacture new gearboxes suited to 
the OSW sector, whilst previously MOCO had only been involved in the service and 
maintenance of gearboxes. Through the acquisition MOCO intended to enter the market 
through product specialization, custom designing a gearbox application to suit the 
customer’s needs unlike the other suppliers in the OSW market; participant 1-0-1: 
“Competitors were offering products that already existed.” This led to the MOCO 
undertaking investment significant capital and resources to undertake train studies 
looking at different turbine layouts to offer an optimized solution to the customer. 
From the acquisition MOCO had two aspects to their business: there was the repair and 
service side for onshore and offshore, wind turbine gearboxes, and then there was the new 
build side involving new product development of offshore wind turbine gearboxes. This 
research focuses on MOCO’s new build side of the business. MOCO intended to enter 
the market through product specialization, through custom-designing a gearbox 
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application to suit the customer’s needs unlike the other suppliers in the OSW market. 
This led to MOCO undertaking significant investments in research on train studies and 
looking at different turbine layouts to offer an optimized solution to the customer. When 
considering the market that MOCO operated in, it was sparse: it consisted of European 
monopolies that had existing ties with the OSW turbine OEMs. MOCO had many 
advantages compared to other gearbox manufactures, especially in the UK OSW sector: 
firstly, they were in the UK, and secondly, they had acquired significant capabilities and 
experience in gearbox solutions, and some advantages in the OSW sector. Participant 1-
0-1: “In the UK, we are the only gearbox manufacturers with a facility of significant size 
in the UK in wind. We have one competitor, they are the only other gearbox 
manufacturers in the UK but they don’t operate in the renewable energy market, they do 
high speed power generator gearboxes for gas turbines (ex-Rolls Royce company).” 
MOCO operated a global key account management structure, which involved matching 
MOCO’s senior personnel with their customers’ senior personnel, and matching lower 
level personnel, for example, technical staff and designers with similar staff in their 
customers’ organization. Participant 1-0-1: “We match our senior guys with their senior 
guys, and we match staff across both organizations.” Participant 1-1-2 was responsible 
for key account management of MOCO’s relationship with SACO as this relationship 
was based in the UK, whilst MOCO used different KAMs for each country in Europe it 
operated in. MOCO had a key account manager based in Germany who would be 
responsible for MOCO’s relationships with their other customers, wind turbine OEMs. 
There was another key account manager based in Spain and one in Finland to work with 
the wind turbine OEMs in their respective markets.  
Before moving into the relationships between MOCO and SACO, it would be beneficial 
to first understand the ways MOCO entered the offshore wind markets, competition, 
customer base, and political situations surrounding renewable energy in the UK. While a 
gearbox can be used in many different onshore wind turbines, MOCO realized that 
gearboxes for offshore wind turbines are often highly customized, and so required a close 
and cooperative relationship between the turbine OEM and gearbox manufacturer, to 
come up with a suitable and workable solution. The OSW market is characterized by 
monopolies of suppliers and customers; for MOCO to be a player in the OSW industry 
they would have to work extremely hard in convincing potential customers that they could 
provide a reliable gearbox application. Participant 1-1-3: “I think we will see a lot more 
single sourcing in the offshore wind industry. You will see supply chains competing 
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against supply chains, as there isn’t enough business to take on multiple suppliers. They 
also tend to be different products, for instance, the gearboxes we make for onshore (3MW 
gearbox) may fit three or four different turbines, and a turbine manufactured by an OEM 
may take three or four different gearboxes…”  
MOCO highlighted that a major issue for them entering the OSW sector was the need for 
volume orders from a customer; the cost of designing a prototype and then manufacturing 
it was so high that MOCO needed to manufacture 150 units before being able to break 
even on their investment. However, the UK OSW sector at its peak could only provide 
demand of 100 turbines per year; with that being split, MOCO could supply 50 per year 
and still would not be able to break even. This emphasized the changes in the OSW sector 
leading to single supply chains competing against each other and a trend towards 
alliancing. The lack of stable UK renewable energy policy made it difficult for MOCO to 
enter the OSW sector. Participant 1-1-2: “The political situation has changed this year 
(2014). Now people understand the market due to governmental reforms. There is now 
the offshore wind industrial strategy in place with the draft strategy in place which has 
helped us.” Participant 1-2-1 is the director of this director of the UK OSW industrial 
strategy and provides insights on the development of the OSW sector throughout this 
case. Political factors specific to the UK had an impact on the way MOCO competed in 
the UK market compared to the other OSW sectors they were in across Europe. The UK 
had an “open market” policy where any company could compete for a contract as long as 
they met the bid criteria. Participant 1-1-3: “If you want to sell into the French market 
you have to manufacture in France; however, it is different in the UK.” 
The UK OSW sector faced high uncertainty; there was now a need to source from the 
UK. The UK government encouraged the use of local suppliers with the hope of 
increasing local content where OEMs would require their suppliers to provide a list of all 
their UK suppliers and what percentage of their turbine came from the UK. Participant 1-
1-2: “UK content is becoming a hot potato now; our prospective customers are requiring 
us to provide a list of all components we source from the UK … Consequently, we were 
selling the UK, showing them the UK should be their manufacturing location rather than 
another country.” Another challenge for MOCO, a new entrant to the OSW industry, was 
that the OSW industry required very high tolerances for gearboxes and cleanliness 
standards for gearbox applications. This posed a challenge for MOCO as it was vital that 
they had the right supply chain in place to be able to offer components that could meet 
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the strict requirements for the UK OSW sector. Participant 1-1-3: “It is very difficult to 
find the right suppliers.” 
In 2009, DACO made orders to several suppliers to supply components to be built into a 
gearbox for offshore wind turbines. However, due to market and political uncertainty, the 
decision was made to sell DACO to MOCO. Ownership changed from DACO to MOCO 
in September 2013. Immediately, the supply change collapsed; this was due to MOCO 
not having a supply chain professional in place, but also to the fact that all the staff 
involved with developing supplier relationships and all the people involved in the 
agreement of contracts with DACO’s gearbox component suppliers stayed at DACO.  
This meant that MOCO needed to start from scratch, developing supplier relationship 
with all the previous companies involved in the supply chain.  
DACO had previously agreed contracts with the above-mentioned suppliers that MOCO 
had to renegotiate and revitalize relationships with. MOCO decided it would employ one 
manager, Participant 1-1-3, to be responsible for their entire supply chain for the capital 
side of the business, responsible for new build projects, and in particular, the offshore 
wind turbine gearbox. There was also another supply chain manager who was responsible 
for the service side of MOCO’s business. Participant 1-1-3 got involved in the project in 
March 2013, and in September DACO transferred the business. The programme had been 
running since 2008/9, and it was already established. When Participant 1-1-3 took over 
as the supply chain manager involved in the ongoing orders for gearboxes components, 
the organization was made up of the purchasing manager, purchasing department, the 
supply chain was already established. When it was acquired by MOCO, he had to pick up 
that responsibility, and together, in October 2013, with staff from Finland, undertook 
research on the UK offshore wind supply chain and could not find a supplier in the UK 
which could provide a product to the right standard, quality, and size. Size was a big issue, 
as the gearbox MOCO were manufacturing was the biggest in the offshore wind market, 
which meant there were limited facilities that could handle manufacturing operations of 
that size.  
Participant 1-1-3 had the challenge of starting all previous supply chain relationships from 
scratch, and was new to the supply chain in offshore wind: “I have been researching the 
supply chain and found that it is very thin in the UK.” This was reflected in previous 
DACO sourcing decisions from countries such as the Czech Republic and Germany. In 
the UK, there were no companies that could provide MOCO with a product to the right 
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standard, quality, and size. Size was the big issue with their gearbox. At the time of this 
research MOCO’s gearbox was the largest available in the offshore wind market globally. 
As a result, there were limited facilities available to MOCO to handle that scale of 
manufacturing.  
The gearbox MOCO supplied to their customer was a gearbox made up of several major 
assemblies, three stages with a major stage in each, involving three main suppliers that 
were outlined in this case, namely: VICO – who would manufacture the raceways that 
housed the bearings in the gearbox; OTCO – who were in Germany and provided the 
annulus ring; SKCO – who would supply the bearings to MOCO; MOCO would then 
supply these bearings free of charge to VICO who would then provide MOCO with the 
completed assembly. Other suppliers providing other components and services that were 
studied in this case were ADCO, providing component machining services, and COCO, 
a foundry providing small component castings. In its entirety, MOCO’s gearbox was a 
very complex product: even the bearings were complex, compared to bearings used in 
other applications and industries. The gearbox was made up of bearings, an inner race, 
outer race, and rollers; specifically, in MOCO’s case, designing an offshore wind gearbox 
meant that the planet gears formed the outer race, an inner race set of rollers fitted inside 
the bore of the gear, which acted as the outer race. So, the form of the bore of the gear 
had to be perfect to roller bearing standards, which required very high technical 
specifications and quality standards.  
Due to the high quality and technical standards present in the offshore wind market, there 
were very few competitors in the market available to offer MOCO gearbox components, 
which had a major impact on MOCO’s ability to compete in the market. When asking 
Participant 1-1-2 about what impacted the ability of MOCO to compete in the offshore 
wind market, he explained that, in a normal purchasing environment, the factors 
impacting the competitiveness of MOCO was the ability to deliver on time, at a 
reasonable price, and at an acceptable quality. However, because the supply chain was so 
limited and small, MOCO were in a captive market where there was no opportunity for 
them to compete; Participant 1-1-2: “We are forced to accept the prices and deliveries 
they offer.” 
To begin reconnecting with suppliers, Participant 1-1-2, along with Participant 1-1-3 and 
Participant 1-1-4, undertook a tour of their European suppliers in the Czech Republic and 
Germany, visited company facilities, shook hands with them, and re-established contact 
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with them, explaining why they had not been in contact with them, and why they had not 
been ordering parts form them recently. This then led MOCO discuss new contractual 
agreements with each of the suppliers, as the contracts made previously were done so by 
the top echelons of DACO; thus, Participant 1-1-2 and 1-1-3 were not made aware of 
these agreements and so each agreement with the suppliers had to be explained, 
understood, and then negotiated. What was interesting about this case was that it showed 
how each of the suppliers approached the renegotiation of contracts very differently, and 
illustrated numerous challenges MOCO faced when forming new relationships with each 
supplier.  
4.1.1.1 Case #1.1 
This case examines the relationship between supplier MOCO (focal company) and buyer 
SACO. The case is primarily informed by the following participants: 1-0-1 as MOCO’s 
UK director; 1-1-2: MOCO’s key account manager; 1-1-3: MOCO’s supply chain 
director and key account manager; 1-1-4: MOCO’s technical product manager. As well 
as industry experts including; 1-2-1: Director, UK OSW Industrial Strategy, UK 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills; 1-2-2: OSW UK Manufacturing Advisory 
Service consultant; 1-2-3: OSW consultant. Further details on the participants 
interviewed for this case can be found in the data collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
To enter the OSW sector MOCO decided to enter a licence agreement with a 
manufacturer for a flex pin that enabled MOCO to keep their gearbox relatively small 
compared to the strain put on it from OSW turbines. MOCO’s gearbox is a very complex 
product that requires gearbox designs to be extremely accurate, due to the amount of 
torque running through them; for example, the gearbox manufactured in this case for 
SACO had the torque equivalent of 16,000 Jaguar car engines. Furthermore, MOCO had 
to improve their quality procedures when manufacturing and assembling the components 
that made up their gearbox. An investment was made in a washing machine for their 
facility where they could wash the gearbox parts at 80 degrees with special detergents. 1-
1-2: "We were surprised at the quality requirements; they were a lot more stringent than 
gearboxes used for other sectors (cement and coal mine gearboxes)."  The consensus from 
interviews involving MOCO personnel illustrated the OSW sector as a market with 
monopolies and strategic partnerships with supply chains competing against each other. 
In addition, the customer base for MOCO had been changing rapidly. Participant 1-1-2: 
“There has been a lot of rationalisation of our customers; OEMs such as Vestas and 
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Mitsubishi have joined forces, so have Areva and Gamesa, and others like Clipper have 
stopped operating.” In contrast, the gearbox manufacturers market had not changed much, 
and MOCO had three main competitors, namely, Hanson, - who provided industrial 
gearboxes, as well as Bosch, and Winergy (owned by SICO, an OEM). 
The offshore wind industry was volatile and uncertain, Participant 1-1-3: “We have seen 
that the wind industry has been through boom and bust and is now starting to come back 
again … There was a time when people couldn’t offer a product quick enough. Now, 
because the build out rate is pretty low, SICO and Vestas are able to supply the market 
with their existing Danish factories, so that gives no reason for investment in the UK to 
occur.” MOCO faced other challenges in the UK market; for instance, OEMs such as 
Areva and SICO had existing well-developed supply chain partnerships already in place. 
The OEMs had beaten MOCO’s customer SACO to purchasing a large port location on 
the Humber estuary to set up their manufacturing facilities. If SACO had been successful, 
there would have been a much greater chance for MOCO to secure an order. Despite 
many of the challenges MOCO faced in the UK market, they had several advantages over 
their competitors. Participant 1-1-2: “In the UK, we are the only gearbox manufacturers 
with a facility of significant size in the UK in wind. The only other gearbox manufacturers 
in the UK who have significant facilities don’t operate in the renewable energy market.” 
Awareness stage 
MOCO first met SACO in August 2010 when Participant 1-1-2 was first employed by 
MOCO. There were no previous ties between MOCO and SACO. SACO had choice of 
many gearbox suppliers in the market. SACO was looking to find a feasible UK supplier 
for projects they would be bidding for. MOCO knew SACO were entering the UK market 
and had made enquiries to several potential suppliers in Europe to build a new, innovative 
gearbox for their larger turbine prototype. MOCO didn’t have a product or a track record, 
but had acquired the experience and capabilities in 2009 giving them a long track record 
in military, oil and gas, and other high torque low speed applications going back over 100 
years.  
MOCO met several challenges during the awareness stage. OEMs tended to use proven 
suppliers and technologies and showed unwillingness to explore and engage with new 
suppliers. When asked about the offshore wind industry norms and standards, Participant 
1-1-2 stated: “The wind industry is a very strange industry: turbine specific application 
lists are sought after.” To mitigate this factor, MOCO employed an independent specialist 
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to undertake verification work on their calculations that what they were doing was correct; 
Participant 1-1-2: “That was one hurdle.” MOCO made significant efforts to be very 
collaborative in their approach towards SACO, conducting a lot of work and analyses free 
of charge.  Building up new relationships with OSW OEMs was time-consuming and 
costly. One of the main issues faced by MOCO in the awareness stage was gaining 
SACO’s trust in their ability to manufacture a gearbox for the OSW sector. Participant 1-
1-2: “Challenges we faced were lack of track record: we were competing against people 
who had thousands of turbine gearboxes already installed and had manufacturing 
experience. While our acquisition gave us lots of experience in gearboxes for different 
applications (military, oil and gas, and more), we didn’t have wind turbine specific 
experience.”  
MOCO’s competitors had already built an 8MW gearbox that they were making for a 
major turbine OEM and so they could easily provide a potential MOCO customers such 
as SACO with a working, tested product. MOCO’s argument was that customers such as 
SACO would need to build their own turbine design around an existing gearbox offered 
by MOCO’s competitors, whilst MOCO could build a gearbox around SACO’s turbine. 
MOCO offered SACO complementary resources in terms of technical product 
knowledge, industry expertise, and distance to market. Yet SACO had limited 
complimentary resources for MOCO to build competences with. There were significant 
incompatibilities between the two organizational cultures from the start.  
Another challenge MOCO faced on the new build side of their business was that they 
only had one customer and one product. So, if their potential customer (i.e. SACO) failed, 
they would in turn fail as well. Participant 1-1-2: “They [SACO] do have the potential to 
source a gearbox elsewhere, but only on our engineering merit and delivery performance, 
we maintained that position. That is not an issue now, the issue now is with the design of 
the nacelle and the turbine itself.” 
Wind turbine OEMs such as Mitsubishi, Vestas, Gamesa, Areva, and Samsung 
manufactured turbines that require a gearbox, unlike SICO and Alstrom who produced 
direct drive turbines with no need for gearboxes like MOCO’s. However, the largest 
turbines in the sector generating 8MW produced by Vestas and Areva did require 
gearboxes. When talking to SACO’s management board, Participant 1-0-1 explained: 
“How will you differentiate yourselves against your competitors if you all have the same 
drive train? So, coming up with something innovative, lighter and smaller is going to give 
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you an edge in the market.” MOCO offered SACO numerous unique complementarities, 
but thanks to efforts made on the softer side of the business, MOCO’s staff making 
significant sacrifices to increase compatibility between the organizations helping to 
secure SACO’s trust in MOCO as a viable long-term partner.  
MOCO believed they had something unique to offer SACO. MOCO had a lot of 
experience developing close relationships with UK ports and all the government entities 
involved in offshore wind as well as local government. MOCO had also built up strong 
links with the Scottish Government where numerous offshore wind testing sites were 
available and could be used by SACO to demonstrate their future turbine. This convinced 
SACO to start more in-depth discussions with MOCO and triggered the Exploration 
stage. 
Exploration stage 
The exploration stage involved the design and production of the two prototypes and the 
build -up for the commitment for the 150 units. This stage involved more intense 
communication where compatibility and complementarity between the two companies 
were being discovered, addressed and improved. The development of prototypes also 
required larger capital investments Participant 1-0-1: “In terms of serial production of a 
wind turbine gearbox, you are looking at £100,000 per MW. A prototype is around 50% 
more expensive.” 
MOCO aimed to serve its customers on the premise that they could tailor-make a product 
to suit the customer’s needs, as competitors in the market were offering products that 
already existed.  To demonstrate this commitment, MOCO would make further 
investments to show their capabilities to SACO; for example, MOCO undertook a train 
study especially for SACO to look at different turbine layouts and offer an optimized 
solution. SACO was impressed with MOCO’s technical capabilities and ability to custom 
build a gearbox to SACO’s requirements.  
This was especially important as SACO was in the process of developing a new 8MW 
turbine which involved designing the whole turbine from scratch. Designing the gearbox 
from scratch and customising it to their supplier’s requirements was a crucial step to 
demonstrate unique complementarities. MOCO could provide a design that would be 
lighter, smaller and more innovative than what was currently available on the market. 
This argument strengthened MOCO’s position as it allowed SACO to differentiate their 
product against their competitors.  
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During the exploration stage MOCO assigned Participant 1-1-2 as global key account 
manager for SACO. His sole responsibility at MOCO was the new product development 
project with SACO.  Having MOKAM1 assigned to SACO enabled high levels of 
communication between the companies, and showed MOCO’s dedication to providing 
help to SACO whenever needed, which helped build SACO’s trust. MOCO realized they 
needed to build more trust with SACO. One of the mitigating factors for MOCO was to 
employ a company to undertake verification work on some calculations to show that what 
MOCO were doing was correct and that they were capable of manufacturing to OSW 
standards. This was received well by SACO who saw MOCO’s investment as a strong 
sign of their commitment to proving their capabilities and that they were a feasible 
supplier for SACO.  
The next hurdle for MOCO was the investment required in research and development. 
MOCO’s first offer on the table included the price to develop the prototype then the price 
of each unit after the prototype. According to Participant 1-0-1, SACO staff commented: 
“We don’t want to pay that because we are talking to suppliers that don’t have all research 
and development cost to incur.” MOCO then decided it would undertake the research and 
development and testing free of charge if SACO would commit to purchasing 150 units, 
which would help MOCO recoup their research and development costs. SACO was 
hesitant as they believed that the order was very large to commit to just one supplier; in 
return, MOCO stated there were several caveats in their contract that SACO could use if 
the quality or delivery was not right. Investment in research and development did not 
necessary guarantee orders. MOCO found it very tough to get SACO to commit to an 
order of 150 units. However, MOCO offered market complementarities through knowing 
many UK entities and government bodies involved in the OSW sector that helped 
convince SACO that MOCO was a feasible supplier. Participant 1-1-2: “This worked in 
our favour, we were advisor to the customer.” This enabled SACO to sail through all the 
complexities of UK and Scottish governments and helped them secure the permission to 
build a prototype of their product in Scotland. The effort made by MOCO triggered the 
strengthening of their relationship with SACO. Participant 1-1-2: "We were trying to be 
very collaborative in our approach, so we did a lot of work and analyses free of charge."  
SACO placed an order in November 2011, which was for two prototypes but with a 
commitment to purchase 150, with a caveat that if SACO did not build 150 turbines, 
MOCO could not claim for 150. If SACO would proceed to build the first 150, then 
MOCO would build the first 150 and then SACO would look to find a second supplier 
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depending on volumes and the current relationship with SACO. Participant 1-1-2: "We 
have given SACO a royalty-free license to build the product after 150 units have been 
built if they needed to." On reflection, the 150-unit contract relied heavily on the 
complementarity between technical capabilities of MOCO and market entry strategy of 
SACO. MOCO transferred technical complementarities by offering SACO a royalty free 
license to build their own gearboxes after the 150 units were delivered. However, when 
MOCO signed the contract with SACO they retained all of their IP, and gave SACO a 
license to build but they didn’t give SACO the IP and detailed product drawings. 
Participant 1-1-2: “They have the right to manufacture our gearboxes in the future subject 
to rules and regulations. One thing about our company is we know what we are doing, 
one thing that we are told that is important is to retain our IP … It’s a difficult balance 
between giving the customer what you think is right and giving them enough information 
for them to go away and do it for themselves if they chose to.” 
MOCO had to convince the company board of directors to invest in all the equipment that 
was needed to build the prototypes and test rig for SACO. 20% of the supplier’s 
investment in capital equipment came from funding from the UK government. The 
investment in the test rig did help move the relationship forward; during several meetings 
with key staff from both firms, MOCO would share all cost information with SACO to 
show how much of their investment was dedicated to their project. Participant 1-0-1: 
“This was one of the key decision makers for the agreement.” SACO could not make 
certain decisions without going up the hierarchy. They had an existing set of terms and 
conditions that they were initially reluctant to change. MOCO had never done any work 
in offshore wind before; Participant 1-0-1: “When we sat down with SACO, we met in 
Aberdeen and agreed very quickly a structure of how we were going to work together.” 
MOCO invested £30,000 in lawyers to draft the conditions of the contract and sent these 
to SACO, who returned them with the original terms and conditions they had set. This 
then involved a long two-month process of sending the edited terms and conditions back 
and forth until they were finally agreed. Participant 1-1-2: "It took a long time to put this 
in place.” During the early-stage relationship building, several incompatibilities were 
discovered. SACO’s culture of high expectations on responsiveness was the first 
challenge for MOCO. For instance, Participant 1-1-2: “We would tend to wake up to lots 
of emails from [SACO] and we would have until 10am to respond to them before they 
finished for the day … They expect answers instantly; whenever they send an email, it 
has a deadline date for when we have to reply to them … It is always a few days away if 
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not tomorrow.” There were also incompatibilities in terms of time difference between the 
partners which required MOCO to work overtime regularly to respond and question 
SACO personnel. Participant 1-1-2: "If I wanted a decision now, I wouldn’t be able to get 
it until tomorrow morning, unless I phoned them at midnight.” 
From the start of the relationship Participant 1-1-2 would dedicate all their time to the 
relationship with SACO; this allowed for fast responses to SACO’s demands which 
impressed SACO and was a key factor in MOCO winning the order. However, several 
months into the project, Participant 1-1-2 started to work on or parts of MOCO’s business 
not associated with SACO which increased the response time to SACO and resulted in 
SACO making a complaint. Participant 1-1-2: "As business development manager, I was 
going away trying to win business elsewhere, but being the key account manager, I 
couldn’t respond as quick any more, as we had set the bar very high initially." MOCO 
found it hard to continue working at SACO’s pace but made sacrifices to do so. 
Participant 1-1-2: "They are a difficult customer, they want things right, their expectations 
of us doing things quickly were very high, for instance, ‘can you be at a meeting 
tomorrow? … ‘Can you get this report to us tomorrow?’” On many occasions MOCO 
staff would be required to sacrifice their weekends off to satisfy SACO’s requests; this 
was something very unusual for the British staff at MOCO; Participant 1-1-3: “This was 
difficult for our guys as that’s not the British way.” MOCO found it very difficult to adapt 
to the differences in expectations in responsiveness and timescales; Participant 1-1-2: 
“Their expecting you to turn up to their factory (in Asia) with the drop of a hat … You 
will receive an email on Thursday reading that they will be visiting our facility on Monday 
for an audit, then we are like, oh shit.” MOCO recognized the problems owing to distance 
and responded to accommodate SACO as much as they could. 
SACO’s hierarchical organizational structure presented further challenges that MOCO 
were not used to. Participant 1-1-2: “The [SACO people] are quite difficult people to deal 
with, they are hierarchical, so the guy you’re talking to can only make certain decision; 
if he can’t, he has to defer to his boss, so he has to go away and come back.” On many 
occasions, Participant 1-1-2 would fly to [Asia] for a three-day meeting with SACO staff 
but end up having to delay the plane and stay for a further three days, only to return a 
couple of weeks later. The differences in hierarchical structures between the two 
companies made doing business a lot harder per MOCO. Participant 1-1-2: "They tend to 
work in silos, so you have to check with different people as to what is going on before 
making a decision. So, making decisions takes a lot longer." MOCO experienced issues 
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in communication with SACO where they would be communicating with different offices 
of SACO: SACO had an office in Scotland, one in Hamburg, and one in Korea. 
Participant 1-1-2: "Sometimes you get information from different parts, mixed messages, 
engineering will say one thing then production will say another, but only the office in 
Korea can give the go-ahead."  
Participant 1-1-2 visited SACO’s HQ in Asia at least six times a year, and would bring 
technical staff, lawyers, Participant 1-0-1, and other MOCO staff on each visit. Participant 
1-1-2: "There was a large spectrum of people involved from both sides." Due to the 
difficulties in distance between the firms, SACO decided to open an office in Hamburg 
to make communication easier and travelling times shorter for the two firms, but also to 
be closer to the market and poach experienced staff from the offshore wind industry in 
Europe. Meetings between the partners in Hamburg involved SACO bringing in crane 
operators and other external companies to the meetings to explain how they would be 
fitting MOCO’s gearbox into their turbine, and to discuss the best methods for 
constructing it correctly and with speed. Sometimes language would be an issue in the 
relationship: while most of SACO’s staff spoke English, none of MOCO’s staff spoke 
Korean, which led to some slight misunderstandings during some of their meetings. 
MOCO overcame this by hiring a translator from Scottish Development (SDI) who was 
based in Korea and would join MOCO staff in their meetings when visiting SACO’s 
headquarters. MOCO invited SACO to their parent company HQ in Finland to 
demonstrate the quality of their manufacturing facility which impressed SACO. From the 
ongoing visits and regular communication throughout the relationship, MOCO was able 
to secure SACO’s trust: Participant 1-1-2: “When they say they are going to do something 
they do it, they won’t lie to you … Some things they said they would do, we never thought 
they would do, but they did! … They were true to their word.” MOCO also found that 
SACO’s culture was one of honour, which was an important factor in terms of trust in 
their relationship; Participant 1-0-1: “They don’t deceive you.” 
MOCO built the first two prototypes over two years. During the building process SACO 
had multiple staff based at MOCO HQ working alongside MOCO’s technical and shop 
floor staff. Participant 1-1-2: “The action plan has changed a lot, because originally the 
timescales were very tight, and the problem we had was that SACO wouldn’t change the 
end date but the negotiations took a lot longer so we ended up compressing the design 
and manufacturing time. … In the end, we didn’t achieve the timescales set out: we were 
late in the delivery of the gearboxes.” However, despite the late delivery, MOCO had 
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demonstrated their ability to produce a working prototype in an impressive timescale; 
Participant 1-1-3: “We designed and built two gearboxes and a test rig in 9 months. By 
industry standards that’s fantastic!” The gearbox was delivered to Korea and stayed there 
for several months until MOCO helped SACO receive planning permission to build a test 
rig in Scotland. However, during the time the gearbox was at SACO’s facility, SACO 
decided to change the design of turbine: the rotor blades were made longer than originally 
proposed. Due to the changes being made after the planning permission was awarded, the 
planning permission became void, which delayed the project significantly. Another factor 
that delayed the project was bad weather, which halted the movement of the foundation 
for SACO’s turbine from one part of Scotland to the test rig site. Participant 1-1-2: “So 
our gearbox ended up sitting in a warehouse in Korea, even though it was late from us … 
When dealing with prototypes, they take a lot longer to manufacture than you would 
expect, lots of things go wrong.” 
Expansion stage 
Shortly after the planning permission in Scotland was made void, SACO received 
planning permission to install 12 turbines in a demonstration site in Korea; this then 
resulted in an order to MOCO for gearboxes. Participant 1-1-3 proceeded to contact their 
suppliers to purchase the raw material required to build the next 12 gearboxes. Shortly 
after receiving the order MOCO completed the construction process for the two 
prototypes; they then shipped both prototypes to SACO’s HQ along with a large group of 
MOCO technical staff. SACO then installed the gearboxes into their turbines to test them 
with MOCO staff. SACO then shipped them back to MOCO where one was installed in 
a turbine in Scotland and the other in a drive train at the UK national renewable energy 
centre. Participant 1-1-2: "During various stages of the build we had people on site 
(Scottish site), to help out when the blades were being installed. When assembling the 
blades to the gearbox, the gearbox needs to be turned while inserting blades. In terms of 
torque and force this is the worst-case scenario for something to go wrong – this is when 
the highest amount of torque is put on the gearbox, and there is a lot more force on the 
gearbox during this stage than when the turbine is in operation. So, we had people there 
ensuring it was then correctly lubricated, that the gearbox turned when it should be turned, 
and stopped when it should be stopped.” Due to the radical design of SACO’s turbine, 
MOCO realized it would be hard to replace SACO as a customer, as other potential 
customers had already invested in turbine designs with a well-designed gearbox to work 
with it. The gearboxes are not interchangeable and so MOCO did not have another 
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potential customer to serve with its gearbox design. Despite the incompatibilities between 
them, both parties invested heavily in relationship specific assets. 
MOCO experienced many difficulties when preparing their first prototype order for 
SACO. The big flange the gearbox fits into, that MOCO supplied for the prototype, was 
too small on the bore. Thus, SACO had to machine it out and repaint it, and then charged 
MOCO for it.  Because of the limitations on shipping, MOCO sent out one gearbox 
complete (65t); the second gearbox was shipped in three parts; due to shipping 
requirements (the way containers were stacked on ships), they sent people out to put the 
parts back together. Although the relationship had informal aspects to it, there were some 
formalities; for instance, Participant 1-1-2: “When things go wrong, when we were late 
we had to pay some damages, so they did look back on the Ts and Cs, any quality issues, 
they have come back to us saying they have had to rectify this problem and asked us to 
pay the cost.”, MOCO provided further complementary resources to SACO by helping 
them in their sales activities, visiting SACO’s potential customers and sending along 
MOCO’s engineers to explain their gearbox in detail. Participant 1-0-1: “We have had 
SACO customers visit our site to show them our test rig. When we had the two gearboxes 
in the facility, we spun them in the test rig in front of RWE, DONG, to show them the 
gearboxes operating. We put the costs down on the table and then took them off, as it 
showed SACO, ‘This is our investment into your project’. That went down well, and was 
one of the key decision makers for the agreement. That and the fact we were going to help 
them establish themselves in the UK …  These were the two triggers for strengthening 
our relationship.” 
Around the summer of 2013, SACO put the contract for 12 units on hold because they 
were having problems securing planning permission at the test site in Korea. They had 
issues with military radar, also due to the area being close to a holiday tourist destination. 
This introduced much uncertainty into the relationship as to what would happen next 
between the partners. Participant 1-0-1: “We know that SACO are potentially dropping 
out of the market. We [MOCO] have other customers. One of the challenges for us is the 
time it takes to get from prototype to serial production, and also the length of time it has 
taken to get customers to have the confidence to invest in the UK. We have only just seen 
SICO commit, and not even fully. When we started doing this in 2010, we expected to be 
in a factory next to SACO building 100 turbines a year. Of course, we are not, no one is 
doing that. SICO and Vestas are supplying the market from Denmark, there’s hardly any 
UK manufacturing.” 
113 
 
Dissolution stage 
In mid-2013 SACO’s order for 12 gearboxes that MOCO had already started to 
manufacture was cancelled. MOCO had already built two and tested them at their facility; 
the next four sat in their warehouse in various stages of production and the four units after 
that were in various parts of the supply chain. SACO decided to cancel their 
demonstration project and made attempts to cancel the order with their customer; if 
successful they would cancel their order with MOCO, reported Participant 1-0-1: “We 
will then have to come to some agreement on compensation for the 12 units. The first two 
were delivered and paid for.” The challenge for MOCO after SACO’s order cancellation 
had been the length of time the whole project lasted, particularly as the Director had to 
convince MOCO’s board to keep funding the project. Participant 1-0-1: “Year after year 
we have said we will get some orders the next year to them … In an ideal world, it was 
for SACO to be setting up a factory in the UK, and for us to build a factory alongside it, 
for us to build gearboxes alongside so we could push straight into SACO’s turbine factory. 
At the moment, their business is going through a big review as to whether they see a 
future in the wind industry. Whether the design is right, whether the market is still big 
enough to take a major player, so we need to wait and see.” 
The gearbox MOCO had developed for SACO was very radical, which introduced several 
issues; Participant 1-1-2: “The gearbox sits in the nose of the turbine and the turbine spins 
outside of the gearbox instead of having a train. Because of that, the gearbox is mounted 
inside two big bearings. When the gearbox is taken out, they collapse and go oval because 
of the pure weight and size of the assembly; also, due to the complexity of the bearings, 
they are very expensive to make and so the proposed SACO design is not a viable design.” 
Given that the gearbox designed by MOCO was not viable, they continued to work with 
SACO and spent January to March 2014 undertaking a large study on whether a 7MW 
model would be big enough, concluding that 8 MW would be better for SACO in terms 
of the levelised cost of energy. Participant 1-0-1: “We did some concept work at 8MW 
for them. So, it may be that SACO decide to abandon the 7MW project and develop an 
8MW prototype, we don’t know. They might decide to pull out altogether or they might 
decide to slow down the project and come back later, but they would lose ground to the 
other OSW OEMs.” Participant 1-1-2 explained that there were written contracts between 
the parties; however, they did not expect to refer to them very often: “Now, as it seems 
we will be closing the deal, we will have to refer to it a lot more closely because of the 
termination clauses in it. We haven’t picked up the terms and conditions since signing 
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them.” Because of the cancellation, MOCO had lots of stock tied up in turbine parts and 
SACO decided that the costs were so high that they wanted to terminate their obligation, 
and so asked MOCO to provide information on all of the costs incurred for the project. 
Participant 1-0-1: “We are still working together, but to a negative end, rather than a 
positive … The relationship is still good but now the business opportunities are limited 
… Our business is in decline but our relationship isn’t.” 
When Participant 1-0-1 was asked about their thoughts on SACO entering the UK market 
after all the setbacks experienced, they were not positive and even suggested that SACO 
may leave the OSW industry altogether or at least slow down the development of their 
OSW products. It was clear that the original order for 12 units would no longer be going 
ahead, as well as the installation of SACO’s turbine at the test site in Scotland. MOCO 
now aimed to develop new customer relationships in the OSW sector. Due to the long 
length of time spent on developing their relationship with SACO, MOCO was now hoping 
to become a second source of supply for OEMs who already had supply chains in place. 
MOCO also planned to focus more on the onshore wind markets, in particular, the service 
and repair business, and prepared to move the staff they had working on the SACO project 
to the service and repair business. Participant 1-1-2: “On a scale of one to seven I would 
say five. It has been hard but we are making a difficult product and they have a difficult 
business. We don’t expect them to be our best friends, but they have been quite a good 
customer. We’ve had lots of issues as you would do building a prototype that size, but 
they have not been unreasonable.” 
Participant 1-1-2: “We will probably end up throwing all the parts we’ve made away, and 
cancelling all the existing orders for parts and maybe placing orders for a different design 
of the same component. If they were still speaking to us … We have been paid for the 
two prototypes we supplied; they have also given us deposits on another twelve, but they 
will only pay you when they see that everything is 100% right. There are some differences 
between when we expected payment and when we got payment.” It was now too late for 
MOCO to expect another customer to take the place of SACO: there were very few OEMs 
in the market, and those who were in the market had already developed their own nacelles 
and drivetrains and would be very unlikely to invest the significant amount of capital 
required to develop a gearbox with MOCO. Participant 1-1-2: “Because our product is 
such a radical design, anybody [OEMs] who has something of the same size and scope 
will already have a well-designed gearbox and they won’t be interchangeable. So, there 
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is not a potential customer for us.” Figure 11 below illustrates MOCO and SACOs 
relationship development trajectory. 
 
Figure 11 MOCO and SACO relationship development timeline 
 
4.1.1.2 Case #1.2  
This case examines the relationship between MOCO (focal buyer) and VICO the supplier. 
The case is primarily informed by the following participants: 1-0-1 as MOCO’s UK 
director; 1-1-2: MOCO’s key account manager; 1-1-3: MOCO’s supply chain director 
and key account manager and 1-1-4: MOCO’s technical product manager. Further details 
on the participants interviewed for this case can be found in the data collection schedule 
in Appendix 6. 
VICO was a company founded in 1918 in the Czech Republic with a long heritage and 
experience in manufacturing gears and mechanical gearboxes for a wide range of 
industries, including industrial applications, railway vehicles, oil and gas extraction, and 
wind turbines. With strong development and state-of-the-art production facilities in the 
Czech Republic, VICO have 800 employees and an annual turnover of €75 million. 
Before MOCO acquired DACO, DACO had contracted VICO to supply 14 carriers for 
their OSW turbine gearboxes. VICO’s contribution to each gearbox ordered came to 
approximately €800,000 per gearbox. After the acquisition of DACO by MOCO, VICO 
had already supplied the carriers for five gearbox sets.  The novation of contracts needed 
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to be renegotiated; in order for VICO to accept the novation of the contract, they played 
hard ball, and persuaded MOCO to pay them upfront in three stage payments, for the 
remaining four gearbox sets up to gearbox ten.  
Awareness stage 
After the acquisition of DACO by MOCO, the newly appointed MOCO supply chain 
manager visited VICO to re-establish relations and the novation of contracts that had been 
made previously by staff at DACO. Since DACO became a part of MOCO, the 
exploration stage mainly involved re-establishing the existing relationship. However, the 
existing relationship was troubled by an outstanding purchase order. DACO had 
originally given them a purchase order for fourteen gearboxes, but with no specific call-
off dates. VICO told MOCO that whether they wanted the component or not, or whether 
they delivered them or not, they demanded payment upfront by February 2014, for 10 
sets.  
Exploration stage 
In this case, the exploration stage involved mainly efforts to resolve conflict. Initially, 
there was a lack of communication regarding the relationship with VICO when MOCO 
took over VICO. Participant 1-1-2 explained how he wasn’t made aware of the upfront 
payment demanded by VICO; when he met and spoke to VICO’s sales manager, they 
would ask for the bearings for the raceways they were manufacturing to be supplied by 
MOCO, for them to complete the gearbox assembly. However, MOCO was not expecting 
to receive payment from their customer SACO and so decided not to send the bearings 
they had already paid for to VICO, as MOCO’s customer SACO looked unlikely to 
proceed with the gearbox order. If SACO were to cancel their order, MOCO’s key 
account manager suggested that VICO would keep their settlement payment and value 
the components at their facility owned by MOCO, in order for MOCO to gain back a 
scrap value price on the metal. Participant 1-1-2: “We ended up paying well over £1m for 
something that we still have not received today … They are sat on the money, they have 
the parts part manufactured, and we have said to them, ‘Don’t do any more, don’t put any 
effort into them, as we are likely to not want them.’” 
The efforts toward the exploration stage began by resolving several issues. First, some 
complicated technical disputes between the components supplied by VICO and SKFCO 
had to be resolved to reach technical compatibility.  Second, the trust between VICO and 
MOCO had to be built up while they had been competing as well as cooperating with 
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each other. VICO and MOCO had both made bids to the same customer [SACO] to be 
the preferred supplier of the complete gearbox; however, MOCO was chosen ahead of 
VICO and then subcontracted the work to VICO. This had a massive impact on the level 
of trust between the organizations; Participant 1-1-3: “It is a wary relationship. On a 
personal level, excellent, nice people, good to work with, very amenable. But there is a 
certain level of wariness as they were originally considered as a supplier to the complete 
gearbox, and we were chosen ahead of them and then subcontracted some of the work to 
them … So, in effect, they wanted to be the lead manufacturer and were eventually chosen 
as the second-tier supplier … The reason why we have to be wary is that potentially they 
could be undermining us in order to win that business. Later, we started to think that was 
a possibility.” 
This was emphasized when MOCO’s director, Participant 1-0-1, referred to his 
experience with technical issues with the components involved in the relationships of 
VICO and another firm SKCO. VICO produced raceways for the gearbox that housed the 
bearings; the bearings were manufactured by another company, SKCO. SKCO specified 
the shape and form of the raceways that were then manufactured by VICO. Once the 
raceways were manufactured and delivered to MOCO, SKCO visited MOCO’s facility to 
inspect the raceways and test the running patterns once they were under strain in the 
gearbox. There was a dispute about whether the raceways VICO manufactured were 
acceptable, or whether SKFCO had provided acceptable measurements for the raceway. 
Thus, there had been a long-running engineering discussion between the three firms to 
understand whether it had been a machining error on VICO’s part or a design error made 
by SKCO. 
The technical disputes between MOCO and VICO had an impact on the level of trust in 
each other, to the point where the relationship was near to non-existent. When asked about 
the latest development in the relationship with VICO, MOCO’s director, Participant 1-0-
1 commented: “It has all gone very quiet, in effect we have said we don’t want you to do 
anything; leave all the manufactured parts in a corner and we will speak to you again 
when we know something.  We haven’t spoken to them for three months; we are now 
waiting for a word from SACO (the customer).” However, despite some of the mistrust 
and disputes, MOCO’s key account manager felt that VICO would provide help to them 
if asked, which was not the case when compared with other MOCO suppliers mentioned 
in this case who had a “take it or leave it!” attitude. Participant 1-1-3 explained that VICO 
was MOCO’s sole supplier; however, they were looking to replace them with their sister 
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company located in Finland. He explained that MOCO started to look at the 
manufacturing process involved in the component and concluded: it was a very complex 
product that had patented technology unique to MOCO. With a lot of production 
engineering and engineering effort, MOCO, through their sister company, would be able 
to take over the manufacturing of these parts. There would be clear advantages of keeping 
this manufacturing process in-house. However, with MOCO’s sister company being 
based in Finland and VICO being based in the Czech Republic, a low wage economy, 
staff wanted to start a cost-based analysis to see how competitive the price would be from 
both suppliers. 
MOCO experienced problems with VICO’s product around the middle/towards the end 
of 2013: one problem was from rust due to packaging issues. As the situation with 
MOCO’s customer put a hold on MOCO’s operations, the parts they had ordered from 
VICO were sitting still in their factory, and due to insufficient packaging, the parts had 
standstill corrosion issues, where the bearings had been standing still and not moving, 
which led to a scuffing effect taking place, as well as a migration of moisture to contact 
areas. Participant 1-1-4, a technical engineer, stated that this was a big issue. However, 
this brought the two companies closer together as they started a joint initiative to 
understand where the corrosion was taking place: whether it was before the product left 
VICO’s factory, during transit, or when it arrived at MOCO’s facility.  
After several meetings and discussions over the phone, both companies concluded that 
the parts supplied were not protected/packaged well enough. Part of the corrosion was 
caused by putting the assemblies into a sealed bag, using silica gel which they tied with 
string to the spray nozzles. The moisture would then be drawn to the silica bag which was 
tied next to the metal surface of the spray nozzle, in effect drawing all the moisture exactly 
where it was not needed. Thus, silica gel is no longer placed near the metal surfaces any 
more. Another issue that arose was that VICO would apply light machine oil to the 
assemblies before sending to them to MOCO. MOCO’s technical product manager. 
Participant 1-1-4, explained that he was responsible for finding the solution to the 
problem, which was that light machine oil was not enough, as the film layer would break 
down; he explained this to VICO technical staff who then applied a more substantial oil 
to the assemblies. Participant 1-1-4 also suggested that VICO use two bags instead of one 
when packaging the assemblies, as if one was perforated, there would be another in place 
to ensure an air-tight seal.  VICO also made investments into the relationship with 
MOCO; VICO invested in improving the transportation of their assemblies to MOCO. 
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They had a purpose-built steel skid, as the diameter of the components is so large that 
they cannot put them on a wagon and transport them on UK roads, so they had support 
pallet made, where they are lowered on and strapped on at 45 degrees.  
Dissolution stage 
Despite the improvements made to logistics and operations between the two companies, 
the relationship moved into the dissolution stage, due to MOCO not receiving the order 
they had hoped for. Figure 12 illustrates the relationship development timeline between 
MOCO and VICO. 
 
Figure 12 MOCO – VICO relationship development timeline 
 
4.1.1.3 Case #1.3  
This case examines the relationship between MOCO (focal buyer) and COCO the 
supplier. The case is primarily informed by the following participants: 1-0-1 as MOCO’s 
UK director; 1-1-2: MOCO’s key account manager; 1-1-3: and MOCO’s supply chain 
director and key account manager. Further details on the participants interviewed for this 
case can be found in the data collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
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MOCO required a foundry that could provide castings for their gearbox. The problem 
was that there were very few foundries in the UK that could supply a casting of the size 
required by MOCO. COCO was a casting manufacturer founded over 100 years ago in 
the North of the UK with an eight-acre site and 80,000 square feet facility. COCO was 
the UK leader in large and heavy castings, supplying to numerous industries including 
nuclear, marine, shipping power generation, automotive, tunnelling, and green-energy. 
COCO had approximately 80 employees and an annualized turnover of £8 million; they 
also put strong emphasis on being a British manufacturer. COCO was considered a sole 
supplier in the UK by MOCO; alternative suppliers would be Europe-based or beyond 
Europe. 
Awareness Stage 
Before going into administration, there was an ongoing relationship between MOCO and 
COCO, but it was troubled by some quality problems and outstanding payment, in 
addition to the administration. Participant 1-1-3 mentioned a specific challenge with this 
relationship when, in early 2014, COCO went into administration. At the same time, 
MOCO were negotiating some serious quality problems on the component COCO had 
supplied. The product in question was a three tonne 2.9m diameter ring. MOCO had found 
metallurgic problems with the components COCO delivered and so were in the process 
of rejecting them and requiring replacements at the time of the sale. MOCO had to 
negotiate with the administrators of the previous company; in effect, MOCO owed them 
£40,000 for the parts they supplied, and MOCO were refusing to pay as the parts were 
defective. The supplier was supposed to be supplying replacements, for which, if 
received, MOCO would have had to pay the £40,000. This resulted with the supplier’s 
administrators issuing invoices for £40,000, which led to protracted negotiations with the 
administrators, ending with a settlement. 
Exploration Stage 
MOCO were in a sticky situation as, if COCO did go into administration, MOCO would 
be left without a supplier and the components they had received would have been useless. 
At this point, MOCO realized they could no longer rely on one source of supply, so they 
identified several alternative suppliers. Also, due to the size of the component required, 
MOCO found it hard to find another suitable foundry in the UK; however, COCO was a 
foundry based in the UK who had made an agreement with DACO who were then 
acquired by MOCO. Thus, there were no existing ties in place with MOCO’s supply chain 
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manager and staff at COCO.  MOCO then proceeded to meet with the new owner and 
explain the problems they had experienced previously. The bond initially made between 
the new owner and staff at MOCO was very strong and positive. The new owner of COCO 
stated his intent to work out the problems MOCO had experienced previously and 
expressed his interest in working with MOCO in the future. The efforts to expand the 
existing relationship started immediately between MOCO and the new owners of COCO 
foundry; MOCO made orders for new parts to replace the faulty ones. COCO was bought 
by a large manufacturer with large machining capability and capacity as well as some 
small foundry capacity that could offer MOCO the sizes required for their gearbox.  
MOCO’s technical product manager explained that there were two foundries responsible 
for supplying various castings which were initially set up to provide the finished article. 
These were COCO as mentioned, and SECO. SECO was a small foundry in Somerset 
that provided MOCO with small castings. SECO subcontracted their machining to a 
company in the Midlands; they then delivered the finished product to MOCO from the 
SECO facility. To provide the complete finished product, the foundries would cast the 
components, which would then need machining. Depending on which process had higher 
value, i.e., the casting or machining, the supplier providing the higher value process 
would take the lead role and subcontract the lower value process to the other. The castings 
were of higher value compared to the machining and so the foundries undertook the role 
of main contractor. Due to the quality issues with the measurements, material properties, 
and tolerances of the castings MOCO received from COCO, MOCO had lost their trust 
in COCO and so decided to take responsibility for subcontracting the work, rather than 
COCO. The machining was subcontracted to a company named ADCO in Manchester, 
who machined the component and sent it back to MOCO facilities. This introduced more 
challenges for MOCO as MOCO’s key account manager (Participant 1-1-2) explained: 
“The obvious problem with that is that you are now taking responsibility for the 
machining taking place; if they scrap that then it’s our liability. So similarly, if your 
supplying foundry provide defective material and you have subcontracted them, again 
that’s your liability. If you put the responsibility on one company to provide the finished 
article, it’s their problem if there are any quality issue or problems. That has been a lesson 
learnt, that cost us a great deal!” MOCO’s director, Participant 1-0-1: “Going forward, 
we want to purchase the finished article; we don’t want any of the intermediate problems, 
just deliver the finished article.” 
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Dissolution Stage 
MOCO did contract some work to ADCO; however, they came across quality issues with 
the component that they supplied. MOCO’s technical staff worked closely with ADCO 
technical product team to improve the quality of ADCO’s product which involved an 
audit of SDCO’s facility. After the audit, MOCO concluded that ADCO did not have the 
ability to deliver on what they said they promised. The issue was with the accuracy of 
ADCO’;s measuring equipment which MOCO said could not meet their high standards. 
ADCO simply said that the equipment would produce the component to the correct 
measurements; however, MOCO disagreed but could not prove them wrong. So MOCO 
decided to subcontract to another company to measure one of their components and 
compare it with ADCO’s. MOCO found that the results between the two were widely 
different and proved that ADCO’s machining equipment was not accurate enough to meet 
offshore wind standards and be used by MOCO. Participant 1-1-3 mentioned ADCO’s 
response: “What we’ve got is what you get and if that isn’t good enough, you can go 
elsewhere. Like it or lump it.” They further commented that if MOCO were to place any 
more orders, they would not be going back to ADCO: “Their response should have been, 
in order to keep this business, we will upgrade our measuring equipment, and until we 
get, we won’t supply anymore … it was an unusual attitude to have but I think, over the 
years, they’ve had so much pushback and grief from the company, they were quite happy 
to walk away from it.” Figure 13 illustrates the relationship development timeline 
between MOCO and COCO. 
 
Figure 13 MOCO – COCO relationship development timeline 
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4.1.1.4 Case #1.4  
This case examines the relationship between MOCO (focal buyer) and SKCO the 
supplier. The case is primarily informed by the following participants: 1-0-1 as MOCO’s 
UK director; 1-1-2: MOCO’s key account manager; 1-1-3: and MOCO’s supply chain 
director and key account manager. Further details on the participants interviewed for this 
case can be found in the data collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
SKCO is a Swedish company, and the largest bearings manufacturer in the world. SKCO 
started manufacturing bearings for the offshore wind sector in 1981. Despite such long 
history in offshore wind, wind is only a small part of SKCO’s total revenues. Their 
operating income in 2014 was 7.8 billion SEK and total number of employees amounted 
to 48,953. While there were other suppliers MOCO could choose from, SKCO served 
bearings to 50% of the global offshore wind market. 
Awareness stage 
The relationship first began in 2009 when DACO staff contacted and met with SKCO to 
enquire about sourcing bearings for their gearbox. After meeting, the two companies 
agreed and set common working routines for their future relationship. However, the 
relationship ground to a halt when DACO was acquired by MOCO.  In 2013, the newly 
formed MOCO and its one-man supply chain leader met with SKCO to revitalize the 
relationship and set new agreements as to how they would work together in the future. 
After meeting SKCO, MOCO was satisfied with the capabilities and experience of SKCO 
so decided to place an order; this moved the relationship into the exploration stage. 
Exploration stage  
When both components were delivered, MOCO began the process of testing the 
gearboxes. This involved stripping the gearboxes down and inspecting the raceways; at 
that point, SKCO came down to MOCO’s facilities, as they wanted to see what sort of 
running patterns their product was getting once under strain in the gearbox. There was a 
dispute about whether SKCO had made the bearings to the right form and shape, or 
whether the predicted shape was not acceptable for the gearbox. MOCO’s director 
(Participant 1-0-1) commented on the state of affairs with SKCO: “There has been a long-
running engineering discussion, rather than a dispute; a lot of work and effort has gone 
into understanding whether it’s a machining error or a design error.” The progression of 
the relationship towards the expansion stage was affected by technical disputes. When an 
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issue with the bearings was raised by MOCO, SKCO sent their technical team over to 
MOCO facility to test and analyse the problem, to prove that the problem existed after 
they had delivered it to MOCO.  
SKCO tested the bearings MOCO had received and had in stock, and there was no 
evidence to suggest that the bearings had been used in any other application, so MOCO 
had to conclude that any issues with the bearings came after they had been delivered by 
SKCO. This meant the issue was to be disputed between MOCO and VICO, who had 
made the raceways which housed the bearings. MOCO faced the challenge that, if there 
was a problem, they would struggle to prove that the problem existed before they installed 
and used the bearings. From SKCO’s testing of the bearings MOCO had in stock, there 
was no evidence that they were used in any other application, so MOCO had to conclude 
that the issues did not lie within SKCO responsibilities, as the problem with the product 
would have likely happened after MOCO had received them. 
The technical issues between MOCO and SKCO had affected the ways the relationship 
between the two companies expanded. When asked about the relationship with SKCO 
Participant 1-1-2 explained: “Nothing is ever the fault of SKCO, where everything SKCO 
provided was apparently correct, anything that is wrong with it is how MOCO have used 
it, stored it, or specified it.” MOCO found this a challenge to prove that any problems 
with the bearings supplied were through the fault of SKCO. The main issue was that 
MOCO’s technical capability was lagging behind SKCO. While the SKCO’s high level 
of technical capability was complementary to MOCO, the lack of compatibility between 
the two companies in terms of technical capability became a barrier affecting the 
exploration stage. To resolve the technical dispute, SKCO invested in an investigation. 
Participant 1-1-2 commented on SKCO: “They are highly technical, they send in a 
technical team to analyse a problem, and then think of an excuse why it’s not their fault.” 
Dissolution stage 
Participant 1-1-3 commented on the relationship with SKCO: “We have technical issues 
with them, but we get on fine with the people; however, we are still trying to resolve the 
technical issues.” There appeared to be a high level of good will (trust) for resolving the 
technical dispute. Along with the technical disputes came payment disputes, which 
became the main barrier for the relationship progressing to the expansion stage; 
Participant 1-0-1: “They have invoices outstanding with us for a lot of bearings they have 
supplied; however, we are not in the position to pay their invoices as we have not been 
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paid by our customer. They are piggy in the middle, just the same as we are.” MOCO did 
want to run pilot projects with SKCO, but the financial situation and state of affairs 
prevented them from doing so. Participant 1-0-1: “Inevitably, it will be a phone call 
saying the project is cancelled. Hopefully, we will be able to compensate you for any 
losses when we get compensated.” Figure 14 illustrates the relationship development 
timeline between MOCO and SKCO. 
 
Figure 14 MOCO – SKCO relationship development timeline 
4.1.1.5 Case #1.5 
This case examines the relationship between MOCO (focal buyer) and OTCO the 
supplier. The case is primarily informed by the following participants: 1-0-1 as MOCO’s 
UK director; 1-1-2: MOCO’s key account manager; 1-1-3: MOCO’s supply chain 
director and key account manager and 1-1-4: MOCO’s technical product manager. 
Further details on the participants interviewed for this case can be found in the data 
collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
OTCO is a German, family-owned company with more than 50 years of gear 
manufacturing experience. OTCO was one of the first manufacturers to supply parts for 
offshore wind gearboxes. Their facility in Germany is 9500m2, in which they manufacture 
a range of products for wage teeth, patented precision worm gear, prototype parts, and 
126 
 
spare parts. OTCO are known for their strong history and well-regarded technical 
knowledge. There were limited other suppliers MOCO could choose from with the level 
of capability and competence of OTCO. 
Awareness stage 
The relationship started in 2009 with OTCO, when DACO contacted OTCO for the 
supply of Annulus rings. MOCO issued OTCO with a purchase order to manufacture 14 
gearbox sets, comprising of three rings per gearbox set. MOCO decided to contact OTCO 
due to their strong technological and market complementariness: namely, that they had a 
lot of experience in manufacturing gearbox sets for the offshore wind sector. OTCO could 
also manufacture prototypes of new products which was of importance to MOCO. Several 
MOCO staff visited OTCO’s facilities in Germany to conduct quality inspections and 
negotiate prices for 14 gearbox sets to be manufactured over five years. Both companies 
came to an agreement and the relationship moved to the exploration stage. 
Exploration stage 
OTCO and MOCO worked closely together over four years, sending staff from its 
headquarters in Germany on regular visits to MOCO facilities, and also facilitating 
knowledge transfer by accommodating MOCO staff at their factory, and training them on 
the processes and quality checks involved. This helped reassure MOCO about the 
capabilities of OTCO in the offshore wind industry, also, MOCO could trust OTCO to 
complete the work not only on time but to the quality standards MOCO had in place. This 
improved the technical capabilities of MOCO’s staff, who could transfer some of the 
specific capabilities back to their UK operations. There were never any quality or delivery 
problems reported with OTCO’s products and services during the manufacturing and 
delivery of the gearbox sets.  
Given OTCO’s strong technical capability, it was a suitable supplier for MOCO to 
continue to expand their relationship with. However, OTCO did not need MOCO as 
much; Participant 1-0-1: “OTCO are very much their own outfit; the OTCO relationship 
is, ‘You place an order, we will deliver,’ hands-off approach; if you want to know 
anything else, sorry.’ OTCO are a family-owned company and very confident of their 
position in the market, they are specialists and have a thriving market and are not worried 
about competition. The owner of OTCO showed us his factory, and was very proud, he 
said if we wanted to place an order then go ahead; if not, then go elsewhere. He made it 
clear that he didn’t need us as much as we needed him.” OTCO offered technical, product 
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and market complementariness to MOCO, whilst MOCO did not have any 
complementariness to offer OTCO. In terms of compatibility between the two companies, 
there were some similarities in European cultures, where in both German and UK 
cultures, importance was paid to delivering a project in time. However, there were few 
personal relationships developed between the staff of both companies, despite staff 
working together at MOCO’s facility as well as OTCO’s on and off for four years.  
Dissolution stage 
Two years after MOCO’s order, OTCO had manufactured and delivered six gearbox sets, 
and MOCO was satisfied with the quality. Towards the end of 2011, MOCO’s customer 
SACO decided to cancel their order for MOCO’s gearboxes. Consequently, MOCO had 
to contact OTCO to share the bad news. MOCO staff visited OTCO at their facilities in 
Germany to re-establish relationships and negotiate the novation of contracts, in which 
OTCO did not negotiate a deal like MOCO’s other supplier VICO, where they wanted 
paying upfront. Therefore, MOCO told OTCO that they would no longer want any more 
gearbox sets to be manufactured unless they told OTCO otherwise. In response, OTCO 
demanded that MOCO pay for all the raw material they pre-purchased to manufacture the 
next four sets of gearboxes, worth £100,000. MOCO explained that they could not pay 
OTCO as they had not been reimbursed by their customer SACO; Participant 1-0-1: 
“There is the potential to take that into law. In the meantime, we are going to put a 
compensation claim to SACO that will cover the purchasing of this material, and if SACO 
pay the compensation claim, then we can pass that onto OTCO and everybody will be 
happy.” The relationship between MOCO and OTCO stalled and communication between 
the two companies broke down. Both companies are waiting for their dispute to be 
resolved. Figure 15 illustrates the relationship development timeline between MOCO and 
OTCO. 
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Figure 15 MOCO – OTCO relationship development timeline 
4.1.2 Case #2 
This case involves TACO the focal firm, who is a supplier to customers SICO, WTCO, 
MACO. TACO had been supplying to the onshore wind market four years before entering 
the offshore market looking for potential customers. In order to enter the offshore wind 
market TACO needed to diversify their product offerings.  
The case involved multiple interviews with the following participants: 2-0-1: TACO 
Offshore wind operations director; 2-1-2: TACO Key account manager; 2-1-3: TACO 
Technical product manager; 2-1-4: TACO Political representative; 2-1-5: Council leader 
(business and trade) North Lincolnshire Council; 2-1-6: TACO Danish HQ 
representative; 2-1-7: UK steel market expert; 2-1-8: SICO Business development 
manager – UK OSW market. Further details on the participants interviewed for this case 
can be found in the data collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
TACO’s strategy in the offshore wind sector maintained rigorous effort and flexibility to 
deliver supply chain and product innovations for the major OEM turbine manufacturers. 
TACO faced many uncertainties in the steel sector a few years prior to and during the 
time of this research. When interviewing, Participant 2-0-1 recalled the 2008 floods in 
Australia that affected one of the world’s largest iron ore suppliers causing iron ore prices 
to rocket, resulting in them charging TACO a premium and costing them dearly, having 
to pass on costs to their customers. TACO were vulnerable to numerous factors in the 
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market which would variate rapidly, requiring TACO to be able to respond quickly to 
recover from fluctuations in prices. The key factors affecting the costs and 
competitiveness of TACO summarized from the interviews undertaken were: 
• Exchange rate fluctuations 
• Transport costs 
• Iron ore (Brazil, Australia) prices 
• Coke and coal prices 
• Scrap steel prices 
The iron ore price had been reasonably stable when conducting interviews with 
participants at TACO; however, previously in 2008, the Australian floods meant that 
prices for iron ore jumped to £150-£200 per tonne. As a result, TACO faced great pressure 
on its costs which meant that it had to recover the losses in the market, passing them down 
onto their customers. Participant 2-0-1: “It was a painful exercise for everyone.” The 
experience from the floods led to a shift in the steel industry, with companies making 
themselves more resilient through being more self-sufficient in iron ore, coal and coke. 
However, companies such as TACO admitted that this was a challenge as, for example, 
the iron ore market was controlled by only three major players. This made the market 
very uncertain for TACO and exposed many risks. However, TACO owned an iron ore 
mine in India where a domestic only use policy was in place, which had changed to allow 
some supply to foreign markets reducing TACO’s market risk. Despite this TACO was 
still in a market characterized by high uncertainty and risk, Participant 2-0-1: “We are 
still exposed to the open market.” 
The market TACO operated in shifted toward more short-term transactions due to the 
volatility of numerous factors in the market; no longer was it feasible to procure in large 
volumes, making order once or twice a year with their suppliers. The economic crisis in 
2008 had a big effect on the steel market and resulted in changes to how companies in 
multiple tiers of the supply chain would procure products; the changes involved taking 
less risk. Participant 2-0-1 explained how before the crisis, most of the tower fabricators 
in the OSW sector would procure either quarterly, half yearly or annually to receive 
discounts and more favourable deals. TACO also procured from their suppliers in a 
similar fashion. Iron ore, coke and coal used to be procured on an annual basis; however, 
due to the volatility of prices and increased uncertainty in the market, iron ore prices were 
changing significantly every quarter, which presented a challenge for TACO to offer their 
130 
 
customers a fixed price for a period of time, and resulted in them taking on more risk in 
order to stay competitive. 
TACO faced financial challenges in the steel plate market which was at over capacity due 
to the flood of foreign steel. The financial reward for TACO to take orders on steel plate 
were extremely low, and they could make much larger returns on other products; 
however, while receiving low returns, they were taking risks through taking on orders in 
the hope of winning long-term business. The financial reward was a barrier. The steel 
plate market which TACO operates in had a lot of capacity where their supply outweighed 
demand significantly; thus, during the time of this research, plate prices were low and 
TACO’s margins diminished for their plate products compared to the other products they 
sold on the market. Participant 2-0-1: “It may be difficult to keep a sustained position in 
the sector; for example, if you look at the materials in a turbine and tower, they are quite 
a commoditized product, just structural steel.” Participant 2-1-4 explained how there had 
been several prominent changes to procurement processes in the offshore wind supply 
chain around 2013/2014 where usually an OEM would free issue steel to the fabricators; 
however, it was now the fabricators who were responsible for the procurement process. 
Previously OEMs would procure steel, which could be problematic. Participant 2-0-1: 
“They wouldn’t care where it would come from or how much it was. If there was 
something wrong with the steel, the OEMs would pass it back to the tower fabricators 
which in turn would deal with TACO or the steel supplier. The costs were passed down 
the supply chain and on to TACO.” 
TACO had to make closer relationships with the tower fabricators, where they spent a lot 
of time and investments doing so, due to the tower fabricators now procuring direct and 
reorganising their business to do so. Participant 2-1-3 was responsible for developing 
closer personal relationships with the relevant staff of the fabricators, to share 
information, plan, and re-align strategies with the tower fabricators to develop joint 
logistics initiatives that would enable future supplies to be delivered JIT. Participant 2-1-
3: “Some of the big OEMs use e-bids for their procurement, but tower fabricators tend to 
procure more traditionally through previous relationships and experience with suppliers. 
They are all more cost-sensitive nowadays.” TACO had four main competitors (Dilingen, 
Arcelor, DanSteel, Thyssenkrupp) all based in Europe, which gave TACO’s customers 
many alternatives for choosing other suppliers, which meant TACO had to work 
extremely hard, not only to win the business but to ensure it was continuous, by 
maintaining high quality standards for their product, offering it at a competitive market 
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price, and offering complementary resources and knowledge to their potential partner. 
Participant 2-1-2: “I think it’s far more cost-sensitive now; it’s more about the bottom 
line, which is why some of these fancier tools such as e-bids are used, because they are 
able to get the lowest possible price for a contract. The use of e-bids removes the 
traditional, softer elements of relationships, and makes it a purely transactional 
relationship rather than a historical/traditional relationship.” 
Participants 2-0-1 and 2-1-2 were new to working in the offshore wind industry and so 
came across many differences compared to the other sectors TACO had previously 
served. Relationships in the offshore wind industry were said to be different in terms of 
being less consistent and short-term orientated. Participant 2-1-2: “Historically, in 
relationships you would expect if you’re in a developed relationship, you may have a 
period where you drop out and in again; historically that may have been quite short. For 
example, Network rail - we have had a close relationship with them and you wouldn’t 
expect to come in and out as presumably they would want some consistency, whereas in 
the offshore supply chain it is different. There is quite a lot of choice, so depending on 
the circumstance you can be in or out; not to say the relationship is bad, but you can be 
in or out still.” Participant 2-0-1: “It’s important for a supplier to understand what type of 
relationship the customer wants. I think through time relationships are changing 
particularly because of market circumstances. I think relationships are different compared 
to what they used to be like; buyers are thinking differently compared to in the past.” 
Participant 2-1-2: “It depends on how many people you trust; the more people a customer 
trusts, the more choice they have.” 
TACO’s aim was to sell volume on a monthly basis, with a strategy to grow their share 
in the wind sector (onshore and offshore) and to make sure they could provide consistent 
volume into the market. During the research period, TACO had high levels of demand in 
the onshore sector but wanted to supply to the offshore market as it was still nascent and 
growing.  When TACO first entered the onshore wind industry, they were not considered 
specialists in any steel products relevant to wind turbine manufacture. Participant 2-1-2 
explained: “We used to be called mill-based people, because we are here next to the mill, 
and the people in other offices see us as just being mill-based. Because historically we 
didn’t have a sector, we had products, so we used to be mill-based people; we would 
control what was sold off the plate mill and the people based in offices would tell us if 
they could go and sell or not … whereas now, we work together with them. If they tell us 
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to stop selling plate in a certain sector and want a different product, I’m flexible, and not 
just stuck down to plate.” 
When supplying to the wind market TACO would be granted contracts or spot 
orders/projects from developers but then would need to research the market to identify 
which projects were about to start. TACO would then need to predict which company 
would be responsible for fabricating the towers, who would supply the towers and where 
the towers would be made, to forecast what their demand would look like, based on the 
relationships they had with players on every tier in the supply chain. Participant 2-1-2: 
“You get a feel for which projects are becoming hot and might drop, based on where they 
fit in the project pipeline.” TACO established its wind tower hub in 2010 to process and 
distribute steel plate to wind turbine towers manufacturers. TACO had the capability to 
deliver up to 200,000 metric tons annually, enabling them to reduce customer processing 
time while ensuring full traceability. TACO offered several different products for the 
offshore wind sector. For jacket foundations, they supplied steel plate for piles, pile 
sleeves, circular hollow sections for j-tubes. They supplied steel plate for monopile 
solutions as well as speciality steels for gear manufacturing and bearing steels that would 
be used for the manufacture of bearings, supplied to a company mentioned in this study 
(SKCO) who in turn sold their bearings to wind turbine OEMs. 
The product itself (steel plate) was a mature product, so TACO had to capture value 
through services that it would offer associated with the product. For example, TACO did 
this through offering delivery sequencing, profiling, and other initiatives aimed to save 
the customer’s costs (discussed below). In 2010 TACO invested in what they called a 
‘wind tower hub’ which provided their profiling and bevelling capability. It was 
developed not to be specific to one customer, but to build a strategy where TACO could 
offer more value to their products and improve their customer’s operations in logistics 
and supply chain. This involved an investment by TACO of approximately £1m, for the 
facilities, land lease, and machinery, including two cutting machines and off-line 
bevelling equipment. Apart from supplying steel plate to fabricators for wind towers, 
TACO also wanted to enter the foundation solution market. This involved an investment 
of £2m in an ‘offshore processing centre’ that enabled TACO to provide steel solutions 
for foundations that included plate for pipe and other tubular products. The processing 
facility enabled TACO to flat pack and supply components to a fabricator, who would 
then be able fabricate the product much more quickly than when they previously received 
orders. The offshore processing centre also improved TACO’s capabilities in making 
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tubular sections up to a certain size for offshore jackets, which were normally very large 
compared to other industries TACO had supplied in the past. To help improve their 
knowledge and performance in this new product offering, TACO signed a joint venture 
with a leading Germany steel manufacturer EKCO who had a reputation for supplying 
high-quality large tubular sections for offshore foundations. Investments in the offshore 
processing centre included welding equipment that enabled TACO to make tubular and 
hollow sections for jacket foundations. 
When discussing the investments TACO made to overcome some of the challenges 
involved in entering the offshore wind industry, they pointed towards the further 
challenges faced, in the sense of the political situation that brought much uncertainty to 
investment by developers into the offshore wind market. They also realized that while 
they had developed the capabilities required by their customers, there were still parts of 
the supply chain that had not made similar investments and so were lacking, which had 
an impact on TACO. Political uncertainty was a major factor and barrier to relationship 
development in the offshore wind industry; for example, TACO’s customers had 
customers who withdrew from making any solid commitments in the offshore wind 
industry. Southern Scottish Energy (SSE) is a good example as they backed out of a lot 
of projects they were going to invest in, due to political uncertainty from the government. 
TACO invested significant time and money in promoting themselves in the offshore wind 
sector; they were known for supplying to wide range of sectors, including onshore wind; 
however, they invested to increase awareness of their capabilities to supply to offshore 
wind projects. Participant 2-1-4 was hired by TACO in 2010; she played a political role 
at TACO ensuring that the message conveyed a push for UK content and created 
awareness of TACO as a player in the offshore wind industry. Over the course of four 
years, Participant 2-1-4 would attend quarterly board meetings with their customers, the 
wind turbine manufacturers. At most of these board meetings, TACO would also be 
introduced to their customer’s customer, the developers, which enabled them to build 
relationships between key personnel of each organization. Participant 2-1-4: “We have 
made significant investments for the offshore wind sector. If someone asked us whether 
we could invest more, right now we are in difficult conditions; offshore hasn’t taken place 
as quick as we had hoped, and there is still a lot of traction required in the UK. There is 
no fabricator in the UK despite SICO making investment decisions. That’s good, but we 
still need someone who is going to need steel; it is a barrier at the moment.” 
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During the research period, as the offshore wind industry was still in its nascent stages, 
various solutions and designs were being put forward by potential suppliers; all of the 
designs offered in the market were in their prototype stage, leading to a lot of speculation 
and uncertainty in the market as to what solutions would be required for each project. The 
location and conditions varied among the upcoming green light projects.  Participant 2-
1-4: “It is a green project in its early stages, and we are waiting for some of the projects 
to break. However, we are actively engaged to try and support and help the development 
of a foundation solution with our clients.” 
This study also involved interviews with the Participant 2-1-5, council leader for North 
Lincolnshire Council (NLC) who was responsible for business and trade. An interview 
took place with the business and trade director of NLC, in which it was stressed that the 
council wanted to know more about the opportunities offshore wind could bring to the 
local economy. This involved working with TACO to identify the number of jobs that 
could be created in the area and the type of jobs that would be needed in the supply chain. 
It was stated that a great sum of investment was needed in infrastructure for the region to 
be able to provide a solid supply chain in offshore wind: the investment required would 
be approximately £160 million. NLC would also provide support towards TACO’s bids 
to customers that helped strengthen TACO’s case to win orders. The interview further 
pointed out that the industry was going through an uncertain period, with one of the main 
challenges being that there was no supply chain in place to serve a potential offshore wind 
farm. It was important for both TACO and NLC to work together to build a local supply 
chain to meet likely government requirements for local sourcing. 
The way TACO transacted with each customer was quite different; for example, for their 
customers based in Germany, TACO transacted and communicated with them through a 
distribution arm of TACO, which was an agent (TABB) based in Germany. Participant 
2-1-2 would transact with the TABB in Germany who would in turn transact with 
TACO’s German customers.  TABB would visit TACO’s customers in Germany more 
regularly than Participant 2-1-2, but Participant 2-1-2 would join him on most visits to 
provide support and build closer bonds with the customer. It was important for TACO to 
use TABB, as he was based within close proximity to their customer and was always on 
call to provide support and answer any queries. Further, it was important to use TABB, 
due to similarities in language and cultural perspectives. For customers in the UK, 
Participant 2-1-2 would take a direct lead, whilst in other regions of Europe TACO would 
use offices with locally based representatives. Participant 2-0-1: “Culturally, we use a 
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local contact which is probably quite different to other suppliers.” TACO would 
undertake a lot of work on account development plans, and improving internal processes 
such as how they evaluated what they forecast to sell to customers and how they 
developed those customer relationships accordingly. This involved using a customer 
relationship management tool called ‘focus’. TACO developed account development 
plans for all their key customers, including SWOT analysis and various other 
performance measurement indicators. TACO performed regular updates and reviews of 
their customer account development plans, to make sure that they were spending their 
time and efforts in the right areas but also on the right customers. Participant 2-1-2: “It’s 
quite a robust process.” 
TACO also conducted annual general customer satisfaction surveys that would be 
undertaken with all of their customers. The survey comprised a call by a research 
company who would interview the customer and ask for their feedback on TACO’s 
performance as well as their contribution to the relationship. Participant 2-1-2: “This 
allows us to set our objectives in line with the feedback so we know where to focus our 
energy and break that down into.” A survey from the previous year illustrated one main 
point that was raised on the commercial side of the business: TACO’s enquiry response 
times with customers. Highlighted was the fact that it was vitally important that, when 
receiving an enquiry, TACO would need provide an answer a lot more quickly than they 
had previously done, to win more jobs from existing customers as well as new ones. When 
TACO received an order from a customer, they had a pre-production meeting to sit down, 
plan, and get some acceptance from the customer that they were happy with how they 
would proceed with the order, what information would be shared between the partners, 
and how the partners would share all the documentation involved; for example, using 
electronic methods of sending documents such as test certificates. TACO would sit down 
and record all the staff members of the customer who would require specific 
documentation from various staff levels at TACO: supply chain managers, engineers, 
logistics managers, and production staff. The customer’s staff would then be set up on 
TACO’s system, so when the relevant documents were produced, they were automatically 
sent to the person the customer required; this would be the same for invoices and dispatch 
notes. Participant 2-1-2: “The documentation goes to the right people in the company to 
make the customers life easier.” 
TACO also built up a service level agreement (SLA) which was outside of the terms and 
conditions and legal contracts associated with each of their customer relationships. The 
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SLA was set up to approach the customer from a more personal angle and ensure that not 
only the transactional or technical elements of the relationship were evaluated. Participant 
2-0-1: “It’s more of the softer elements of the relationship; for example, if a customer 
sends us an enquiry, the SLA will let them know what TACO expect from the enquiry in 
order to quote it properly. For instance, the sizes, grades, tolerances. We have found that 
in the past it has been a back and forth process, as some enquiries lack the information 
we need, so setting an SLA formally saves a lot of time and gives the expectations of both 
sides.” Other parts of the SLA included frequency of meetings, where TACO would have 
a working document in place, which helped TACO tighten and engage more in the 
relationships they had with customers. Figure 16 below illustrates major events taking 
place in the OSW and steel industries, directly effecting TACO. 
 
Figure 16 Background of events - TACO 
4.1.2.1 Case #2.1 
For this case TACO was the focal firm and supplier, while SICO was the customer. 
Participants involved in the case included: 2-0-1: TACO Offshore wind operations 
director; 2-1-2: TACO Key account manager; 2-1-3: TACO Technical product manager; 
2-1-4: TACO Political representative; 2-1-6: TACO Danish HQ representative and 2-1-
8: SICO Business development manager – UK OSW market. Further details on the 
participants interviewed for this case can be found in the data collection schedule in 
Appendix 6. 
SICO is a German owned subsidiary, wind turbine manufacturer established in 1980 in 
Denmark. In 2011 SICO employed 7,800 staff, had 6.3% share of the world wind turbine 
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market and established their offshore wind headquarters in Hamburg, Germany. In 2015 
SICO had a combined market share of 63% of European offshore wind turbines. 
Awareness stage 
TACO was aware that to enter the offshore market and be selected by SICO to become a 
strategic supplier, their production and manufacturing capabilities had to meet stringent 
quality standards. It was also key that TACO could develop their logistics capabilities to 
deliver to the requirements of offshore wind construction projects, which would often 
require JIT delivery as well as sequence deliveries of specific parts. TACO could improve 
their quality standards as well as logistics capabilities by developing a good relationship 
with SICO and building their trust to start joint initiatives. SICO’s complementary 
knowledge would help TACO develop their own capabilities so they could provide a solid 
product and potentially win orders from other turbine OEMS in the market.  
TACO first met SICO at an offshore wind exhibition in 2009 where TACO’s sales 
manager and commercial manager met SICO’s procurement staff and UK director. From 
their first meeting in 2009 until early 2011, there were no transactions between the two 
companies. TACO had staff based in Copenhagen, referred to in this study as Participant 
2-1-6, who was made responsible for developing the relationship with SICO’s staff at 
their Danish HQ. This would involve monthly visits to SICO’s HQ in Brande to discuss 
TACO’s investments in the offshore wind industry and their new capabilities and product 
offerings to the market as well as future project pipelines. TACO had not undertaken a 
project in the offshore wind industry at the time of meeting SICO and deemed SICO a 
feasible partner and key to their entrance to the market. TACO was aware of SICO’s 
strong reputation and experience in offshore wind, with SICO holding a monopoly in the 
turbine OEM market. TACO did have some transactions with SICO previously, but these 
were for products not related to the offshore wind industry and involved staff in other 
areas of TACO’s and SICO’s organizations. 
Exploration stage 
Monthly visits with updates of TACO’s operations began which included visits from 
TACO’s UK staff, including Participant 2-1-2, 2-1-3 and 2-1-4 as well as production, 
technical and engineering staff; thus, the relationship between the two companies spanned 
multiple levels not only in the UK but also throughout TACO’s offices and agents in 
Europe. The regular meetings involving numerous staff allowed the two companies to 
build social bonds, develop common ground, and identify common goals between the two 
138 
 
organizations and personnel. There would be clear expectations set out regarding the type 
of information shared between the companies; for example, general market information, 
market demand, and project pipelines, as well as financial information and views on the 
steel plate market. Other expectations were set out such as the frequency of 
communication, the time for responding to SICO’s enquiries, and future potential joint 
initiatives the two companies could work on.  
Both organizations were taking part in two-way information exchange where SICO would 
provide TACO with an idea of their future pipeline and projects they were looking to 
secure, whilst TACO provided SICO with sensitive financial data that enabled SICO to 
calculate exact costs and include them in their bid to developers. This showed SICO that 
TACO trusted them and was willing to share whatever data necessary to strengthen the 
relationship and win an order from SICO. TACO offered a mature product to SICO, 
whilst SICO was a major manufacturer of technical process equipment for manufacturing 
industries and so offered complementary products to TACO, as TACO would purchase 
SICO’s new systems and process technologies to use in their steel mills. SICO had a 
choice of many steel suppliers apart from TACO: in the UK, they had a choice between 
TACO and another major steel producer. In Europe, there was a large selection of 
suppliers from Germany, Turkey, Poland and Sweden; some known for their quality 
whilst others known for their low cost. Then further away, there were suppliers in China, 
who could offer steel at very low rates compared to the rest of Europe and the UK.  
Despite facing tough competition from high-quality experienced suppliers as well as low 
cost suppliers, TACO could offer advantages to SICO that suppliers outside of the UK 
could not. TACO’s competitors would transport their steel to SICO by sea, which would 
take days and could involve port delays leading to higher costs and risks, which were 
especially important when considering offshore wind construction. Due to TACO’s close 
proximity to the offshore wind development sites, TACO could transport their steel by 
rail to SICO’s potential waterside facility within 20 minutes. Their competitors would not 
be able to achieve the same efficiency unless they invested significantly in facilities in 
the UK. During the construction stage of the wind turbine, TACO could provide an agile 
logistics strategy that would be low risk, low cost and efficient. There would be a very 
rare chance of delays, and production could be planned to achieve high cost savings. 
Compatibility between the partners from being in such close proximity to one another 
would ensure a close working relationship and higher chances of trust being built; 
therefore, SICO saw TACO as a feasible partner. 
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Expansion stage  
Towards the end of 2011, TACO secured an order for 25,000 tonnes of high-quality 
profiled steel plate that would be used to build 150 onshore wind towers from SICO. The 
contract would run until January 2013 and was the largest to date for TACO’s dedicated 
wind tower hub. The deal was worth an eight-figure-pound sum and established TACO 
strategic customer alliance with SICO. Participant 2-1-4: “This major contract, and our 
position as SICO’s nominated sub-contractor, is a direct result of the investment in our 
[TACO] wind tower hub and a great deal of work from the TACO team,” 
Being part of a strategic customer alliance with SICO helped TACO become a step closer 
to their main objective, which was to be SICO’s key supplier in the offshore wind market. 
The final shipment of the 25,000t order was delivered in January 2013 and the fulfilment 
of this order was perceived to be executed well by TACO. However, shortly after the final 
delivery, TACO’s key account manager left the department and was replaced by 
Participant 2-1-2. Shortly after fulfilling SICO’s order, TACO ran an initiative to improve 
the steel plate surface quality of their steel. The steel they had been supplying to SICO 
was delivered to SICO’s nominated fabricators who were not entirely happy with the 
quality of TACO’s steel. The fabricators found that when they received the steel, there 
were significant proportions of rework needing to be undertaken, which added on time 
and costs to the fabricators’ operations. Participant 2-0-1 admitted that there would 
always be some rework required and usually expected from TACO’s customers. 
TACO wanted to make sure the quality was improved to meet EURONORM standards, 
thereby improving the fabricators’ processing times and ultimately reducing the costs of 
their customer, SICO. Not only would the quality initiative improve the processing time 
of the fabricators, but it was also put in place to improve TACO’s logistics capabilities; 
Participant 2-1-2: “It is massively going to help us remove time and cost out of the supply 
chain.” To start the quality initiative, TACO staff including the mill production staff, 
technical managers, and product managers visited SICO with the key account managers 
to explain the benefits of working together with SICO on the initiative. They wanted 
SICO to be involved and to invest in the initiative so the two companies would come 
closer and develop common goals; also, for TACO to gain knowledge from SICO on how 
the quality initiative could be started and would work. After several visits by staff from 
both organizations, a joint project between TACO’s mills in Northern England and 
Scotland and SICO was agreed. 
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The joint quality initiative required heavy investment by TACO in terms of time, 
dedicating personnel and capital investment in their mills. The initiative involved visits 
to TACO’s mills by specialists at SICO to split up the processes involved when rolling 
steel plate in the mill and to identify surface quality issues. It also involved large project 
teams, with members from shop floor to senior levels of TACO’s organization. An 
outcome of the programme was that it developed stringent routines on cleaning equipment 
after a certain amount of rolling and recording it. Previously staff would not have known 
whether the equipment had been cleaned adequately or not. Another outcome resulted in 
a deep clean of TACO’s mills as previously equipment in the mill rattled and surface 
debris would fall on to the plate surface, reducing the quality of the finish. Participant 2-
1-3: “Improving the surface quality allows for less rework, less start and stop during the 
process, less welding repairs on tower sections… If you get far down the process, and it’s 
only on paint application that you notice the issue in a particular section of the tower, then 
you will have to take that section out of the process; it adds a lot more time onto the 
process and affects their ability to complete a project on time.” 
TACO immediately saw the benefits of starting the initiative with SICO, as its 
manufacturing capabilities were instantly improved. The initiative also solved issues 
faced by TACO previously that were associated with the identification of plates. Usually 
once manufactured, TACO would store the plates in its warehouse facility; however, the 
problem was that it was hard to locate the plates once an order had been received, as they 
were usually not marked or easily identifiable. As a result of the quality initiative, TACO 
would stamp and mark each plate that was produced which led to them never having 
issues finding the right plate when it was needed. Even with SLAs and expectations set 
out at the beginning of the relationship, there were issues with the frequency and 
timeliness of information sharing from SICO. While TACO would provide on-time, on-
demand information to SICO whenever they required, the same was not delivered by 
SICO to TACO’s staff when they enquired for specific data on future pipelines and orders. 
There was a slight issue with trust emerging, as well as uncertainty in the relationship. 
Information sharing from SICO to TACO began two-way, but after the order was fulfilled 
communication started to become one way from TACO’s side only, which made it hard 
for the staff to build trust in the relationship. TACO wanted to know SICO’s future plans 
and potential projects they would be getting involved in, so they could plan ahead and 
minimize their production costs; however, SICO provided information that was often 
delayed which ramped up the costs for TACO, as they would receive a potential order 
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from SICO and have limited time to plan production and fulfil the order effectively. 
Participant 2-0-1: “SICO will secure capacity and have a good idea of demand, but they 
will wait until projects drop and at that point will load a steel supplier with order. The 
projects can vary, so whether they are in the UK or overseas will depend on where you 
free issue the steel to (that was the case during that time).” Despite the one-way 
communication from SICO, and a slight concern about mutual trust from TACO, the level 
of contact between TACO and SICO continued at a reasonable level, with regular 
telephone calls, and face-to-face meetings at trade shows. 
Dissolution stage 
After delivering the order for 25,000t to SICO, TACO did not receive another order they 
were hoping for as SICO had not received an order from their customer, the developers, 
due to uncertainty around contracts for difference and electricity market reforms. Despite 
the ongoing investment in their relationship with SICO and no potential orders in the near 
future, TACO saw it important to maintain the relationship with SICO so they were in 
place to supply SICO when the next offshore wind project would break. A year later SICO 
contacted TACO, as they were looking to place another large order of steel plate for a 
contract they had won from a developer of a major offshore wind site that had been given 
the green light.  
TACO was aware that some OEMs would give steel plate procurement responsibility to 
their suppliers, and would use various procurement methods such as e-bids to decide on 
the supplier, but could also use a list of preferred suppliers that were on the tower 
fabricators’ procurement lists. In some cases, the tower fabricators would then procure 
their own steel, due to their experience in procuring and relationships with steel mills. 
Participant 2-1-3: “The procurement process depended on who the work was for and 
where the work was going.” In SICO’s case, steel procurement responsibility was given 
to the tower fabricators and so it was essential for TACO to have good working 
relationships with the OEMs and the tower fabricators. TACO had long-running 
relationships with almost all of the tower fabricators in the market; Participant 2-1-2 
particularly knew the procurement staff on a personal level and this brought high levels 
of compatibility in the relationship with SICO and its supply chain. As a result, TACO 
believed they had a strong case for working with SICO, compared to their competitors.  
However, unlike before when SICO purchased from TACO based on their relationship, 
SICO decided to put the tender to the market via a Dutch auction that was open to 
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suppliers throughout Europe. The new procurement strategy adopted by SICO was 
structured and transparent and used e-bids. Participant 2-0-1: “It was not the traditional 
method of procurement where a supplier can transact and negotiate with the customer.” 
TACO had used e-bids in the past, in particular, e-bids both in supplying material but also 
when procuring it, which is what they were expecting in the offshore wind industry.  
TACO participated in the bid along with numerous other European competitors, but was 
unsuccessful from a price perspective. When asked to comment on what relationship stage 
TACO was currently in with SICO, Participant 2-1-2 explained: “We have experienced 
moving through the expansion stage with SICO but then tracking back” …. We find that, 
despite having a mature relationship, for example with SICO. The fact that we got a big 
contract in 2012 and delivered it, despite having a strong relationship, you can find that 
you may not supply again for several years; that’s the way they work. Participant 2-0-1 
commented further: “You may have a long-term relationship with a customer but that 
does not mean that the transactions are long-term.” 
In March 2014, SICO invested £310m in turbine blade manufacturing facilities in Hull 
for their intended new 6MW turbine model. TACO had previously strengthened their 
capabilities with the help of SICO and were now capable of producing most of the size 
specifications required in the offshore market, yet SICO’s 6MW model required a size 
TACO was not capable of producing. TACO was faced with a decision on whether to 
invest in capital equipment for a larger slab caster or buy the slab from elsewhere and roll 
it through their mill that was capable of rolling the larger slab sizes. Participant 2-0-1: “It 
is a case of chicken or the egg; this is due to the fact there is no tower fabricator in the 
UK that requires the larger slab size at the moment, so there is no obvious firm 
commitment; however, larger slab sizes will be required in the future.” Participant 2-1-2 
commented further about the uncertainty TACO faced: “We are aware of the investment 
decision made by SICO in Hull, to make the 6MW turbine. We know that at some point 
there will be an overseas offshore tower fabricator wanting to come into the UK to make 
offshore towers. There are rumours of who that might be but we don’t know; we just need 
to make sure that we are in the right position to support the demand for offshore steel.” 
The relationship died out because the two companies were not able to re-ignite the 
relationship during a period of one year with no transactions. Participant 2-1-3: “It’s a 
fine line for both the buyer and supplier; if you’re not too careful, you can revert back to 
the very early stages of the relationship and you forget what each other offers and requires 
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in the relationship.” Another factor that prevented the companies from moving to 
expansion stage was SICO’s sole focus to purchase based on cost in their second tender. 
The two companies had worked previously and built trust and common working 
procedures together. There was a history of personal relationships and compatibility 
between the two organizations; nevertheless, SICO did not respond mutually and consider 
alternative suppliers, as most likely they were unhappy with the quality despite TACO’s 
investments to deliver to SICO’s standards. The same mistake made again on delivering 
the product to correct standards proved to speed up relationship dissolution (Chen et al., 
2019). Participant 2-0-1: “You want a relationship as consistent as possible; it’s how you 
keep injecting life into that relationship and making sure you maintain a high level of 
contact and discussions. If a customer was busy procuring a contract from another 
supplier, then naturally they would spend more time on that than with a supplier that 
wasn’t supplying.” Figure 17 below illustrates TACO and SICOs relationship 
development timeline. 
 
Figure 17 TACO and SICO relationship development timeline 
4.1.2.2 Case #2.2 
This case involves TACO as the focal firm and supplier, WTCO is the customer. The case 
is informed through multiple interviews with the following participants: 2-0-1: TACO 
Offshore wind operations director and 2-1-2: TACO Key account manager. Further 
details on the participants interviewed for this case can be found in the data collection 
schedule in Appendix 6.  
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WTCO was first established in 2011 with an 80% investment from Southern Scottish 
Energy (SSE) and a 20% investment from Highlands and Islands Enterprise. It is a 
specialist supplier of wind turbine towers to markets across Europe and the only offshore 
turbine tower manufacturer based in the UK. WTCO has an 18.25-hectare site based in 
Argyll, Scotland and currently employs 130 people. They supply turbine towers for 
several wind turbine manufacturers involved in this study such as SICO and other major 
wind turbine OEMs based in Europe. Other customers of WTCO include energy 
companies’ SSE and Scottish Power. Further details on the participants interviewed for 
this case can be found in the data collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
Awareness stage 
The relationship between TACO and WTCO first began in 2002 when WTCO was 
formerly owned by a major European OEM wind turbine manufacturer. In 2006 Vestas 
sold facility to Skycon, (been through various ownerships). TACO and WTCO started 
transacting in 2008 when TACO supplied OEMs who would then contract WTCO to do 
the fabrication. In effect, WTCO were being supplied by TACO but there were no 
transactions between the two companies. The OEMs would transact with TACO for the 
steel and then use WTCO to fabricate the towers, and then sell to a developer (e.g. SSE). 
The companies first met in March 2013 at All Energy wind conference in Aberdeen where 
TACO’s sales representative met procurement staff from WTCO; this brought about a 
more direct conversation between the two companies and started their relationship. 
WTCO were new to the offshore industry; as a result, their offshore wind tower solutions 
were designed from scratch and had varying design specifications. TACO’s priority at 
this stage was to invest much of their time and knowledge into developing WTCO’s 
capabilities and complementary resources to gain their trust. Participant 2-1-2: I have 
engaged a guy in what’s called ‘customer technical services’ (WTCO), who is an advisory 
engineer, and I have said, if you need any more in-depth technical knowledge, we have 
the resources at TACO to help you.” From March 2013 to June 2013, TACO’s sales reps 
and WTCO procurement team began discussions on future projects; this led to a small 
order being placed by WTCO for replacement steel in July 2013. Previously WTCO 
would be free issued steel by the OEMs, but now they would be responsible for the 
procurement process. A pre-production meeting was arranged where staff from both 
companies met to discuss capabilities and solutions.  
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Exploration stage 
At this stage WTCO were new to the process of steel procurement; previously, when 
being free issued steel, Participant 2-1-2: “WTCO would not pay particular attention to 
the type of steel procured, i.e. grade, size, solutions.” Once responsible for the 
procurement process, TACO sales representatives worked with WTCO’s procurement 
team to explain procurement processes to them and help them understand more about the 
product they would be buying. This involved several HQ visits by staff on both sides and 
technical knowledge exchange between individuals in both organizations. Participant 2-
1-2 listened to the tower fabricators’ engineering and production staff to make changes to 
the quality and profiling of their steel, to improve fabrication speed at the fabricators. 
After the order was delivered in August 2013, staff at TACO suggested a supplier open 
day where staff from WTCO would visit TACO’s steel mill to get a better idea of the 
processes and value-added services TACO offer. A customer satisfaction survey was sent 
to WTCO shortly after receiving the delivery of their small order and in August, staff 
from both companies worked together on gathering feedback on the quality of the product 
they received. Discussions regarding future pipelines also took place to give TACO a 
better idea of WTCO’s order book and to work out what proportion of orders would be 
from different customers; for example, developers or OEMs. This gave TACO a better 
idea of which relationships to focus and spend more energy on.  The customer satisfaction 
survey yielded good feedback; however, two areas for improvement were suggested by 
WTCO. One was the quality of the product, as WTCO would receive steel plate with 
surface quality issues and the other was unsatisfactory delivery performance. Following 
the feedback and suggested areas for improvement, the sales representative at TACO 
organized a visit to WTCO HQ, but this time bringing TACO’s commercial manager and 
mill plant manager.  The visit was used to talk about the TACO investment in the quality 
initiative they were undertaking and to show WTCO that they were actively trying to 
improve their product quality and position themselves for once a project would break.  
Order book information sharing was in August 2013; Participant 2-1-2: “We discuss 
future pipelines in order to get a better idea of WTCO’s order book, to work out what 
proportion of WTCO order book are from different customers (developers, OEMs).  This 
was done so we would know which relationships were best to focus our energy on. To be 
honest, it is a combination; we have around 25/30 different people we are maintaining 
contact with.” TACO’s mill plant manager gave presentations to the commercial 
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managers of WTCO; the plant manager also inspected WTCO’s facilities to understand 
why it was so critical to get the surface quality of the product right. He then brought the 
message back to TACO. Participant 2-1-2: “Bringing the mill manager with me to when 
meeting with WTCO worked really well and strengthened our relationship.” WTCO 
attended a conference where TACO lent their tower turbine model used at previous 
conferences to put on display. This was also accompanied by publicity material that 
would promote the current relationship between WTCO and TACO.  
TACO introduced a service level agreement (SLA) for their relationship with WTCO, 
which was outside of terms and conditions and legal formalities and focused more on the 
softer elements of the relationship. For example, if a customer sent TACO an enquiry, the 
SLA would let them know what TACO expected from the enquiry to quote it properly, 
e.g. the sizes, grades, tolerances. Participant 2-0-1: “We have found that in the past it has 
been a back and forth process, as some enquiries lack the information we need, so setting 
an SLA formally saves a lot of time and gives the expectations of both sides. Other parts 
of the SLA included a working document detailing the frequency of meetings, which 
helped strengthen their relationships with WTCO. The SLA helped evaluated each 
partner’s performance and capabilities they brought to the relationship, which reduced 
some uncertainty and made it easier to test goal compatibility between the two partners. 
Expansion stage 
Both organizations had a good idea of what the other could bring to the relationship; they 
both found common ground in their goals and working relationships. Both showed 
goodwill to each other where information shared was a two-way process and there was 
mutual trust in each other. Moreover, TACO showed WTCO that they were willing to 
take risks and invest in their relationship to satisfy WTCO. Whilst WTCO had 
experienced some quality issues with TACO’s previous deliveries, they were convinced 
that TACO would do everything possible to ensure these quality issues were solved if 
they were to win another order. The exchange of information between the two partners 
intensified: TACO offered support to WTCO by providing market knowledge and 
sourcing strategies with WTCO and shared highly sensitive information with WTCO, to 
reduce uncertainties WTCO faced being a new to the steel industry. This helped reduce 
WTCO’s risk and gave them a clearer idea about TACO’s intentions for their future 
cooperation. 
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Consequently, through multiple staff visits, two-way technical knowledge exchange and 
SLAs in place, in December 2013 TACO received a second order from WTCO that was 
larger than the first. A month later another order was placed that would run until summer 
2014; Participant 2-0-1: “It is now starting to get more consistent.” A technical visit to 
WTCO by one of TACO’s specialist welding staff was proposed but had not yet taken 
place. The welding engineer was part of TACO’s research and development centre and 
focused on improvements in welding processes taken from experience in ship building. 
The welding staff member formed a partnership with a welding equipment supplier so 
they could go into WTCO and offer the technology to weld, as well as the best method to 
weld efficiently. The visit would involve suggesting ways in which WTCO could improve 
their welding process and shorten their welding times.  Due to TACO’s strong experience 
in the steel industry, it was clear that they could offer many complementary competences 
to WTCO, and could improve their competences in manufacturing if they decided to work 
with TACO in the long-run. 
The development of the partnership faced challenges due to the Scottish political 
situation, which created a lot of uncertainty as WTCO’s customer was a Scottish 
government enterprise. TACO wanted to assure WTCO that it would do everything 
possible to support WTCO in the other areas under their control, to develop a long-term 
agreement. Participant 2-1-2: “WTCO is an interesting company, as they are proposing 
to go into offshore as opposed to a foreign tower fabricator coming into the UK. They are 
trying to put a case together to the Scottish government, but it is all very political due to 
the referendum on independence. It is very political as WTCO is 80% owned by SSE and 
20% owned by Highlands and Islands (a Scottish Government enterprise).” 
Despite high political uncertainties affecting the market, the two companies continued to 
communicate and meet to discuss ways to improve efficiency in their manufacturing 
operations. There was a silver lining to the political cloud as it was suggested many of 
the proposed Scottish wind farms would require local content, with WTCO likely to be 
chosen as a supplier of local content. Consequently, TACO raised the importance of 
keeping their relationship with WTCO engaged and on-going, keeping up the discussion 
so as not to revert to earlier stages. It was vital to TACO that WTCO were satisfied and 
to select them as a key strategic supplier; therefore, TACO invested all their efforts in 
providing support to WTCO, through technical knowledge and market exchange, 
updating and improving their existing joint initiatives, as well as discussing ideas for 
future initiatives together. WTCO recognized that TACO was bringing a lot to the table; 
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they also felt a close bond between the organizations that was a result of working closely 
together over two years, delivering and working on orders, and evaluating and improving 
each other’s performance and capabilities. Each partner was satisfied with the other’s 
performance and what they could bring to the relationship. There was a mutual 
understanding that, once the political situation had blown over, the orders would start to 
flow in and both parties were ready to work together for future orders. Figure 18 below 
illustrates the relationship development timeline for TACO and WTCO. 
 
Figure 18 TACO and WTCO relationship development timeline 
4.1.2.3 Case #2.3 
This case examines TACO as the focal firm who is a supplier to MACO, the customer. 
The case involved numerous interviews, over a period of two years with the following 
participants: 2-1-2: TACO Key account manager; 2-1-3: TACO Technical product 
manager and 2-1-4: TACO Political representative. Further details on the participants 
interviewed for this case can be found in the data collection schedule in Appendix 6. 
The relationship between TACO and MACO spans over 50 years. MACO is a British 
family- owned company and was founded in 1923. MACO employs over 1,000 people in 
140 countries and has an annualized turnover of £100 million. The company specializes 
in supplying fabricated steel bridging, structural steelwork and associated services 
internationally. Participants interviewed for this case can be found in Appendix 6. 
Awareness stage  
Social bonds between TACO’s sales team and MACO’s procurement team grew stronger. 
From a customer’s perspective, TACO would talk to MACO’s procurement team on a 
day-to-day basis. Furthermore, on a higher level, communication between commercial 
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managers of both organisations would take place once a week. The TACO political 
representative would be in regular contact with MACO’s PR and marketing team to 
develop joint press releases. Key account manager, Participant 2-1-3: “We are well 
engaged throughout the whole of their organization.” Previously, the relationship with 
MACO was with Britain’s largest steel company, which was acquired by TACO. Before 
supplying towers to MACO, the relationship involved supplying steel for MACO’s bridge 
business. In 2008, a new opportunity arose for MACO to enter the UK wind market. This 
required MACO to search for suppliers to procure steel, to manufacture turbine towers 
for upcoming onshore wind projects. However, MACO did not have future plans to enter 
the offshore wind sector; Participant 2-1-2: “I see MACO’s position being more stable in 
the onshore sector, but they do not have ambitions to enter the offshore wind sector.” 
Exploration stage 
In 2010, MACO began working with TACO on onshore turbine towers. At this point, 
MACO were new to the onshore tower industry whilst TACO already had 10 years’ 
experience. From the start of the relationship, TACO and MACO conducted quarterly 
commercial and technical visits to each other’s headquarters, something they had been 
doing for years previously when working on projects in other industries. Commercial 
visits involved sharing information regarding market demand and potential upcoming 
projects MACO would be involved in or bidding for, as well as cost structures and pricing 
information from both partners. The ongoing meetings on how to develop the supply 
chain enabled both companies to build common ground and build compatible working 
practices on top of the informal structures and personal relationships that had already 
existed. 
In early 2011 MACO invested £38 million in a facility in Newhouse, UK, specifically for 
the manufacture of wind turbine towers and other tubular products. After the investment, 
numerous technical visits were made to each company’s HQ by both sides of production 
staff, to share technical information and improve MACO’s knowledge on the process of 
profiling plate. Other technical visits involved MACO graduates visiting TACO’s mill to 
get more in-depth knowledge of the products being supplied to MACO. Whilst working 
with MACO for over four years on towers, TACO have been able to tailor their service 
to MACO’s requirements. Despite TACO’s product being commoditized and in its 
mature stage, TACO have been able to create value through up-selling their services to 
MACO, as well as creating joint initiatives to identify solutions to cut cost together. Partly 
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due to the previous ties between MACO and TACO’s previous owners, there was a high 
level of mutual trust built up over the many years both companies had worked together. 
Both companies shared a high level of trust which continued with TACO and led to 
mutual information sharing and knowledge exchange. The personal relationships between 
personnel of both companies grew stronger. Participant 2-1-2 commented on TACO’s 
relationship with MACO: “It is a fairly open relationship in terms of project pipeline: they 
keep us informed about what projects are breaking.” 
Expansion stage 
An opportunity to strengthen the relationship arose in 2013. After several technical visits 
by TACO production staff explaining the benefits of a tailor-made approach to their 
services, MACO suggested the two partners start what was known as the sequence 
production initiative. Previously, MACO would order steel in quantity from TACO and, 
once received, store it in bulk at their facility, which would then need to be managed for 
sequenced production of towers. The sequence production initiative involved TACO 
tailoring its pricing structures to maximize the value of their services. One immediate 
benefit this would achieve would be the shortening lead times, through TACO reserving 
their rolling plan, giving MACO up to the last minute to place an order on a project. This 
enabled MACO to hold less stock as they wouldn’t need to order in bulk quantity, store 
the product outside, and then manage the product sequence once ready to be processed. 
Instead, the steel plate could be delivered to MACO via in-can sequence or section 
sequence. This improved MACO’s cash-flow immediately as they would hold less stock; 
it also improved production efficiency as well as reducing lead-times of MACO’s 
operations. Key account manager 2-1-2: “It works very well.”  
Commitment stage 
The relationship between TACO and MACO was at a mature stage due to both parties 
fully understanding each other’s requirements and offerings, as well as capabilities. There 
was a strong bond and feeling of mutual trust, where the relationship was said to be ‘very 
supportive’ and ‘two-way’. Participant 2-1-4 commented on the relationship with 
MACO: “We can describe our relationship with some customers as mature as we know 
how they transact, what they require, and what we can offer, but every time a longer-term 
project breaks we find ourselves returning to the early stages. But there is an underlying 
relationship and maturity in everything we have done in the past.” Figure 19 below 
illustrates the relationship development timeline of TACO and MACO. 
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Figure 19 - TACO – MACO relationship development timeline 
4.1.3 Case #3 
This case analysis the relationships between BRCO, the focal firm and a number of its 
customers, these include: GRCO, STRCO, SKANCO and BAMCO. The following 
participants were involved in this case study; 3-0-1: BRCO OSW operations director; 3-
1-2: BRCO Key account manager; 3-1-3: BRCO Technical product manager; 3-1-4: 
Concrete centre director; 3-1-5: ABCO Business development manager; 3-1-6: ABCO 
Director; 3-1-7: Consultant – OSW consultant. Further details about the interviews can 
be found in Appendix 6. 
BRCO was founded in 1908 and specializes in the design and development of bar 
reinforcement and welded wire mesh. BRCO is the largest manufacturer of steel 
reinforcement and associated products in the UK. BRCO operate a steel mill in Wales 
and several regional depots around the UK. The reinforced steel manufacturer owns 60% 
of the UK’s rebar market and source 95% of their steel from the UK scrap metal market. 
One of BRCO’s main selling points is the visibility of their supply chain. Their scrap 
metal is collected in the UK, taken to their factory to be milled, delivered to their regional 
facilities, and transported to fabricators. BRCO offer 100% UK content and have very 
low carbon emissions in their manufacturing process. BRCO also have a BES 6001 
certification for the responsible sourcing of construction products. They pride themselves 
on their supply chain on being sustainable, responsible, and safe. To offer a new product 
for the OSW sector, BRCO have recently certified a new product named Ellipse. This 
enables radius bending of rebar that improves production volume and time significantly. 
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BRCO introduced sustainability benefits to the supply chain through the local sourcing 
of raw materials (scrap metal usually from cars) where all scrap is from the UK and from 
within an average 200-mile radius. BRCO aims to increase the sustainability of its supply 
chain through delivering rebar by rail from its main facilities in Wales to BRCO 
fabrication units, cutting CO2 emissions from road transportation. BRCO is also 
considering delivering stock bar by sea for specific projects, some of the Round 3 UK 
OSW farm projects. The supply chain sustainability benefits are highlighted through 
having a number of fabrication yards geographically spread across the UK, with low 
delivery distances (typically 75 miles) allowing BRCO to concentrate on local projects. 
Participant 3-1-2: “We have a good story, 98% recycled content, 2% lost in slag that is 
skimmed off the top that is sold on for road coverings … All scrap is UK sourced … We 
would only buy scrap from outside the UK if there is a major shortage or crisis; last time 
we bought scrap outside the UK was five years ago.” 
Through numerous interviews with BRCO, key capabilities and competences were 
highlighted including various benefits and cost savings in the supply chain have been 
identified: 
- Using higher grade steel can result in less overall steel being used in the 
foundation. 
- Unlike many of its competitors, as BRCO is part of CECO Group, they can order 
steel at exact lengths instead of industry standard lengths, removing the costs 
associated with cutting rebar and waste levels. 
- Through talks with gravity base foundation manufacturers, BRCO have developed 
a new rebar product ‘Ellipse’, that is easier to bend compared to standard rebar 
allowing higher volumes to be produced faster. 
- They are a vertically integrated company providing full visibility of the supply 
chain. 
- All scrap steel is sourced within the UK. 
- BRCO aim to use rail or sea to transport steel products depending on location. 
Round three Crown Estate sites, in particular, Dogger Bank and Hornsea, comprise 
9000MW and 4000MW respectively. With turbine innovations at present, it is likely that 
turbines in the range of 5MW will be used for these mentioned projects. Thus, Dogger 
Bank will require approximately 1800 turbines, and Hornsea, 800 turbines. At present, 
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there is a wide range of foundation solutions being used in the market; these include, 
monopiles, tripiles, jacket structures, and concrete gravity foundations. 
This case study also involved several interviews with the director of the Concrete Centre, 
who heads the special interest group for concrete gravity foundations for the UK OSW 
market. In the first interest group meeting that took place in March 2011, the group 
discussed the likely supply overview of CGFs for round three projects. They agreed on 
an “optimistic” figure of 25% of all round three demand, in response to the Crown 
Estate’s requirement for an alternative to the structural steel solutions. Later in 2011 the 
group stated that 30% should be a “minimum” figure. In January 2013, the Crown Estate 
suggested the target should be raised to 40%. Considering these estimates, calculations 
were made as to the estimated number of CGFs that will be required for two specific 
round three projects; Dogger Bank and Hornsea. Table 3 below shows that in a low case 
scenario of 20% of demand being fulfilled with CGSs, the number of CGSs required is 
520, while in the high case of 40% the number is 1040.  
Wind farm Capacity No. Of 
turbines 
CGF - Low 
(20%) 
CGF - High 
(40%) 
Dogger 
Bank 
9000MW 1800 360 720 
Hornsea 4000MW 800 160 320 
Total 1.3GW 2600 520 1040 
Table 3 CGF Demand estimates discussed at OSW SIG Meetings 
Participant 3-1-2: “We have also invested through the funding application to get funding 
for machinery to make our new product, money that needs to be spent first before it is 
claimed back through the funding offered” “funding is retrospective.” One of BRCO’s 
customers GRCO received £660,000 from government industrial funds, that they claim 
has been more hassle than good, as they have had to explain exactly where that money 
has been spent. Participant 3-0-1: “But it is not easy to do that when you are developing 
a product. They’ve [GRCO] said, it’s a full-time job for someone to sit down and manage 
the claiming back of expenses.” Participant 3-1-3 visited Germany in 2011 to look at 
machinery with a spend of $450,000 in mind (four machines); however, BRCO could 
only claim back the depreciation of those machines. Participant 3-1-3: “So you have to 
demonstrate the expenditure, pounds per hour per man etc. and then work out the 
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depreciation, then they may question the figure, so it goes back and forth, very 
cumbersome.” 
Participant 3-1-3: “The time we invest in offshore wind is hundreds of thousands of 
pounds … If we stop the steel mill in Cardiff to change the production line from standard 
rebar to trial 100 tonnes of BRCO new product, the mill reckon it will cost them more 
than £50,000 every time they do it, due to changeover, different billet/temperatures 
needed, also bending, moving around the factory, man hours, transportation … After 
paying £50,000 to change production line which brings disruption to the factory, we then 
have to transport it to our fabrication yard in Mansfield to be radius bent, then you have 
four men working two days bending the rebar …  After that, it is transported back to the 
steel mill to be re-scrapped … £200 per tonne can be knocked off due to it being re-
scrapped … So, the overall cost stands at around £30,000 … So, for the trial run you have 
around 120 tonnes at £420 per tonne (£50,000) knock off, plus four men, plus transport 
etc.… A trial run for the Ellipse product will cost £80,000 per run plus man hours, 
transportation, disruption to the factory; that’s why we are going to TSB to look for 
funding as it is not cheap.” 
Entering the offshore wind industry meant that BRCO had to form relationships with 
ports that would be involved in the installation and construction phases of UK offshore 
wind farms. This required key personnel from BRCO establishing and building close 
working relationships with UK port staff, not only in the UK but also in Scotland. 
Participant 3-0-1: “We also have good relationships with a local port and SRCO and 
similar relationships with Scottish ports. BRCO spent much time and effort to develop 
relationships with ABCO, a £450m port development located centrally in the UK on the 
South Bank of the River Humber. ABCO forms the UK’s largest developable land bank 
(366.7 hectares) with a deep-water frontage (1,389m) and provides a purpose built 
environmentally-friendly facility to suit the needs of the Offshore Marine Renewables 
Sector, especially OSW. ABCO is a nationally-supported development. Prime Minister 
David Cameron and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg recently stated their public 
support for a positive planning determination: “…This [ABCO] is a very important 
investment. We all want to see the Humber estuary become a real magnet for investment, 
particularly green energy investment…” (Prime Minister David Cameron, 11th September 
2013, PMQ). 
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Costing exercises took place between an ABCO and BRCO to demonstrate to BRCO 
customers that a manufacturing facility for concrete gravity bases could be set up on port-
side to serve UK government round three demand. The exercise included costs that BRCO 
would incur; for example, the rent on facilities at the port, the machinery and staff 
invested into a facility as well as the port’s costs. This would then be shown to BRCO 
customers to demonstrate BRCO willingness to invest in the relationship given that they 
would receive orders and build a long-term relationship with their customer. This showed 
the commitment that BRCO was willing to make towards its customers and showed a 
long-term vision of their relationship. BRCO demonstrated that they could set up a facility 
on the port for one of their customers that would reduce the logistics costs for steel 
tonnage that could be shipped in on barges from BRCO’s main facility.  However, when 
discussing the opportunity for BRCO to set-up a facility on port side, Participant 3-1-4 
mentioned that a significant investment would be needed by BRCO and so they would 
require a long-term partnership with a CGF manufacturer with guaranteed order to make 
the investment feasible. Participant 3-1-4: “Machinery needs to be cares certified, which 
is costly, so unless they have a long-term order placed with customer, it is likely they will 
produce, cut and bend rebar at existing facilities and transport it to the port ready for 
assembly, where it will be fixed together. “The uncertainty within the OSW sector was 
high, with future pipelines for projects being changed regularly; however, the volumes 
that were being considered were still attractive for BRCO to invest in their OSW 
capabilities. Participant 3-1-4: “There was 48GW of Wind energy proposed; I think it will 
be more like 35GW and that is significantly large enough for us to be very interested in 
it … We are looking at almost half a million tonnes of rebar over the duration of the 
construction phase … and potentially double that … The UK market is currently 700,000 
tonnes a year.” 
This case study also involved a three-month project working with ABCO regarding 
setting up a facility to allow CGF manufacturers and associated supply chains to co-
locate. The project involved working with the directors and business development staff 
at the port and discussing their requirements and demands for companies such as BRCO, 
as well as CGF manufacturers who were likely to set up port-side manufacturing facilities 
at the port. The project involved mapping potential supply chain solutions for the 
construction of CGF. This would involve all players in the supply chain, including cement 
suppliers, aggregate suppliers, and steel suppliers (see figure 20).  
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Figure 20 CGF supply chain structure 
The study involved multiple meetings with port staff, and interviews with staff at 
aggregate and cement suppliers involved in the CGF SIG to map potential supply chain 
scenarios for the construction of CGF The project aimed to show the benefits to CGF 
manufacturers and wind turbine manufacturers of adopting a UK-based supply chain with 
UK content, compared to sourcing outside of the UK. It demonstrated that all materials 
required for the construction of CGFs could be sourced in the UK, within close proximity 
of suggested port-side manufacturing facilities. This reduced the supply risk due to 
proximity of suppliers, but also demonstrated the ability to maximize UK content and use 
logistics solutions with a lower carbon footprint compared to foreign sourcing 
alternatives. For example, if BRCO did not invest in a port-side facility, there were other 
supply chain solutions where steel produced by BRCO could be transported from their 
main facility in Wales by rail to their facilities in the North of England, located very close 
to various potential UK offshore wind port developments. As all material required for the 
construction of CGF could be sourced in the UK, the project showed the potential for a 
very low-risk supply strategy that was vital for offshore wind construction timetables. It 
could then be transported by rail to port-side facilities. Another option for BRCO was to 
deliver their product by barge from their facilities in Wales to Northeast port locations, 
offering a low-cost transportation solution that had been demonstrated on the recent 
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London Olympics Games construction project. Figure 21 below illustrate some of the 
scenarios calculated during the project.  
 
  
Figure 21 Scenarios for CGF supply chain 
This included calculating distances and costs of numerous different supply routes and 
from numerous different suppliers to calculate the most cost-effective logistics solution 
(table 4 and figure 22). 
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 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Investment 
cost 
New manufacturing 
facility; Concrete 
batching plant 
New manufacturing 
facility; Concrete 
batching plant 
New manufacturing 
facility; Concrete 
batching plant – Joint 
venture opportunity 
Construction/ 
installation 
cost 
Vessels used (vessel 
rate); Distance to 
zone; Quay usage – 
conv. port charges 
Vessels used (vessel 
rate); Distance to zone; 
Quay usage   
Vessels used (vessel 
rate); Distance to zone; 
Quay usage   
Port costs Incurred if shipping 
to assembly base is 
required; Import of 
steel - conv. port 
charges; Capital 
equipment charges 
Incurred if shipping to 
assembly base is 
required; Import of steel 
– UK port offers fixed 
port charges; Capital 
equipment – cost 
sharing opportunity; 
Storage costs cost 
sharing opportunity 
Incurred if shipping to 
assembly base is 
required; Import of steel; 
Capital equipment – cost 
sharing opportunity; 
Storage costs – cost 
sharing opportunity 
Logistics 
costs 
Cement – 
LaFarge/Hanson 
(UK mainland) 
(road); Steel – 
BRCO (Wales), 
TACO (Scunthorpe) 
(Road/Rail); 
Imported steel - 
conv. port charges 
Cement – 
LaFarge/Hanson (UK 
mainland) (road); Steel – 
BRCO (Wales), TACO 
(Scunthorpe) 
(Road/Rail); Imported 
steel; Close proximity 
to customers 
Cement – 
LaFarge/Hanson (UK 
mainland) (road) – fewer 
trips required if 
concrete batching plant 
located on port; Steel – 
BRCO (Wales), TACO 
(Scunthorpe) (Road/Rail) 
opportunity for dual 
sourcing; Imported steel 
Table 4 Scenario costings 
 
 
Figure 22 Scenario costing savings 
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Sustainable and responsible sourcing was at the heart of BRCO’s business: BRCO’s key 
account manager (Participant 3-1-4) was previously the chairman at the British 
Association of Reinforcement technical environmental and sustainability and health and 
safety committee. “We sign up sustainability charters as members within the room 
(Chinese import companies, ROM Group [no sustainability certifications at all – source 
from China], concrete centre etc.), where the members will agree and sign their 
organizations up to the sustainability charter.” BRCO could supply all round 3 demand 
with gravity bases (6000); all the foundation material could be sourced from within the 
UK. Participant 3-0-1: “If we take a jacket for instance, it costs £5million, and most of 
the materials are imported from Korea or China; on the other hand, we have a concrete 
gravity base that costs £5million, creating 3000 jobs in the UK, with all materials being 
sourced from the UK, with half the carbon footprint … With jacket structures, the cost 
will remain at £5million each, no matter how many are produced; however, as concrete 
gravity bases are a construction project, scale and repetition are key, and costs can be 
brought down by reducing construction time. … it’s a no brainer! … The only reason you 
may choose a jacket over concrete is due to the seabed conditions (uneven surface).” 
Several of BRCO’s customers (SRCO and SKCO) are very supportive of BRCO’s 
approach as they want a stable supply chain, BRCO gives them a better product, and due 
to offshore wind, a supply chain needs to be stable as they do not want to be waiting for 
a vessel. For example, a vessel cannot be late due to the tight construction schedules; thus, 
a just-in-time supply chain model is needed for concrete gravity base construction. 
Participant 3-1-4 mentioned that the sustainability argument over cost has worked. For 
example, express reinforcement was bidding against ROM group for a job for Cambridge 
University. ROM came in cheaper, but due to Express reinforcement mentioning the BES 
6001 certification, having a sustainable supply chain but being a more expensive option, 
they still managed to win the tender against ROM. Participant 3-0-1: “So we are excited 
at the opportunity but we still don’t have a customer … Our customers are waiting on the 
energy companies to give the green light on projects such as Dogger Bank, as that will 
open up orders for say 500 gravity bases in various designs etc. Then the gravity solution 
providers will come to us to talk about rebar… We will most likely sit in a room with La 
Farge to talk about concrete, with PERI to talk about formwork, to sit together as a bunch 
of suppliers to work on a solution … We have a big lump of the market; while some 
customers are wary that we have so much of the market and they don’t trust it, we are 
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breaking down a few barriers now. Just because we have a large share does not mean we 
will be charging higher prices…” 
Additional interviews were undertaken with the director of the concrete centre 
(Participant 3-1-4) who was responsible for running a special interest group for the 
manufacture of CGF. Participant 3-1-4 was a well-known figure in the UK engineering 
industry: he previously had roles in large engineering companies in the UK working on 
numerous projects including Crossrail and nuclear projects.  At the time of interview, 
Participant 3-1-4 was running in the election to become the president of the UK Institute 
of Civil Engineers. 
The concrete gravity foundation special interest group was composed of potential players 
involved in the CGF supply chain, meeting once every quarter to promote the use of CGF 
in the offshore wind industry, and to ensure the CGF suppliers could find the right 
partners to create a sufficient solution for the industry. The SIG acted as an intermediary 
between CGF manufacturers and turbine manufacturers; as the tower is the interface 
between both components and is usually owned by the turbine manufacturers, it was 
important that CGF and turbine manufacturers meet to share technical specifications, 
when discussing the nature of the offshore wind industry and the experience many of the 
companies had that were involved in the SIG. The director of the concrete centre 
mentioned that relationships between buyers and suppliers always required non-
disclosure agreements. More specifically, the wind farm developers were demanding non-
disclosure agreements from all their partners and suppliers. 
Participant 3-1-4 also commented that turbine manufacturers were very secretive within 
the industry, and explained that not having wind manufacturers based in the UK as well 
as the need for UK suppliers to travel to European bases to share technical information, 
made the relationships much harder to bear.  Secrecy and the unwillingness of players in 
the CGF supply chain to work together was also experienced from the aggregate 
suppliers, who would be supplying aggregate for the manufacturing of CGF. The 
aggregate suppliers frowned upon the suggestion by Participant 3-1-4 to collaborate with 
competitors and other players in the SIG, due to uncertainty in demand which they were 
worried they would incur a fight with some of the other members. The major wind 
developers wanted to see a fully working demonstration of a CGF; whilst they understood 
that CGF had been previously tested and successfully employed in the offshore oil and 
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gas industry, they were still adamant to see a fully working CGF designed for the offshore 
wind industry. 
BRCO’s key account manager explained that there were two sticking points when setting 
up relationships within the offshore wind sector. One was the will of political leaders, 
energy companies and investors in the industry; the other problem was that many of the 
customers were from typical construction industries and had not entered the offshore wind 
sector. Typical construction attitudes were still visible, where solution providers were 
adamant on using their own models to evaluate suppliers, and keep up to date with 
products, availability, and track inventory. This had the potential to introduce many 
problems, as normally a contractor would send out many surveys and questionnaires to 
their suppliers, in order to build a database of information regarding new products and 
their availability; however, the issue was that much of this information would be 
duplicated as all providers would use their own systems to record data.  
BRCO also faced competition in the UK from the structural steel market. Participant 3-
0-1: “The one big problem comes from the structural steel sector which is a huge market 
compared to the rebar market… and so players are sometimes doubting the use of gravity 
bases; however, there are over 300 gravity bases in use around the world already … 
Structural steel sector saying, I wouldn’t build it out of concrete if I were you … While 
there are hundreds of voices saying that, there are only a dozen saying that concrete is a 
good option, longer lasting, more durable… Players may favour monopoles and complain 
about the fact that gravity bases have not been tested with 6MW turbines, but monopoles 
have also not been tested with 6MW turbines.” Participant 3-1-2: “Customers keep asking 
for prototypes but gravity bases have been proven to work. Hinckley power station was 
built by BRCO; however, BRCO was not asked to build a prototype of that; similarly, for 
the River Severn Bridge, where BRCO built but didn’t need to make a prototype.” 
The market BRCO operated in was not volatile and didn’t spike or dip dramatically; 
therefore, BRCO operated with very low margins. In the past few years before this study 
was undertaken, market prices had been steadily increasing; however, the recent increase 
in Chinese imports of rebar had dropped prices in the market by 10-15% that resulted in 
BRCO’s profit eroding. Previously, the UK market was buoyant and had needed to rely 
on imports from China; however, during the time of this study, the market was a lot 
smaller and Chinese imports were still coming into the UK in vast volumes, so the UK 
market was getting considerably worse. Contrary to BRCO’s rebar, although Chinese 
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rebar was cheaper, it was carbon intensive, had no sustainability certifications and had a 
supply chain carrying high risks due to US dollar and iron ore price fluctuations. Due to 
the cheap Chinese imports, BRCO had to take jobs at a loss to keep their factories running. 
BRCO’s key account manager (participant 3-1-2): “We have a two-tier market, one of 
BRCO rebar and imports, it is split straight down the middle … Imports from China and 
Turkey are still having an impact on the UK rebar market. Factors include weakening of 
the pound, lower iron ore price, Chinese market slowing down … The average import 
figure for rebar in the UK is around 20%. Jamie mentions that currently it is at around 
35%, possibly even 40% “which is a pain … BRCO supply the rest of it.” BRCO’s key 
account manager explained to potential customers that if the import market kept growing, 
there was a distinct possibility that BRCO’s parent company in the UK could be shut 
down; therefore, their customers would have to rely on their other parent companies based 
in Spain/ France/ Nordics to supply rebar to the UK market. Participant 3-0-1: “Our head 
company CECO is the only steel mill producing rebar in the UK … When we explain to 
our customers about the rising import market we say, ‘Without a rebar mill, suddenly the 
UK will become like Ireland, which doesn’t have a rebar mill, and is a free for all, it’s 
like the wild west!’” 
Some of BRCO’s prospective customers showed their intentions to not let this happen 
and showed their support of the UK steel sector. Participant 3-1-2: “We don’t expect to 
be used as a sole supplier, but we believe that customers should commit to buying some 
of their products from the UK market, as long as the price is not ridiculously high. It’s a 
strange thing, when we have had Chinese imports in the past, we have had a buoyant 
market, so the UK has had to import in order to satisfy demand … At the moment, the 
market is a lot smaller than it has been in previous years. It’s strange having imports 
coming into an unhealthy UK market. It is making the market worse … What would 
improve the situation (make the market buoyant again) is if we didn’t have as many 
Chinese imports dragging the prices down … The work and market are recovering and 
getting better but the prices are still going down, which is the opposite of what should be 
happening.” 
Previously, BRCO did buy rebar from China; however, this was done when the UK 
market needed it, and BRCO’s key account manager went over to China to work with the 
supplier on certifying the sustainability of their products. BRCO’s director, Participant 3-
0-1: “We have 60% of the rebar market and there are many good independent fabricators 
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in the UK so it is disappointing that Chinese imports have been chosen so keenly… The 
Chinese rebar product have responsible sourcing sustainability issues to take into 
consideration. It has disappointed us that the middle ground companies have decided to 
take the money and run … They can see that buying Chinese imports is not in the interest 
of the UK PLC, of sustainability … Short-term, you may make a few quid from buying 
imported rebar…. However, this may stop. The dollar only has to move a little or the iron 
ore price move a little and then China will not be interested in the UK market … Then 
where will these companies buy their rebar?” 
Figure 23 provides a simple illustration of BRCOs supply chain in comparison with its 
Chinese competitor’s supply chain (figure 24). 
 
Figure 23 BRCO supply chain 
100% visibility of supply chain; 100% UK content; 100% safe supply chain; 650 kg CO2 
per tonne end-to-end; Approximately £535 per tonne finished product; Rebar certified to 
BES 6001 by UK CARES. 
  
 
Figure 24 Chinese competitor supply chain 
Iron ore sourced from Brazil, Australia, Africa and transported to China; The iron ore 
needs to be dug out and processed, and is four to five times more damaging in terms of 
carbon emissions; Iron ore source unknown; Unlikely to increase recycled content; 
Unlike UK, China does not create much scrap metal; the UK produces approximately 
12,000,000 tonnes per year of which 2 million tonnes is used by CECO, and then the rest 
may be exported to China, and finally shipped back to UK as finished product; Chinese 
rebar has some of the certifications that BRCO rebar has; UK CARES is a steel 
reinforcement certification body. Chinese rebar has CARES UK approved quality 
certification, but no sustainability certifications such as BES 6001; A conservative 
estimate of the carbon footprint for Chinese rebar is 2.6 tonnes per tonne of rebar; that is 
making conservative assumptions, such as shipping iron ore from Australia and not 
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Brazil. BRCO’s director stressed the disadvantages of their Chinese competitor’s supply 
chain and product, stating it was full of risk mainly due to three factors:  
1. Dollar 
2. Iron ore price 
3. “The Chinese are fickle” 
Participant 3-0-1: “When the dollar or iron ore prices change, it will become more 
attractive to sell rebar to other markets such as Japan; this makes the Chinese import 
supply chain unsafe … That’s what I’m trying to get across to these companies, but it is 
not easy, because someone is making a lot of money doing it. So, it is very frustrating but 
we will continue doing what we do … There is an 11 million tonne market for steel in 
UK; in China, it is more than a billion tonnes. If you buy cheap you buy twice; this could 
be the scenario for Chinese imports … It’s short-termism … The reason why Chinese 
imports are still considered is due to price; however, while fabricators are happy buying 
Chinese rebar, once the Chinese find a more attractive market, it is likely that fabricators 
will turn back to BRCO. However, instead of paying, for example, £535 per tonne, which 
was more expensive than the Chinese option, BRCO are more likely to increase this to 
£635 per tonne.” After discussions with the technical chairman of BAR, BRCO’s key 
account manager discovered that he wanted to resign as he felt he could not put his name 
down to the sustainability charter when members were signing up to the charter, and did 
not comply with it. These members would then purchase steel products from ROM Group 
or Chinese rebar which didn’t comply with BAR sustainability charter. Commenting on 
the technical chairman, Participant 3-0-1: “He cannot tell a member not to buy from these 
suppliers … Due to this fact, if this wasn’t the case, the price may be around £550 per 
tonne, which would mean everyone in the market would be making a reasonable profit 
… Members are putting their business at risk by buying from ROM Group and Chinese 
for short-term gain.”  
Participant 3-0-1: “We have a lot of potential customers, especially in Scotland because 
they seem to be a little more proactive than the UK Government … The UK has signed 
off around 10 energy projects; three or four of these projects were Scottish but were not 
included in the sign off, and the reason for that is political. It’s because the UK 
Government is not going to support anything the Scottish government are proposing until 
it is clear on how the independence argument will play out … What this has done is pause 
the development of Scottish wind projects for at least 12 months.” 
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BRCO’s staff spent time visiting prospective customers (BAMCO, SKANCO) based in 
Scotland who were working on the Beatrice Wind in Northern Scotland, to provide 
concrete gravity bases, but all of a sudden, talks were stopped due to the political situation 
in Scotland. Participant 3-1-2: “The problem is, you only have to read the press … You 
have extreme views from the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph that are anti-renewable then 
you have The Times, The Guardian and The Independent saying it is sensible … And the 
government sit in the middle … Some nuclear. where it looks like three power stations 
will be built supplying 20% of our energy need, 20-25% from wind whether onshore or 
offshore … This would downscale what we have in the pipeline for offshore wind by 
around 30%, but the size of the market would still be massive … Then you have coal and 
fracking, which in my opinion is not a sensible option … But you have people in 
Westminster saying that offshore wind is expensive to set up; however, theoretically, after 
10 years of setting up a wind farm, the electricity generated has paid for itself … Nuclear 
for example is costing around £15 billion for Hinckley power station, while fracking is 
very cheap. So, in these economic times (high energy bills), people are likely to choose 
fracking just because it’s cheap.” 
Energy in the UK costs BRCO £65 (£30 is tax) per tonne, while in China it is £15 per 
tonne (no tax); £50 difference (approx. £30 tax). Participant 3-1-2: “If the tax was held 
back by the Chancellor we would be on a level playing field with the Chinese … the 
Chancellor has held the cost of energy back, as we pleaded with him to do so;, we and 
TACO told the Chancellor, ‘These carbon taxes are crippling us.’” Participant 3-1-4: “The 
Chancellor has agreed to hold back the tax, which is helpful but benefits are only realized 
in 2017 … We won’t get in front of the import market because the taxes are capped and 
we still pay the same amount today. The Chancellor will knock the price back over the 
next coming years.” Participant 3-1-7: “Bankers want to know that they will get a return 
on their investment; I think this is unfair as investments will go one way or the other. It 
is like saying to a bookmaker, I want £20 on the Grand National, but if my horse falls, I 
want my money back … It’s not really fair.” 
Participant 3-0-1 commented: “It is still very early… we have had a lot of contact in 
offshore wind but until someone presses then green button on a major project like Hornsea 
or Dogger Bank, we don’t have a customer. We are not holding the trigger to the gun … 
We all know what we can offer to each other, and what each other is capable of; we are 
now just waiting for the green light … It is frustrating but you can understand it as it’s a 
big investment; we are talking tens of billions of pounds … These things tend to take time 
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to get the go ahead and when they do, everyone wants to start it tomorrow … I imagine 
when the green light comes, there will be a flurry of activity and we will be starting to 
construct within 6 months … I have witnessed this from experience … It is a similar 
situation to Hinckley power station where we provided the rebar; we were all ready but 
waiting for the green light.” 
4.1.3.1 Case #3.1  
This case analysis the relationship between BRCO, the focal firm and supplier, and 
GRCO, the customer. Participants interviewed for this case include: 3-0-1: BRCO OSW 
operations director; 3-1-2: BRCO Key account manager; 3-1-3: BRCO Technical product 
manager and 3-1-8: GRCO commercial director. More details about the interviews can 
be found in Appendix 6. 
GRCO was an experienced market leading Construction Company but had never 
undertaken a project in the offshore wind industry.  Both BRCO and GRCO had been 
aware of each other years previously, as they would be involved in other industries such 
as the construction industry, rail, and road projects. This initiative involved staff in other 
departments of the organizations, while the offshore wind departments were newly 
developed teams in both organizations. GRCO were attempting to enter the offshore wind 
industry as a concrete gravity solution provider; their customers would be the developers, 
also known as the big energy companies. GRCO were looking to develop a supply chain 
for CGS that involved relationships with UK ports, steel manufacturers, aggregate and 
concrete suppliers and fabricators. When it came to identifying steel suppliers, GRCO 
had a choice of two main suppliers in the UK as well as suppliers based in China, Turkey 
and Poland.  
Awareness stage 
BRCO staff first met GRCO at an offshore wind conference in early 2010; contact 
information was exchanged and BRCO staff felt they had left a good first impression with 
GRCO. After the conference, BRCO contacted GRCO and suggested a formal meeting 
take place, for BRCO to give a presentation on their product and to explore possibilities 
of working together to supply concrete gravity solutions for the UK’s round three offshore 
wind projects. GRCO had vast knowledge repositories and experience in design work. 
They had a partnership with a worldwide reputed construction designer, who had 
thousands of extremely qualified engineers at their disposal. BRCO’s key account 
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manager was already aware of GRCO impressive technical capabilities; Participant 3-1-
2: “They can design gravity bases without the need for prototyping.” 
GRCO agreed and invited BRCO to their offices in London, where the key account 
manager and two technical team members gave a presentation on BRCO’s history, 
experience, and key capabilities. During the meeting, GRCO shared the design 
specifications of the current design of their CGF. Along with the technical team, the key 
account manager of BRCO suggested they would like to take GRCO’s design back to 
their facilities and work on it, to show where it could be improved with BRCO knowledge 
of steel and manufacturing processes involved.   Several months later the supplier visited 
the buyer at their headquarters in Germany for a formal meeting to discuss design 
specifications and capabilities of the two companies.  
When staff from each company met face to face at GRCO headquarters, a close social 
bond began immediately. During the meeting GRCO shared information on the design 
specifications of the concrete gravity solution they were going to propose to their potential 
customers, the developers. BRCO explained that they had a lot of knowledge and 
experience in the steel industry, especially in the reinforcement sector; they had strong 
technical and design knowledge, knowing the best time to buy in the market; also, the 
ability to offer low risk supply chain solutions and being UK-based, design capabilities 
were key complementarities to bring to the relationship. BRCO’s director convinced 
GRCO to share their CGF design specifications to attempt to improve the design in terms 
of cost and speed to manufacture. 
Exploration stage 
After several months, a second meeting was suggested where GRCO wanted to explain 
their requirements from a potential supplier such as BRCO; what they expected in a 
feasible supplier; the goals of the organization; also, what complementary resources 
BRCO could bring to their relationship; and to seek common ground between the 
organizations and personnel. BRCO had been developing a new product especially for 
the offshore wind industry that had been in early development stages but nearing 
prototype stage. In the second meeting BRCO introduced their new steel bar product that 
was in prototype stage. They presented the product and shared information with GRCO 
about its design and features and how it could offer GRCO an advantage in their bids to 
customers such as developers. BRCO technical team started to redevelop the GRCO 
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design over several months, that involved contacting GRCO technical staff, developing 
social bonds between the two organizations. 
In 2012, the BRCO visited the GRCO’s HQ to give a presentation on their new product 
that they suggested could be used in the prototype, due to its benefits of needing less rebar 
and being produced at a faster rate, shaving approximately 10% off the cost of the 
customer’s original design. Participant 3-1-2: “We are not trying to sell them a product; 
we are trying to sell them less of it, unlike our competitors who may add on more rebar 
to the design to make more money.” GRCO saw the ability of the supplier to add value 
to the relationship, so they decided to arrange several meetings to discuss the building of 
a prototype CGF together. This started the exploration stage. After several months BRCO 
created a new CGF design that resulted in using 10% less rebar, which not only saved 
costs in terms of less rebar but also improved the build time of the CGF.  
This gave GRCO confidence in the capabilities of BRCO and identified common ground 
between the two companies, where they both offered mutual benefits to each other. 
Meetings between key account managers, technical staff, and logistics managers carried 
on throughout 2011, developing relationship specific routines and bonding socially, until 
senior management from both companies decided to meet in order to discuss discounts 
regarding the building of a prototype; Participant 3-0-1: “This escalated the relationship 
to a higher level.” In 2013, a major presentation to GRCO’s board was given by BRCO 
directors and technical team to give information on their BRCO Ellipse product and how 
it could improve the quality and cost of GRCO’s CGS. BRCO introduced the idea of a 
joint initiative that would focus on improving the build time of their CGS, with any 
savings split evenly between the companies.  Participant 3-1-2: “We told them we will 
get onsite, build two or three units; after three we will measure how long it takes to build, 
say 27 weeks to build the fourth, 27 for the fifth, 26 for the sixth … and we get it down 
to 25 weeks eventually. We have shaved three weeks off the build …We then quantify 
what cost savings have been achieved through the reduction in build time e.g. labour etc. 
That figure might be £80,000 … What we want to do then is say to the customers, you 
give us half of that for every build achieved in 25 weeks, so what we do is share the 
benefit of using our new product.” 
To show their commitment and views of a long-term partnership with GRCO, BRCO 
suggested a rebate system, where if they could reduce the amount of time taken to build 
a CGS then the cost savings would be quantified and for each CGS built within that 
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specified time, both companies would share the costs saved. BRCO’s director 
commented: “It is an incentive for everybody to get it right.” In early 2013, the supplier 
offered a formal discount to the customer for the building of a prototype; Participant 3-0-
1: “BRCO has offered support to these key players in terms of giving discount on their 
rebar for demonstration projects … We want any one of these companies to build one and 
stick it in the water and say that it works.”  GRCO was impressed by BRCO dedication 
to the project and willingness to share information and knowledge with them to improve 
their product as well as logistics capabilities. They also liked the idea of sharing the 
rewards of any innovations or improvements made on the project.  This brought a lot of 
common ground between the two companies. GRCO then enquired to BRCO for quotes 
on several offshore wind projects. BRCO produced the quotes and sent them over to 
GRCO. In their tender to the energy companies, GRCO included their quote for rebar but 
explained how they may be able to reduce the cost by 10% using BRCO’s new product. 
Expansion stage 
Due to the close bonds between the two companies, BRCO offered $200,000 of their 
funding to GRCO to put towards the building of their prototype. This triggered the start 
of the expansion stage, as the customer then made a commitment to the supplier to build 
their prototype. BRCO then asked GRCO to write a formal letter of support for their 
funding application to the TSB, which the customer was happy to do. GRCO signed the 
letter of support for BRCO new product funding application, a commitment to involve 
them in the project. Participant 3-1-2: “He is older than me but has a young outlook; he 
is a reluctant collaborator but knows that he has to collaborate for the projects to work … 
GRCO were the proactive company who offered to give BRCO’s product a letter of 
support, unlike the other companies … The best relationship we have is with GRCO, the 
director and I are good friends … He is a very difficult individual but we are similar 
people so we get on well … The UK director of GRCO is the reason why GRCO has 
written a letter of support for the development and testing of BRCO’s product.” The trust 
was reciprocated when BRCO said they would share any further funding they received 
with GRCO. Participant 3-1-2: “I said to GRCO’s director: “If we get another £300,000 
funding and you do want to build a prototype, you can have some of the funding.” 
A month later, the funding application was submitted by four companies, CECO (steel 
mill), BRCO (fabricator), ARCO (material testing facility, Wales), and the welding 
institute to test BRCO’s new product. All four companies submitted a joint funding 
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application for BRCO’s new product. After the submitting the application, GRCO were 
a bit quiet in late 2013 but enquired and asked for support for quotes on several wind 
farms. GRCO had made a commitment to sourcing most their steel from the UK market, 
which aligned with the supplier’s strategy of increasing UK content and ensuring 
sustainable sourcing of steel. They recognized that BRCO also shared the same values 
and goals and could support their strategy. One sticking point for BRCO was that GRCO 
was a tougher negotiator than some of their other customers: even with close personal 
relationships, negotiations would be a challenge. GRCO demanded all the sustainability 
features that BRCO had, but wanted them at a lower price than was offered. BRCO’s 
director (participant 3-0-1): “GRCO are more maverick, and they will choose to take the 
sustainability route with BRCO; however, they are likely to squeeze the price down.” 
BRCO sold their steel at £500 per tonne while imports were £465 per tonne but without 
the sustainability features. GRCO asked BRCO to reduce the price to $465 to match the 
import steel price but BRCO declined. Instead they compromised and lowered their 
original price from £500 to £490. This reduction was possible as BRCO stated they were 
reliant on GRCO, so it was important to keep them happy by making a small discount. 
Participant 3-1-3: “We are all in it to make money.” The relationship between the two 
companies was not able to grow further due to uncertainty in the industry. As a result of 
political uncertainty, the customer put their operations on hold; the customer’s 
commercial director (participant 3-1-8) commented, “We are not doing anything until we 
get an order for a reasonable number of CGF, 300 at least.” Figure 25 below illustrates 
the relationship development timeline between BRCO and GRCO. 
 
Figure 25 BRCO – GRCO relationship development timeline 
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4.1.3.2 Case #3.2 
This case analyses BRCO as the focal firm and supplier to STRCO, the customer. The 
following participants were interviewed: 3-1-2: BRCO Key account manager and 3-1-3: 
BRCO Technical product manager. Further details about the interviews can be found in 
Appendix 6. 
STRCO was a European construction company based in Austria, with headquarters in 
Vienna. STRCO was founded in 1835 and was the largest construction company in 
Austria and one of the largest construction companies in Europe. Most services offered 
by STRCO included building construction, civil engineering, infrastructure construction 
and facility management. STRCO’s revenue in 2010 was €12.38 billion, total assets 
€10.38 billion, and number of employees was 76,100. STRCO had strong technical 
knowledge and in-house design department that had experience with many elements 
associated with OSW. For example, they specialized in offshore logistics, scour 
protection, soil mechanics, scatter diagrams for waves, aerodynamics, and load spectrums 
for wind, to name a few. Prior to UK OSW developments, STRCO had helped set up a 
OSW construction project in Europe. STRCO’s managing director saw the upcoming UK 
OSW sector as a €50 billion plus market and one which would require a long-term 
investment of 25-30 years (taken from STRCO’s managing director’s conference 
presentation).  
Awareness stage 
BRCO were first aware of STRCO when they were working on large construction 
contracts outside the offshore wind industry. In late 2011, STRCO were making signals 
in the market that they were aiming to enter the UK offshore wind industry by setting up 
construction facilities to supply CGF. This required searching suppliers of steel bar for 
their proposed CGF design. The two companies first met face-to-face when personnel 
from both organizations were invited to a special interest group, that promoted the use of 
concrete gravity foundations in offshore wind and involved all tiers of the supply chain 
that were involved in manufacturing CGF. During the interest group, BRCO explained 
that they could offer STRCO a stable, low-risk supply chain solution, as well as offer 
their expertise and experience in the steel industry to ensure that STRCO would have a 
competitive advantage compared to their competitors. A few weeks after the interest 
group meeting, BRCO contacted STRCO to arrange a meeting to present their products 
to STRCO and explain potential future collaboration. STRCO invited BRCO personnel 
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to their headquarters in Germany where they had a working CGF prototype built and on 
display. 
Exploration stage 
BRCO sent their key account manager along with two technical personnel to STRCO 
headquarters where they met with STRCO’s director, design team and logistics manager. 
The aim of the meeting was to analyse STRCO current CGF design to see whether BRCO 
could introduce any improvements and suggest what specification steel would be best, as 
well as the logistics involved with delivering the steel to STRCO’s manufacturing 
facilities. BRCO’s complementary technical knowledge played a big role in redesigning 
STRCO’s original design, and made a large contribution in terms of time and personnel 
dedicated to working with STRCO teams on many levels. BRCO was very willing to 
share high-quality information with STRCO to improve their product; this was 
reciprocated by STRCO who shared all design specifications and deeper organizational 
routines. 
STRCO’s CGF design was a tapered design, which immediately stood out to BRCO 
technical personnel, who highlighted that STRCO design was lowering costs by using 
less concrete and steel; however, they did not consider the construction time required with 
this particular design, which, when considered, made the design not feasible. STRCO 
staff were shocked.  BRCO had shown they could improve STRCO performance with 
their technical knowledge that was complementary to the relationship. Participant 3-1-3: 
“They believed they were saving money by tapering it as the CGF will require less 
concrete and steel; our team of designers and technicians showed the customer that the 
construction time would be long and costly, and recommended that they avoid using a 
tapered design.” STRCO’s CGF prototype design had a circular base, which required 
radius bent steel bar, which at the time was a relatively new product on the steel market 
and was not produced in the UK. BRCO design team discussed and worked on the CGF 
design with the STRCO design team during the two-day meeting and introduced a major 
improvement that could be made. Instead of using radius bent steel bar, STRCO could 
change the design of the base from a circular shape to an angled base; this meant that 
STRCO could save a lot of money as it would require less rebar then their original design. 
BRCO explained to STRCO that they would invest a lot of effort and use their strong 
partnerships with a wide range of different construction specialists to organize a joint 
initiative to redesign the product. The construction of CGF would require concrete 
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specialists, slip forming specialists, and rebar specialists, all of which BRCO had strong 
relationships with and so the initiative would build on BRCO relationships. The initiative 
would get all four players together to discuss the solution from all three viewpoints; 
BRCO’s director and key account manager personally guaranteed STRCO’s director that 
this would improve their CGF design and make it quicker to construct. This strengthened 
the trust of STRCO and the commitment BRCO showed to developing their relationship 
together. 
Four months later and several visits from BRCO’s design team co-designing with 
STRCO’s design team, resulted in changing the CGF design to feature an angular base; 
this would require a lot less steel bar and saved STRCO a lot of money. BRCO offered 
complementary resource through technical knowledge on the product, where BRCO 
recommended that STRCO use a higher grade of steel that would need less rebar. One 
example, Participant 3-1-3: “A solution requiring 850t of 500 grade steel can be reduced 
to 790t using 600 grade steel. A 60t reduction in rebar is a significant saving, not only in 
price paid but also when you take into consideration transportation, storing it, and fixing 
it.” The quality of the personal relationships between the two companies increased as 
BRCO proved that they were willing to share the rewards of their knowledge with 
STRCO and build on a mutual goal of a long-term relationship together. 
BRCO’s technical knowledge impressed STRCO and showed they were a feasible 
exchange partner. STRCO’s trust in BRCO capabilities increased as well as the personal 
level trust between staff of each organization. There was now a lot of social bonding 
between staff and relationship specific routines were beginning to emerge. BRCO offered 
resource complementarity through its numerous facilities located strategically around the 
UK and so it was able to provide cost effective and sure supply chain solutions to get their 
product to the customer’s facility. The steel bar would be delivered by rail to three 
suggested port locations; BRCO were also able to deliver the steel bar by barge from their 
facility to any port in the UK. A key selling point was BRCO’s location that enabled it, 
compared to its foreign competitors, to offer a on low-risk supply chain solution, which 
was crucial to offshore wind construction and installation schedules. BRCO market 
complementary enabled them to offer just-in-time deliveries, and BRCO could also take 
responsibility for the sourcing of steel. With their vast knowledge and experience, they 
could pre-purchase the steel on behalf of STRCO when it was at a market low and store 
it for them. Further, to show their commitment to the relationship, BRCO would share 
these savings with their customer. 
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On a personal level, the director of STRCO and BRCO’s key account manager had a close 
relationship: they both saw eye-to-eye and felt they could trust one another. Visits 
between the two organizations became frequent; STRCO directors and design teams 
would visit BRCO facilities, and key account managers and technical personnel from 
BRCO would visit STRCO headquarters in Hamburg and in Cuxhaven over a year and a 
half period. They started to work on co-designing how the CGF could be serial 
manufactured. When discussing each organization’s goals and values, much 
compatibility arose. Firstly, both organizations were driven on sustainable sourcing which 
instantly drew common ground. Unlike other customers BRCO had, BRCO’s key account 
manager believed that STRCO were being true to their word. This was proven when it 
came to discussing prices for BRCO product: STRCO were happy to pay the price BRCO 
offered and would be purchasing 100% of their steel bar from BRCO and not from abroad, 
where sustainable sourcing was questionable. 
BRCO used a UK construction industry tool, BIM (Building Information Modelling), that 
helped track products across the whole supply chain maximizing logistics capabilities, 
while on the other hand, STRCO were a German company that had not adapted the BIM 
model, due to it being specific to UK construction industries. BRCO explained that by 
adopting BIM, STRCO would have a transparent picture of the supply chain that would 
improve the efficiency of their production and inventory capabilities; however, it would 
need investment. Adopting BIM would increase the compatibility of resources between 
the two organizations and improve the efficiency of their construction schedules, 
especially as STRCO wanted to undertake serial production of CGF. BRCO believed 
STRCO were most likely to invest in BIM and use this in collaboration with their future 
supplier; however, the investment involved would need to be justified by a large order 
from their customer, the developer. STRCO were most likely to invest; Participant 3-1-
2: “STRCO are a big company, and they won’t want to be left behind when all the others 
have adopted BIM.” 
In March 2014, STRCO enquired to BRCO for more quotes to supply to a round three 
UK offshore wind farm that was in the process of being green-lighted. BRCO received 
the order on the telephone from the director of STRCO for pricing up investment required 
for the construction of 350 CGF. BRCO’s key account manager worked alongside his 
logistics and technical team to create solutions for potential logistics routes, as a port 
manufacturing location had not been chosen, so it was vital for BRCO to maintain and 
keep discussions open with around five port operators and owners. This required 
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investment from BRCO, to meet with the operators to discuss pricing strategies cost 
structures as well as the logistics solutions required. BRCO believed they had gained the 
trust of STRCO and were hoping that this order would be the start of a strategic 
partnership with STRCO. Unfortunately, the political uncertainty regarding offshore 
wind led the developers of the round three wind farm to put the project on hold; this fed 
down to STRCO and ultimately to BRCO, which was extremely bad news for all 
organizations involved in the supply chain. 
Since then, both organizations maintained their open working relationship, however, after 
the design work involving both teams integrating together for a solution with constant 
communication and site visits. This all started to reduce; there was now less need to visit 
each other; they both understood each other’s capabilities and what each other could bring 
to the relationship. They both recognized that they had strong cultural compatibility, not 
only through the values that each company and its staff stood for, but also through the 
strong personal relationships between the staff of each organization; there was trust on a 
personal level, but also signs of benevolent trust and good will. Both organizations were 
willing to share information of high quality to each other, and would take on risks and 
share rewards together, each bringing complementary resources to the relationship. Both 
organizations accepted that it was not in their hands anymore and they were waiting for 
political uncertainty in the market to clear. Figure 26 illustrates the relationship 
development timeline between BRCO and STRCO. 
 
Figure 26 BRCO – STRCO relationship development timeline 
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4.1.3.3 Case #3.3 
This case analyses the relationship between BRCO (focal firm) as a supplier to SKACO, 
the customer. The following participants were interviewed: 3-0-1: BRCO OSW 
operations director; 3-1-2 and BRCO Key account manager. Further details about the 
interviews can be found in Appendix 6. 
SKANCO was founded in 1887 and is one of the world’s leading project development 
and construction companies. It employs approximately 57,000 employees worldwide and 
is headquartered in Sweden. Before starting their relationship in the OSW sector, BRCO 
and SKANCO had worked together for many years on other projects in the rail and road 
construction sectors.  
Awareness stage 
A year before their meeting, they had an incident where a competitor of BRCO raised a 
complaint with SKANCO regarding sustainable sourcing. The complaint involved a 
SKANCO procurement director who was working with BRCO’s key account manager 
after they had won an order to supply a rail project SKANCO was working on. BRCO 
was in competition for the order they eventually won; however, their competitor, who lost 
the bid, sent a formal complaint to SKANCO suggesting that they were dealing with 
BRCO based on relationship only and not on price. This resulted in an official complaint, 
requiring SKANCO to bring over their HR people from Sweden and psychologists to go 
through a process with the SKANCO buyer, who was noted to be one of the most 
respected people in the industry. The individual was off for six months due to this; the 
case went through and he was found not guilty. Participant 3-1-2: “He dealt with us 
because we are offering a partnership that not only focuses on price but value added of 
the services we provide … The competitor who raised the formal complaint did so 
because his product was cheaper; he didn’t understand that just because it is cheaper does 
not necessarily mean it is the best choice, due to requirements of sustainability and 
responsible sourcing.” 
This provided strong evidence for the importance of personal relationships and cultural 
compatibility between the two organizations. A key priority for both was sustainable and 
responsible sourcing; they both had substantial knowledge of each other’s capabilities, as 
well as developed relationship-specific routines from the previous project they had 
worked together on. This resulted in a two-way dialogue between the organizations; both 
sides were willing to share any information required from the partners spanning years 
177 
 
before entering the offshore wind industry. BRCO was very impressed with SKANCO 
sustainability charters and commitment to UK sourcing and responsible sourcing. 
Commenting on SKANCO HQ in North London, Participant 3-0-1: “You walk through 
the doors and it just shouts sustainability and responsible sourcing. It’s all over everything 
you see – there are statements, murals, pictures, big screens talking about the 
environment, and the responsibility to be the greenest, most thoughtful, sustainable 
contractor in the world … It’s incredible, it’s like going to a parallel universe … It’s one 
of the few places where you walk in and believe that they are committed to what they say 
…“When I walk into SKANCO office block with 300 or so employees, I don’t doubt that 
every one of them has bought into the sustainability and responsible sourcing ethics and 
values.” 
Participant 3-0-1 first met SKANCO regarding offshore wind in mid 2011, when he paid 
a visit to SKANCO HQ to discuss future plans for the offshore wind market and the 
potential for working together on upcoming UK round three projects. BRCO 
recommended that SKANCO join an offshore wind industry special interest group on 
CGF, that would help them better understand the requirements and roles of each player 
in the CGF supply chain. SKANCO accepted the offer and two weeks later they attended 
the SIG; during the group session BRCO introduced SKANCO to a concrete specialist 
and a fabricator specialist, and used the session to form an integration initiative together 
to work on a developing prototype design for SKANCO. BRCO demonstrated their 
commitment to helping SKANCO develop the prototype and to start discussions 
regarding aligning the goals of the two organizations and building relationship-specific 
routines. 
Exploration stage 
The joint initiative formed from the SIG started to undertake visits to each of the player’s 
facilities and undertook sessions with the technical teams involved, to exchange 
knowledge on different production techniques for concrete, steel, and fabrication 
methods. There was a key staff member from each organization, which met every month 
to discuss new suggestions for improvements in design. All players were keen to share 
information with each other, including cost information that enabled them to share 
rewards from future orders if successful. There was a lot of common ground between 
them members and trust quickly built. The joint initiative members all agreed that UK 
sourcing was a priority that developed a basis for mutual goals to be built on. SKANCO 
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was very interested in the sustainability credentials of BRCO steels and wanted to use 
that as a key selling point to their customers, the developers. Participant 3-0-1: “There is 
support for BRCO’s sustainability and recycled content approach. SKANCO are very 
supportive of what we are trying to do and achieve with recycled content.” 
This showed BRCO as a feasible supplier to SKANCO offering complementary resources 
in terms of the sustainability credentials of their product, and BRCO’s market knowledge 
and commitment to helping SKANCO improve the design of its prototype. The meetings 
helped SKANCO remove a lot of uncertainty regarding the product and provided them 
with expert knowledge that would improve their product and reduce their costs. It would 
also help SKANCO form the bid to the developers for large contracts involving several 
offshore wind farms, as they could map out the costs involved at each tier of the supply 
chain and provide the developers with the confidence that the players involved were 
capable. After BRCO proposed that their new product would reduce the amount of 
material needed in the CGF design by up to 10%, SKANCO decided to include this 
potential reduction in costs in their tender to the developers of offshore wind farms. 
To further show their commitment, BRCO made an informal commitment to offer a 
discount on their new product for the SKANCO prototype if they required. BRCO offered 
complementary knowledge on different product features that would offer SKANCO 
significant savings; for example, BRCO suggested SKANCO use the higher-grade steel 
rather than the cheaper lower grade to save costs through requiring less steel bar for CGF, 
but also saving SKANCO costs in transportation, storage, and fabricating it. This resulted 
in SKANCO making a bid to BRCO for only the high (600) grade steel, as they were 
confident in BRCO’s technical knowledge and capabilities and trusted their 
recommendations, which were unlike BRCO’s other customers who opted for a mixture 
of the two.  Relationship quality was high as there were mutual goals set in place as the 
joint initiative took place over several months. The personal relationship between country 
directors of SKANCO and BRCO directors was strong. Both organizations shared 
compatible goals where their main priorities were recycled content, UK content, and the 
carbon footprint of the product offering. SKANCO decided to ask BRCO to quote them 
for a bid they were to submit to the developers of upcoming Scottish offshore wind farm 
projects.  
BRCO prepared a thorough analysis of the costs involved and provided SKANCO with a 
quote.  However, a month afterwards, the political situation with the Scottish referendum 
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put all talks about Scottish wind farm projects being developed on hold, as uncertainty 
regarding electricity market reform also introduced a lot of uncertainty; so SKANCO’s 
customer was not able to provide feedback on their bid until the political and market 
uncertainty had cleared. Several weeks after hearing the news, Participant 3-0-1 still 
required SKCO complementary resources, in the form of signing a letter of support for 
BRCO’s new product to receive grant funding from the UK technology Strategy board. 
However, Participant 3-0-1 was unable to contact customer representative at SKCO and 
all talks were put on hold. Figure 27 illustrates the relationship development timeline 
between BRCO and SKANCO. 
 
Figure 27 BRCO – SKANCO relationship development timeline 
4.1.3.4 Case #3.4  
This case analyses the relationship between BRCO (focal firm) a supplier to BAMCO, 
the customer. The case involves interview with the following participants: 3-0-1: BRCO 
OSW operations director; 3-1-2: BRCO Key account manager; 3-1-3: BRCO Technical 
product manager. Further details about the interviews can be found in Appendix 6. 
BAMCO is one of the largest construction enterprises in Europe with experience and 
specialist knowledge in all aspects of civil engineering, building, and process. BAMCO 
had developed a prototype design for their CGF and was starting talks with several 
suppliers of steel bar to form cost information and develop a supply chain. 
Awareness stage 
BAMCO and BRCO first met in late 2012 at an offshore wind conference in Glasgow. 
This was followed up by a visit from BRCO personnel to BAMCO’s office. From their 
arrival, BRCO personnel felt that the two companies did not share as much similar ground 
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as they expected. Their compatibility in terms of common goals, values, and ethics were 
noticeably different, as noted by BRCO staff who visited BAMCO offices: Participant 3-
1-2: “When I walk into BAMCO’s office in Camberley, I doubt that they have all bought 
into it; I think there are still many employees who think, what is all this crap up around 
everywhere? Let’s put the football on … I honestly think that these companies want their 
cake and want to eat it … The sustainability and responsibility reasons are done for 
effect.” 
This bothered BRCO personnel as they instantly felt distrust towards BAMCO as they 
felt that BAMCO were selling to their customers based on their sustainable credentials 
and UK content; however, they did not totally abide by what they said. This instantly 
brought about some incompatibilities between the two organizations but did not stop the 
relationship from continuing, Participant 3-0-1: “We will deal with them, but they just 
don’t have the same ethics as some of our other customers.” However, there were 
technological and process compatibilities between organizations as they were both using 
the BIM model to manage their construction operations. This would improve the supply 
chain and logistics of both parties’ operations if they were to conduct future business 
together. Participant 3-1-3: “It is a foregone conclusion that they will be using BIM.” 
BRCO delivered a presentation on their services and their new product for the offshore 
wind industry, and BAMCO discussed their current CGF design and the manufacturing 
and logistics processes that would be required from BRCO. BRCO suggested they would 
be able to improve BAMCO design if they allowed them to take it back to their designers 
to work on; however, BAMCO were not interested in the idea and refused. BRCO felt 
there was a serious lack of information sharing between the two that made the relationship 
difficult on a personal level. BRCO felt that any social bonding that should have taken 
place, had not, and felt that the two were not seeing eye-to-eye. This was emphasized 
again when BRCO suggested they could improve BAMCO’s CGF build time by building 
two or three CGF for BAMCO and then measuring the time taken in production to 
improve the production time for the next units. BAMCO were uninterested; Participant 
3-0-1: “They treat us differently.”  
Exploration stage 
Several months passed with no contact from BAMCO, that BRCO found unusual. Then, 
BAMCO contacted BRCO and asked them to provide quotes for supplying steel bar to 
two offshore wind farms. When BRCO contacted BAMCO to explain and exchange 
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technical knowledge on the different types of steel products, grades, finishes, and 
bevelling available, an option was given to BAMCO to choose between two grades of 
steel. BRCO explained that the higher-grade steel, although more expensive than the 
lower grade, would not require as much for a CGF compared to the lower grade, and so 
it would be in BAMCO’s best interest to choose the higher grade. BAMCO did not listen 
to BRCO’s advice and chose to be quoted for the lower grade steel. Whilst 
communicating with BAMCO, BRCO found that their focus was on price with a short-
term outlook on their supplier relationships, while on the other hand BRCO were more 
focused on building and developing a long-term relationship. Thus, there were obvious 
incompatibilities between the two organizations. These incompatibilities and the lack of 
communication between the two organizations started to build mistrust between the two 
companies and made it hard for both organizations and personnel to find common ground. 
BRCO started to question BAMCO’s commitment to sustainability; Participant 3-0-1: 
“Some of these companies (BAMCO) are making all these statements for sustainability 
but they are probably breaking the law, as they don’t abide by them.” 
During the time BRCO were delivering quotes to BAMCO’s request, political 
uncertainties meant that the offshore wind farms being developed were put on hold; 
Participant 3-1-2: “We were up there talking to BAMCO who are working on the Beatrice 
Wind Farm in Northern Scotland, to provide concrete gravity bases, but all of a sudden, 
talks between us have stopped due to the political situation.” Another surprising issue 
emerged when BRCO proposed that their new product could be used and tested along 
with BAMCO’s prototype design. This was BRCO’s way of introducing the idea of an 
integration initiative between the two companies, bringing them closer together with the 
aim of strengthening their relationship and developing a long-term partnership. BRCO 
needed a partner to help them apply for innovation grants and wanted BAMCO to join 
them to write a letter of recommendation to help certify their new offshore wind product. 
Unfortunately, BAMCO was not interested in this idea and preferred a more hands-off 
approach. BRCO’s new product was a higher price than the standard steel bar product 
available because it was in the prototype stage of development; however, BRCO made 
concessions to BAMCO so it could offer the new product at the same price as standard 
steel bar; having BAMCO on board would speed up the development of their product, by 
providing letters of recommendation to funding boards, and by ordering enough to make 
the production, testing, and manufacturing costs feasible.  
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BRCO’s new product would also provide further cost benefits to BAMCO regarding build 
time; however, BAMCO decided not to go ahead with BRCO’s new product and asked 
for the standard steel bar product instead. This may have been down to the lack of 
confidence BAMCO had in BRCO’s new product, as it had not yet passed prototype 
stage; however, BRCO assured BAMCO there would be no issues or risks and they would 
have their new product certified to the same standards as the standard bar available; 
however, they failed to gain the trust of BAMCO. As a result, BRCO did not receive a 
request for their new product and instead for standard steel bar. Participant 3-1-2 
mentioned how he believed BAMCO as a company had changed: “I thought they were 
an innovative company … but they came across a bit apprehensive.” Quotes were 
provided but BRCO were not given any feedback and did not hear from BAMCO again 
until shortly after two Scottish offshore wind farms were given the green light by political 
leaders. BRCO then received a request from BAMCO to build an onshore fabrication unit 
where steel bar would be delivered, fabricated, and then entered the CGF manufacturing 
process, all on port-side. BAMCO required costings from BRCO to satisfy their customer, 
an offshore wind farm developer. The offshore wind site BAMCO was bidding to supply 
required 80 CGF, which amounted to 25,000-40,000 tonnes of steel bar per year. 
According to BRCO, this amount was not enough to justify building onsite facility, as 
their current steel plant was producing 160,000 tonnes per year at a current capacity of 
100,000 tonnes. BAMCO did not appreciate this. BRCO’s director suggested instead that 
they would be able to tranship the steel bar from their existing fabrication yards to 
BAMCO’s decided place of manufacture. However, BAMCO did not take keenly to this 
idea, and they did not want to listen to BRCO who tried to explain why it was not 
financially justifiable to set up an onshore facility. The communication was one-way; 
BRCO’s key account manager (participant 3-1-3): “BAMCO seem to keep quite distant.” 
BRCO mentioned to BAMCO that an order for 50,000 tonnes of steel bar a year would 
justify setting up a new facility on site, as afterwards machinery and equipment could be 
moved to other facilities and the building sold. However, BAMCO could not commit to 
50,000 per year and could not understand BRCO’s view that 25,000 tonnes were not a 
big enough order. When discussing BAMCO’s sourcing strategies for steel bar, regarding 
the political attention on UK content and industry pressures for sustainability and 
responsible sourcing, incompatibilities emerged between the two. BAMCO explained 
how they may decide to purchase 80% of the steel bar required for an offshore wind 
project from the UK, while the other 20% would be bought from China for BAMCO to 
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make higher margins from the lower prices charged. However, BRCO did not see this as 
a problem as they didn’t expect to be a single source supplier, but did see it as a lack of 
commitment regarding a long-term relationship with BRCO. Participant 3-0-1: “BAMCO 
has a much shorter-term view compared to the other CGF providers … The likes of 
BAMCO would say, ‘Well, the Chinese rebar is £40 per tonne cheaper; we would go with 
BRCO for an extra £10 per tonne but any price higher and then it’s a commercial decision 
to buy the cheapest.”   
When asked about what stage the relationship between BRCO and BAMCO was in, 
Participant 3-1-2 replied: “We are in a build-up / exploration stage … They treat us as a 
supplier and not a partner … A more traditional approach of a construction supply chain, 
hands-off approach is used in this relationship.” When preparing their tender to the 
developers, BAMCO did not include the potential reductions in costs of around 10 % that 
could be achieved by using BRCO’s new product, which BRCO were surprised to find 
out. After a period of silence between the two companies, BRCO contacted BAMCO to 
suggest they visit BAMCO’s Scottish office to discuss Scottish wind projects; however, 
BAMCO stated that they were happy with BRCO and their products. Participant 3-0-1: 
“It was a case of we will call you and not the other way around.” Participant 3-1-2: “This 
is disappointing but there’s nothing we can do about it.” Figure 28 illustrates the 
relationship development timeline between BRCO and BAMCO. 
 
Figure 28 BRCO – BAMCO relationship development timeline 
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4.2 Cross Case Analysis 
Having discussed each case describing how interfirm relationships have developed over 
time, it is necessary to examine the similarities and differences between the cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The cross-case analysis focuses on the early stages of development, 
with particular emphasis on (1) the role of complementarity and compatibility in the 
forming of new interfirm relationships, and (2) the triggers and barriers for entering each 
relationship stage. 
Figure 29 plots a timeline of the 12 pairs of relationship development trajectories. The 
figure displays variation among each of the cases; where some relationships took two 
years to explore, others spent up to six years in the exploration stage. There is variation 
among the cases, particularly when considering the level of market and political 
uncertainty; between cases with higher uncertainty, relationship development speeds 
were seen as erratic. Some cases bore the necessity to gain fast trust between buyer and 
supplier, whilst others depended on the outcome of political decisions in the market, 
which meant the relationship would be stalled in the expansion stage. Some relationships 
progressed to the expansion stage.  
 
Figure 29 Relationship Development Trajectories 
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As explained in the research methodology chapter, the data was coded in order to identify 
patterns between the cases selected. Numerous tables in this chapter illustrate 
representative quotes taken from each of the cases for each relationship development 
stage to provide evidence for the findings of this research. Timelines were drawn for each 
relationship studied across the cases to describe the evolution of compatibility and 
complementarity, and identify triggers for each case. The cases share similarities in that 
each buyer or supplier studied is based in the UK.   
For cases in the OSW sector, typically the relationships are newly formed due to the 
nascence of the industry; this has allowed the study to examine the key factors leading to 
the formation of new interfirm relationships. For each of the OSW cases, the relationships 
have been studied over a four-year period.  
As outlined in chapter three, the cases were selected for their importance and contribution 
to UK manufacturing. The cases were purposively selected to as they illustrated the most 
variance between the cases, another reason for choosing the three focal companies was 
that the research had gained more in-depth access to the companies that would then report 
on their experiences with multiple partners enabling ore data to be collected and allowing 
for more rigorous assessment of relationship constructs and life-cycle stages. The analysis 
of the three focal companies was undertaken due to more data being available to the 
researcher.  
The cases were selected for their range in relationship development with supply chain 
partners, where the nascent OSW sector would observe the initial formation of buyer–
supplier relationships. The cases were selected to cover nascent industries, the 12 pairs of 
relationships are illustrated in Appendix 7. 
4.2.1 Awareness stage 
The initial stage of a buyer–supplier relationship is noted by Dwyer et al’s. (1987: 15) 
model as the “awareness” stage and is defined as, “Party A’s recognition that party B is 
a feasible exchange partner”. Potential partners have yet to work together on a 
transactional basis. Suppliers and buyers rely on distinguishing themselves in the market 
through compatibilities with potential partners and complementary resources they can 
offer.  
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Compatibility 
For cases that involved the start of a new relationship between buyer–supplier, it took 
suppliers who were looking for new customers a lot longer to convince the customer to 
work with them. This required regular visits to customers to communicate their offering 
as well as build social bonds between staff at the organisation. On the other hand, for the 
cases that involved buyer and supplier who had previously done business together in 
other industries, the investment required by buyer or supplier was a lot less compared to 
the new relationships. For example, the suppliers in Cases 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 3.2 talked to 
new suppliers, made multiple visits, and arranged numerous meetings with several 
potential customers in order to explain the benefits they could offer as supplier. However, 
the supplier in Case 2.3 skipped past the first stages of relationship formation due to 
previous working relationships built upon projects undertaken together in the past.  
While the cases studied from the buyer’s perspective saw an equal amount of effort 
invested into starting relationships with new suppliers compared to existing suppliers, the 
relationships initiated from scratch typically spent more time in the awareness stage, 
where partners were assessing the level of compatibility in values and goals, as well as 
the complementarity resources and capabilities partners could offer by working together 
in the future. For the OSW cases, the suppliers were seen to invest more effort and 
resources to increase compatibility with new management of the buyer company and to 
establish trust between individuals on a personal level. For the supplier cases (cases 2.2, 
2.3), the suppliers, who shared similar values with their customers in terms of 
sustainability and responsible sourcing, built trust faster than the suppliers’ relationships 
with customers who did not share these values and tended to be driven primarily on price. 
Thus, for the cases that were more relational in nature as compared to transactional, higher 
levels of trust resulted (Martins et al. 2018).  
In the awareness stage the social bonds between staff at the buyer–supplier firms were a 
key factor in developing the relationship to further stages. Social bonds enabled the staff 
to communicate regularly and offset any uncertainty with their partners on their plans 
for working together in the future. These personal ties enabled the supplier to prevent 
initial trust loss by the buyer and proved vital for relationships progressing through the 
awareness stage (Kaufmann et al. 2018) It was also key for suppliers hoping to win new 
business to actively contact potential customers to explain their company values and gold 
to identify the best match for a partner. Having strong social bonds in place enabled the 
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buyer–supplier firms to gain a clear idea of how they planned to work together in the 
future.  
In all the cases, communication between buyer–supplier during the awareness stage was 
vital to removing uncertainty and establishing compatibility between each other. For the 
cases in the OSW sector, communication was fundamental to reducing the uncertainty 
faced from political decisions in the market, and also to establish whether the firms shared 
the same values in terms of sustainability and responsible sourcing. Communication also 
enabled the buyers in cases 2.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 1.2 to ascertain whether their potential 
suppliers shared their vision of producing high quality products.  
Communication in all the cases allowed the potential partners to discuss how their work 
routines would coincide, should they move into a deeper relationship together. 
Communication also allowed each partner to mitigate cultural incompatibilities that 
existed; for example, the geographic distance between buyers and their suppliers in Cases 
1.1, 1.2, 1.5 and 2.2 highlighted the vast cultural differences in work routines and 
operating practices which then required more investment in time and communication to 
overcome. For the cases involving partners who were distant from each other 
geographically and culturally, much more idiosyncratic time and financial investments 
were required to establish the feasibility for working together; for example, case 1.1 
involved the supplier sending multiple staff on numerous long-haul flights to the customer 
to increase the level of compatibility with its potential customer, while in cases 1.3, 1.4 
and 1.5 the customer made regular visits locally to their suppliers to assess the level of 
compatibility in values and work routines.  
During the awareness stage, it was observed that in some industries there was growing 
interest in local sourcing, not only pushed on by institutional pressures but also the values 
of the specific suppliers or buyers studied (cases 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1). The emphasis on 
sustainability in terms of local content helped align common goals of potential partners 
and their associated supply chains; Case 1.1, Participant 1-1-2: “UK content is becoming 
a hot potato now; our prospective customers are requiring us to provide a list of all 
components we source from the UK … Consequently, we were selling the UK, showing 
them the UK should be their manufacturing location rather than another country”.  The 
market and institutional needs for sustainability helped the focal companies quickly 
realise whether their potential partner shared the same values, and instantly identified 
incompatibilities between potential partners. This would also give the focal supplier or 
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buyer a clue about whether their potential partner was likely to form a long-term 
partnership (cases 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1), or treat the relationship as purely transactional and 
short-term (cases 2.1, 3.5, 1.5); Case 2.2, Participant 2-0-1: “It’s important for a supplier 
to understand what type of relationship the customer wants; I think through time, 
relationships are changing particularly because of market circumstances. I think 
relationships are different compared to what they used to be like; buyers are thinking 
differently compared to in the past.”  
The case analysis also found that when personal relationships between staff at partner 
firms were close, there would be more informal commitments made to working together 
in the future. The cases exhibiting strong personal relationships could be attributed to the 
proximity of the buyer–supplier firms, where closer proximity meant that cultures were 
more closely aligned; for example, firms that were closer in proximity to their 
customers would tend to be more open with information sharing and develop informal 
working practices together. This helped build trust at a much faster rate compared to, for 
example, case 2.1, where the vast distance between supplier and buyer made 
communication and information sharing more difficult, and thus the process of building 
trust between the firms took longer.  For some of the cases where the buyer–supplier 
relationship had pre-existing ties from work or dealings together in other industries, the 
personal relationships between staff were close; this meant that these relationships would 
typically spend less time in the awareness stage. For all cases, the level of compatibility 
between the partners was very important in the awareness stage, as it enabled the partners 
to build a foundation for commitment and cooperation to grow in later stages of the 
relationship.   
For the three cases studying the buyers’ search for feasible suppliers, compatibility with 
the suppliers’ work processes and values of quality were of utmost importance. To meet 
the stringent quality standards required by the OSW, establishing compatibilities with the 
supplier was a key factor for the progression of the relationship to the next stage. For case 
1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 assessing the level of compatibility with a potential supplier was a 
costly affair. It involved regular visits by staff on various levels of each organisation, and 
on-going regular discussions for the buyer to build trust in the supplier’s capabilities. 
Table 5 below outlines the key compatibility factors across the three focal companies. 
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Awareness Stage – Compatibility 
Case 1: MOCO 
(supplier/buyer) 
Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO 
(supplier) 
Distant buyer, vast cultural 
differences (CU) 
 
Vast geographic distance (CU) 
 
Values differed at the start 
based on expectation but were 
realised (VA) 
 
Supplier offered tailored 
product (P) 
 
Vast differences in work 
routines with buyer (WR) 
 
Supplier differences in values 
and quality expectations (VA) 
 
Despite some suppliers being 
UK based, cultural differences 
arose (CU)  
Some European similarities in 
culture (CU) 
 
Strong values in UK 
manufacturing sometimes 
matching with customers (VA) 
 
Suppliers processes were 
incompatible (PS) 
 
Suppliers product did not meet 
customer quality standards (P) 
 
Investment in networking, new 
relationship development (PR) 
 
Identifying common ground 
(WR) 
 
Relation-specific routines (PS) 
 
Communication (WR) 
Sustainability and 
responsible sourcing 
values shared with 
most buyers (VA) 
 
Cultural similarities, 
UK staff from both 
firm (CU) 
 
Supplier steel market 
knowledge (M) 
 
Social Bonding (PR) 
 
Developing relation-
specific routines (WR) 
 
Identifying common 
goals (WR) 
 
Close geographic 
distance (CU) 
CU, Culture; VA, Values; PR, Personal Relationships, WR, Work Routines, Product (P), 
Process (PS) 
Table 5 Compatibility in the awareness stage 
The case analysis found that suppliers who were geographically further away from their 
customers took longer to gain their trust and establish common ground. The cases 
illustrated the crucial need for a supplier wanting to win business from a customer, 
needing to understand their customer’s “way of doing business”. Many cases showed how 
a supplier, who would not consider the cultural background of their customer in enough 
detail, would often spend a lot more time and effort. A recurring factor observed in some 
of the supplier cases, that prevented the relationship progressing to the expansion stage, 
was the buyer’s sole focus to purchase based on cost. Despite previously working 
together and building trust and common working procedures together, the focus on cost 
would still prevent relationships from progressing further. For example, in Cases 2.2, 3.1, 
and 3.2, there was a history of personal relationships that built compatibility between the 
two organisations; nevertheless, in some cases, the buyer did not respond mutually and 
considered alternative suppliers, due to being unhappy with the quality despite the 
supplier’s investments to deliver per the buyer’s standards and expectations. Figure 30 
below illustrates the variance in compatibility between the 12 pairs of relationships during 
the awareness stage. 
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Figure 30 Compatibility in the awareness stage 
The radar plot above displays the scoring of each element of compatibility, scored by the 
researcher and validated by the participant. The lines around the outer edge of the radar 
plot represent high scores (i.e. up to a maximum of five out of five), while the lines 
towards the middle of the radar plot represent lower scores (i.e. down to a minimum of 
zero out of five). Table 6 below attempts to combine and synthesise the findings from the 
radar plot, illustrating the scoring on each element of compatibility (i.e. culture, values, 
personal relationships, work routines, process, product). 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Culture 1 1 2 2 0 2 2.4 3.9 2 2.2 3 2 
Values 1 2 2 2 0 2 3.2 4.1 2 2.2 4 2 
Personal 
relationships 0.9 2 1 1 1 1.3 2.6 4.4 2 3 2 1 
Work 
routines 1 1 1 1 0 1 1.5 4 2 3 2 1 
Process 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 3.8 2 3 2 1 
Product 2 1 0 2 0 2 1.8 3.5 3 3 3 0 
Table 6 Awareness stage compatibility scores 
The significance of each element of compatibility was based on a scoring system out of 
five. The significance of the scoring and scale rating is illustrated in table 7 below. This 
scoring system is used for each relationship stage to follow in this thesis. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Culture
Values
Personal Relationships
Work Routines
Process
Product
Compatibility - Awareness stage
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1
2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
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 Compatibility scoring and significance 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Culture Comp. in 
cultures is 
very low 
Comp. in 
cultures is 
low 
Comp. in 
cultures is 
medium 
Comp. in 
cultures is 
high 
Comp. in 
cultures is 
very high 
Values Comp. in 
values is 
very low 
Comp. in 
values is low 
Comp. in 
values is 
medium 
Comp. in 
values is 
high 
Comp. in 
values is 
very high 
Personal 
relationships 
Comp. in 
personal 
relationships 
is very low 
Comp. in 
personal 
relationships 
is low 
Comp. in 
personal 
relationships 
is medium 
Comp. in 
personal 
relationships 
is high 
Comp. in 
personal 
relationships 
is very high 
Work 
routines 
Comp. in 
work 
routines is 
very low 
Comp. in 
work 
routines is 
low 
Comp. in 
work 
routines is 
medium 
Comp. in 
work 
routines is 
high 
Comp. in 
work 
routines is 
very high 
Process Comp. in 
process is 
very low 
Comp. in 
process is 
low 
Comp. in 
process is 
medium 
Comp. in 
process is 
high 
Comp. in 
process is 
very high 
Product Comp. in 
product is 
very low 
Comp. in 
product is 
low 
Comp. in 
product is 
medium 
Comp. in 
product is 
high 
Comp. in 
product is 
very high 
Table 7 Compatibility scoring and significance 
Complementarity  
Complementary resources allow firms to combine acquired resources with their own 
resource sets, thereby creating a resource bundle that provides unique and difficult-to-
imitate value (Harrison et al. 1991). For the cases studying suppliers entering the OSW 
sector and finding potential partners, the ability to offer complementary resources to 
potential partner was of upmost importance. The OSW suppliers would invest heavily in 
their product and process capabilities even before receiving an order from a potential 
customer. For example, Case 3.1 saw the supplier investing in a new product specifically 
designed for the OSW sector, which would help them reduce build time costs and provide 
them with an edge over their competitors offering products that already existed in the 
OSW market. 
For the OSW sector cases that faced high levels of uncertainty, a key factor in speeding 
up relationship development was the supplier’s complementary knowledge of the 
market, this would help the customer remove some uncertainties and risks in moving 
to the next stage and forming a deeper relationship. The focal suppliers working in the 
OSW sector had made significant investments prior to starting relationships with their 
customers. The suppliers in these cases were entering the OSW sector for the first time 
and had no previous experience supplying to the sector, insofar as all three suppliers had 
to make investments to build on their complementary resources and make themselves be 
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seen as a feasible partner to supply to the OSW sector. Another interesting finding is for 
cases 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.3 where the suppliers faced strong competition from overseas 
that were focused on a price perspective. The suppliers were not able to compete on price 
and so had to strengthen their argument as to why their complementary products, 
processes, or technology were more beneficial for their customers in the long run. We 
also see that firms will make investments to increase product and process complementary; 
for example, cases 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 saw the supplier investing in a dedicated wind tower 
hub that would offer state of the art supply chain solutions tailored to the OSW sector; 
the investment was made prior to receiving any orders from a customer. In all supplier 
cases, the suppliers would offer the buyer complementarities by investing in new 
product development, as well as technology required to satisfy the buyers requirements. 
They would also make sufficient sacrifices to please the buyer and show their 
commitment to the relationship. Suppliers who had trust in the buyer tended to share more 
information and initiate more joint problem-solving activities that led to the development 
of new products and services helping the partnership gain sustainable competitive 
advantages (Mai Anh et al. 2018). 
For the awareness stage in particular, it was observed that focal suppliers hoping to win 
orders from a potential partner would invest a lot of time and money to demonstrate 
their ability to transfer technical expertise and product and process knowledge, as well as 
market knowledge with their buyer, should they be chosen as a supplier; Case 2.2, 
Participant 2-1-2: “I have engaged a guy in what’s called ‘customer technical services’ 
(WTCO), who is an advisory engineer, and I have said, if you need any more in-depth 
technical knowledge, we have the resources at TACO to help you.”  
While Cases 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.3 posited that the suppliers would make vast 
financial and time investments into proving to the customer that they were a feasible 
supplier, this was also the case for the buyers, who would also need to undertake various 
investments in assessing and ensuring that the supplier could deliver on what was 
proposed. Complementary resources in the form of technical knowledge were found to 
be very important in the awareness stage, particularly for suppliers, where for example, 
Case 3.1-3.4, illustrated how the supplier’s technical knowledge helped re-design the 
customer’s product, saving the time and money in the manufacturing process. This built 
the trust of the customer and identified what value the supplier would offer in the 
relationship.  
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Reputation was a key factor when deciding on embarking on a new interfirm 
relationship. For the OSW supplier cases, due to the nascence of the industry, the 
suppliers had not been able to build a reputation based on the products they could offer 
to the OSW sector; however, their reputation based on their market/technical knowledge 
offered complementarities to potential customers, where for example, in Case 1.1, the 
supplier’s reputation, knowledge, and contacts with government organisations helped 
them build the trust of their customer and be seen as a feasible supplier, whilst Case 3.2 
and 3.3 offered complementary technical and market knowledge in the steel sector that 
the customer did not have and reduced a lot of uncertainty for the customer. Table 8 
outlines the complementarities found in the awareness stage.  
Awareness Stage – Complementarity  
Case 1: MOCO (supplier/buyer) Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO (supplier) 
MOCO reputation in the UK 
market and contacts helped 
buyer (M) 
 
Buyer had strong reputation in 
other industries (R) 
 
Supplier provided IP, technical 
knowledge on product and 
process (P, PS)  
 
Suppliers offered buyer 
technology (T) 
product and process expertise 
(T, PS, P) 
 
Buyer transferred capabilities in 
product and technology (P, T) 
 
Knowledge sharing with buyer 
(TE) 
 
Investments in specify industry 
technology investments made by 
supplier (T, P) 
Buyer shared market 
information and increased 
supply chain visibility to 
TACO (M) 
 
Supplier close to market 
(P) 
 
Supplier provided 
technical expertise on 
supply chain processes 
(TE, PS) 
 
Knowledge sharing with 
buyer (TE) 
 
Buyer provided strong 
reputation in the OSW 
sector (R) 
 
Information exchange (P, 
T) 
 
Search for technological 
complementarities (T) 
Supplier sustainable sourcing 
(P)  
 
Supplier offered product and 
technological expertise to 
buyers (P, TE) 
 
Supplier offered home 
market knowledge to buyer 
(M) 
 
Investment in market 
awareness of technical 
knowledge to potential 
partners 
(TE, M) 
 
Search for technical 
knowledge 
complementarities in 
partners (T, TE) 
 
Investment in awareness of 
technological offerings (T) 
 
Tangible (P, Product; T, Technology; PS, Process) Intangible (M, Market knowledge; TE, Technical 
expertise; R: Reputation.) 
 
Table 8 Complementarity in the Awareness stage 
Reputation in the market was a key factor for forming a relationship, especially for the 
OSW sector where for example, Case 2 supplier had 10 years’ experience in the OSW, 
whilst their potential customer had no experience, which gave the supplier an advantage 
over their competitors and illustrated how their customer would benefit from technical 
knowledge transfer if they were to progress the relationship to the next stage. Further, 
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Cases 1 and 3 demonstrated how a supplier’s reputation and knowledge of the market 
made them a very attractive partner to work with as they would be able to complement 
their suppliers with their knowledge of the market. In Case 1, the focal supplier had a 
strong reputation in the industry alongside complementary technical knowledge on 
products and processes, which made them a very attractive partner for potential overseas 
customers, as a longer-term relationship would ensure that this knowledge was transferred 
to the customer and would develop their capabilities to better serve the industry and win 
new business from their customers (the OSW OEMs) in the future. Buyers or suppliers 
who had a reputation for technical, product, or process complementarities typically spent 
less time in the awareness stage, whereas firms that did not have a reputation in the 
industry had to spend more time communicating these complementary resources with 
their prospective customer or supplier to progress to the next stage. Figure 31 below 
illustrates the observed complementarities in the awareness stage while  
             
Figure 21 Complementarity in the awareness stage 
Table 9 below attempts to combine and synthesise the findings from the radar plot, 
illustrating the scoring on each element of complementarity (i.e. Product, technology, 
process, market knowledge, technical expertise, reputation). 
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 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Product 3 1 2 2 0 2 2.5 4 2.8 3.6 3 2 
Technology 3 2 2 2 0 1 2 3 3 3.2 4 2 
Process 2 2 1 1 1 1.5 1 4 2.6 3.2 2 1 
Market 
Knowledge 3 1 1 1 0 3 2.5 3 2.2 3.5 2 1 
Technical 
Expertise 3 1 2 1 0 2.2 2 3.5 3.3 3.5 2 1 
Reputation 2 1 0 2 0 2.2 2 4 3 3 3 0 
Table 9 Awareness stage complementarity scores 
The significance of each element of complementarity was based on a scoring system out 
of five. The significance of the scoring and scale rating is illustrated in table 10 below. 
This scoring system is used for each relationship stage to follow in this thesis. 
 Complementarity scoring and significance 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Product Comp. in 
product is 
very low 
Comp. in 
product is 
low 
Comp. in 
product is 
medium 
Comp. in 
product is 
high 
Comp. in 
product is 
very high 
Technology Comp. in 
technology 
is very low 
Comp. in 
technology is 
low 
Comp. in 
technology is 
medium 
Comp. in 
technology is 
high 
Comp. in 
technology is 
very high 
Process Comp. in 
process is 
very low 
Comp. in 
process is 
low 
Comp. in 
process is 
medium 
Comp. in 
process is 
high 
Comp. in 
process is 
very high 
Market 
knowledge 
Comp. in 
market 
knowledge 
is very low 
Comp. in 
market 
knowledge is 
low 
Comp. in 
market 
knowledge is 
medium 
Comp. in 
market 
knowledge is 
high 
Comp. in 
market 
knowledge is 
very high 
Technical 
Expertise 
Comp. in 
technical 
expertise 
is very low 
Comp. in 
technical 
expertise is 
low 
Comp. in 
technical 
expertise is 
medium 
Comp. in 
technical 
expertise is 
high 
Comp. in 
technical 
expertise is 
very high 
Reputation Comp. in 
reputation 
is very low 
Comp. in 
reputation is 
low 
Comp. in 
reputation is 
medium 
Comp. in 
reputation is 
high 
Comp. in 
reputation is 
very high 
Table 10 Complementarity scoring and significance 
The case studies showed that the relationships that moved fastest through the awareness 
stage involved high levels of complementarity, where partners were keen to access the 
others’ resources to develop their own capabilities. For example, Case 2 illustrated how 
a supplier, who was new to the OSW sector, saw it of utmost importance to develop a 
relationship with a leading OSW company with a strong reputation in the market, that 
would help the supplier enter the OSW market by sharing their technical and market 
knowledge and boosting the supplier’s reputation by making them a strategic partner. 
This was also a similar situation for Case 1.1, where the buyer saw that the potential 
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supplier could offer complementary resources in terms of their reputation in product 
innovation and design, and also their reputation and knowledge of the OSW market.  
4.2.2 Exploration stage 
The exploration phase is a search and trial phase in which the potential obligations, 
benefits, and burdens of continued exchange are considered (Jap, 2000; Brickman et al. 
1987; Eidelson 1980; Holmes 1991). Uncertainty reduction and an assessment of the 
potential value of continued interactions are central goals in this phase (Jap, 2000; Berger 
and Bradac 1982; Berger and Calabrese 1975; Kent et al. 1981). To progress the 
relationship from awareness to exploration stage, the partners make an assessment on the 
traditional performance dimensions such as cost, flexibility, delivery, and quality of the 
products and services offered, and the levels of compatibility and complementarity 
between each firm.  When entering the exploration stage, the buyer and supplier both start 
working together on a transactional basis. The exploration stage involves trial purchases 
to test and evaluate a partner’s capabilities that help to build trust and joint satisfaction in 
the relationship.  
For the cases that involved new partnerships as opposed to forming relationships with 
previous ties, the exploration stage typically took a lot longer to progress through. The 
study found that new interfirm relationships required more time working together on a 
transactional basis, as they needed to assess the complementary resources the partner 
could offer in the relationship, such as product innovation or reputation for 
trustworthiness and performance. The partners with no pre-existing ties would also need 
more time to develop compatibility in the relationship through social bonding, and 
communication to help remove uncertainties between the two partners. This was 
particularly evident in Case 1.1, where both partners were totally new to each other, had 
differing cultural values which required increased communication and social bonding in 
order to increase compatibility between the two firms.  Whilst, partners with pre-existing 
ties working in same industry or different industries found it a lot easier and quicker to 
assess each other in terms of their compatibility with one another, their performance, and 
the complementary resources they could bring to the relationship.   
During the exploration stage, reducing uncertainty was a key factor in many of the 
cases; to do so, suppliers would value the market information from their suppliers who 
would be involved in lower supply chain tiers. The ability of partners to share market 
knowledge with one another provided crucial in building trust and showing long-term 
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commitment to the relationship; Case 2.3, Participant 2-3-2: “It is a fairly open 
relationship in terms of project pipeline; they keep us informed about what projects are 
breaking.” Differences were apparent in the OSW cases where there was much higher 
political and market uncertainty. In these cases, the partners would work much more 
intensely together to minimise the risks of external uncertainties; this required high levels 
of compatibility through personal relationships, to aid regular two-way communication 
between the firms, and also develop joint work routines and align company cultures to 
provide the foundation for a longer-term relationship. In particular, it is observed that 
partners working on product innovations/ improvements helped transition the relationship 
towards the exploration stage. Furthermore, for some cases the compatibility in culture, 
values and relationships on a personal level helped trigger the exploration stage.  
Compatibility 
In the exploration stage, communication increases and staff from both partners will start 
to develop work routines. For the cases that had partners in close geographic proximity, 
there were many cultural similarities. This made communication straightforward and 
allowed the partners to develop work routines quickly, whilst for partners with 
geographic distance, cultures differed significantly. Incompatibilities arose in 
communication, establishing work routines, and general cultural difference and practices. 
For example, Case 1.1 illustrates how the buyer and supplier had very different cultures 
and entered the exploration stage with a high level of incompatibilities, where cultural 
differences resulted in misinterpretations between partners; Case 1.1, Participant 1-1-2: 
“They expect answers instantly; whenever they send an email, it has a deadline date for 
when we have to reply to them … it is always a few days away, if not tomorrow.” Further, 
the geographic distance meant that language and time difference was a major factor in the 
difficulty in communication; Case 1.1, Participant 1-1-3: “They are a difficult customer; 
they want things right; their expectations of us doing things quickly were very high; for 
instance, ‘Can you be at a meeting tomorrow? … Can you get this report to us 
tomorrow?’”  
The focus on sustainability, from the supplier and buyer perspectives, proved to be a 
significant factor in the compatibility of partners during the exploration stage, particularly 
for UK based companies. For cases involving UK suppliers, incompatibilities would often 
arise in regard to sustainability, where suppliers accepted that customers would treat 
them as a supplier rather than a partner; Case 3.4, Participant 3-4-1: “I honestly think 
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that these companies want their cake and want to eat it”, “the sustainability and 
responsibility reasons are done for effect.”  
The cases that involved close personal relationships between staff at each firm allowed 
the firms to work together on an informal and flexible basis. A high level of trust in most 
cases was already established, which made communication and information sharing 
effective and two-way throughout multiple levels of partner firms (Mohr et al., 1996). 
Personal relationships also enabled partners to experiment with new ideas and introduce 
joint initiatives to meet common goals (Mohr and Nevin, 1990). The closeness of 
personal relationships also enabled suppliers to make their customers take on further risk 
in the relationship, which would be mutually beneficial in the end. Personal relationships 
fostered by the suppliers enabled them to negotiate well with the customer, particularly 
for the OSW industry UK-based firms faced tough competition from overseas suppliers 
with lower prices; however, personal relationships between key decision makers were 
seen to be crucial for suppliers getting future orders and growing the relationship. For 
example, in Case 3.2, facing cut-price competition from China, there were tough 
negotiations on getting the customer to commit to long-term partnership; a goodwill 
gesture of a reduction in price, despite the extremely low margins, was enough to prove 
their commitment and helped build trust with the buyer.  
The personal relationships within the OSW sector proved vital for some companies to 
gain approvals and written consents from partners, to receive funding from Government 
bodies to improve their product and technological capabilities. Case observations 
showed that partners with similar characteristics built up relational capital much faster 
and could develop relational capital that positively affected that outcome of a partnership. 
Relational capital strengthened mutual trust and enabled partners to weather through 
uncertainties in the market. As observed in most of the cases, through mutual trust came 
mutual commitment and information exchange that moved the relationship from an arm’s 
length exchange to a more relationship-based arrangement. In cases where information 
and knowledge exchange were two-way both organisations improved their supply chain 
performance and developed product and process innovations (Zacharia et al. 2019). Thus, 
in all of the cases, it is observed that the importance of individuals in building relational 
capital is paramount, where their ongoing efforts to build and maintain the exchange can 
yield tremendous value and customer satisfaction (Jap and Anderson, 2001; Cravens, 
1995; Wortruba, 1991).  
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For the cases where partners were geographically distant (Cases 1.1 and 1.2), it was very 
costly and time-consuming to establish efficient work routines among staff. Regular visits 
by staff from both partners took place and required significant investment by each 
organisation. Relationships that involved staff exchanges typically facilitated knowledge 
exchange of either technical or product knowledge from the other partner. For the 
supplier cases, suppliers with product or technical expertise would be able to transfer 
capabilities with the intent to build trust and secure long-term business with the customers 
(Ganesan, 1994). The transfer of capabilities from supplier to buyer was crucial for the 
supplier’s future business and relationship development. Where suppliers could not offer 
product or technical expertise, they would rely on market reputation as well as knowledge 
of the market due to their long-standing history. 
It is observed that incompatibility between partners led to a counterproductive working 
relationship with conflict and distrust. For cases where cultural compatibilities were 
high between top managers, trust tended to be higher which resulted in more types of 
cooperation when top managers approached a conflict situation with one another 
(Holtgrave et al. 2019). In some cases, the focal buyer or supplier made investments in 
time and money to reduce incompatibilities in the relationship. A lot of time would be 
invested in communicating regularly with the partner company, which would require 
staff exchanges and regular meetings between top level staff as well as lower levels. 
Where suppliers were dependent on their buyer, there was greater a chance they would 
invest in reducing incompatibilities, even when the incompatibilities were so vast. When 
the focal company was a sole supplier or buyer, and incompatibilities between culture, 
values, and work routines were vast, they would invest limited time and money to reduce 
these incompatibilities and would typically operate at arm’s length with their partner 
(Cases 1.4, 1.5, 2.1 and 3.4). Table 11 outlines the compatibilities found in the exploration 
stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
Exploration stage – Compatibility  
Case 1: MOCO (supplier/buyer) Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO (supplier) 
Distant buyer, vast cultural 
differences (CU) 
 
Values differed at the start based 
on expectation but were realised 
and strengthened relationship 
(VA) 
 
Despite some suppliers being UK 
based, cultural differences arose 
(CU) 
 
Strong bonds between staff at 
executive and management level 
developed over time (PR) 
 
Differences in values and quality 
expectations of suppliers (VA) 
European, distant 
suppliers, some differences 
in European cultures, 
formalities (CU) 
 
Work routines were 
established and developed 
(CU) 
 
Information Exchange 
(PS) 
 
Social bonding (PR) 
 
Shared values (VA) 
 
 
Sustainability and 
responsible sourcing 
values shared with most 
buyers (VA) 
 
Cultural similarities, UK 
staff from both firms (CU) 
 
Personal relationship/ 
social bonding (PR) 
 
Willingness to adapt to 
cultural expectations (CU) 
 
Willingness to take small 
risks (VA) 
 
Compatibility of shared 
goals (VA, WR)  
CU, Culture; VA, Values; PR, Personal Relationships, WR, Work Routines, Product (P), 
Process (PS) 
Table 11 Compatibility in the exploration stage 
Evidence of relationships stalling in the expansion stage were due to the lack of business, 
or projects the focal company would be awarded. For the all cases this was particularly 
common, where high uncertainty in the market resulted in a lack of transparency across 
the supply chain and led to work being awarded on an ad hoc basis rather than on-going. 
The negative side of trust was found to be more pronounced when there was high 
uncertainty on the supplier’s side, unlike the results stated by Villena et al’s. (2019) study. 
This made it harder for partners to work together and build up common work routines 
whilst working on projects, as well as develop personal relationships between staff 
members to overcome incompatibilities.  High uncertainty resulted from the need to 
reduce cost by sourcing products overseas, there was also significant uncertainty owing 
to the internal restructuring of the buyer. Therefore, the suppliers found it very difficult 
to establish common ground and working practices with the buyer. It was observed that 
cases exhibiting high levels of incompatibility in values, norms, and culture tended to 
result in higher levels of stress when trying to reduce uncertainty in the relationship 
(Cases 3.4). Figure 32 illustrates the compatibilities in the exploration stage. 
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Figure 32 Compatibility in the exploration stage 
The significance of each element of compatibility was based on a scoring system out of 
five. The significance of the scoring and scale rating is illustrated in table 12 below. This 
scoring system is used for each relationship stage to follow in this thesis. 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Culture 1.3 1 2 2 0 2.2 2.6 4 3 4 3 2 
Values 1.4 2 2 2 0 2.2 3.4 4 3 4 4 2 
Personal 
Relationships 2.5 2 1 1 1 2 3.2 4.5 3.2 3.9 2 1 
Work 
Routines 1.3 1 1 1 0 1.4 2.5 4.2 2.5 4 2 1 
Process 1.4 1 2 1 0 1.4 1.8 4 2.6 4 2 1 
Product 2 1 0 2 0 2.3 2 4 3.2 4.2 3 0 
Table 12 Exploration stage compatibility scores 
Complementarity 
During the exploration stage, partners would initiate small joint projects together to assess 
the performance of their counterparts. For example, in Case 1.1, the supplier wanted to 
demonstrate their strong product and technical capabilities to their customer and did so 
by inviting the customer’s design staff to their factory for several months at a time to train 
them.  
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During the exploration stage, the partners experienced their perceived benefits of pooling 
resources and capabilities. Through the interaction and integration of each partner’s 
resource base, relationships were triggered to move towards the expansion stage when 
the relationship moved from being market based toward a mutually orientated 
collaborative relationship (Cases 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.2). This involved a high 
exchange of complementary resources, including technical knowledge such as quality 
standards required and market information, and also offering product technology to help 
improve their partners’ manufacturing systems and processes to progress faster 
through the exploration stage. However, despite high levels of complementary resources 
offered by exchange partners, some relationships did not progress as fast as others through 
the exploration stage, which was due to their vast incompatibilities with each other (Case 
1.1 and 3.4).  
Where there were mutual technological complementarities such as supply chain 
innovations enabling JIT delivery (Cases 2.3 and 3.2), new process innovations (Cases 
1.1, 2.2, and 3.1) and technology products to improve the quality standards in partners’ 
manufacturing processes (Cases 1.2, 2.1 and 3.2), relationship quality would be stronger 
and partners would be more open to one another, resulting in higher levels of trust and 
building on mutual commitment (Michalski et al. 2019). In all the three aforementioned 
cases, the investments in relationship specific resources and high levels of technical 
knowledge exchange helped the partners develop joint quality initiatives that led to 
greater performance of the partnerships. For case companies operating in highly uncertain 
market conditions, the exploration stage involved building trust through sharing 
market information with partners, with the aim of reducing uncertainty and facilitating 
the potential for new orders (Cases 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.2). 
During the exploration stage, partners would be involved in an exchange, typically seen 
as a trial purchase, where partners would evaluate each other’s capabilities in order to 
build trust and satisfy expectations of one another (Dwyer et al., 1987).  For the supplier 
cases, there were high expectations on the need to deliver to expectations set out on the 
awareness stage of the relationship. Once in the exploration stage, it was observed for all 
cases that partners would trial and test one another on expected deliverables. For 
example, in Case 1.1, the supplier was required to introduce the buyer to all the 
government contacts required to gain planning permission for a prototype test site. For 
Case 2.2, this involved the supplier inviting the buyer to their facility for an inspection, 
in order to demonstrate sufficient capabilities to carry out future projects.  For the cases 
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from the buyer’s perspective, the exploration stage involved visits to the supplier’s 
facilities to undergo inspections to ensure that the suppliers could deliver to specific 
quality requirements (Cases 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4). Key criteria in the exploration 
stage was to ensure that specific suppliers could deliver to the requirements of the buyer 
before committing to a long-term relationship. For cases involving new relationships, 
i.e. the buyer and supplier were strangers with no previous ties, it was observed that the 
exploration stage was far more time and capital intensive than for cases with buyers and 
suppliers who had previous ties and experience working. Communication between the 
partners was a lot more intense than in the awareness stage; this involved regular meetings 
and coordination between staff of both partner organisations (Cases 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3.3).  
During the exploration stage, suppliers and buyers would undertake small joint projects 
together to test the competences of their partner. In some cases, the projects would not be 
completely successful; in other cases, the high political and market uncertainty meant 
that projects could not be taken further until the uncertainty had cleared and so 
relationships would tend to stall. According to DSO theory, these relationships would be 
abandoned because they were a liability, and difficult to revive and make profitable. 
However, this study found that this was not necessarily true. It was observed that, for 
cases where joint initiatives failed the first time around, partners would follow RV theory, 
where there was a sequence of repeated cycles of negotiation, commitment, and 
execution, where failed projects would be reignited (Case 2.2, 3.1, 3.3). Table 13 
highlights complementarities found across the focal case companies during the 
exploration stage. 
Exploration stage – Complementarity  
Case 1: MOCO (supplier/buyer) Case 2: TACO 
(supplier) 
Case 3: BRCO 
(supplier) 
Market knowledge offered by buyer 
(M) 
 
Supplier reputation in the UK market 
and contacts helped buyer (M, R) 
 
High, two-way, intense, multiple levels  
(PS) 
Technical knowledge –quality 
standards (buyer (M) 
 
Suppliers offered market knowledge 
(M) 
 
market knowledge 
(buyer – government 
links, 
 
Suppliers offered 
technology and product 
knowledge 
 
Buyer offered technical 
expertise/ reputation 
late Exploration – one 
way, (TE, R) 
 
Buyer shared market 
information and 
Technical knowledge 
transfer (TE) 
 
Prototype development 
(P) 
 
Idiosyncratic 
investments in 
technology adaption (T) 
 
Exchange of tacit 
knowledge (TE) 
 
Supplier product 
innovations for buyer 
cost advantages (P) 
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Suppliers offered buyer technology, 
product and process expertise (P, T, 
PS) 
 
Joint product development initiatives 
(P) 
 
MOCO developed custom licensed 
product for buyer with opportunity to 
transfer IP (P, TE) 
increased supply chain 
visibility to TACO (M) 
 
Process innovations 
(PS) 
 
Open sharing of market 
information (M)  
 
Supplier product design 
capabilities (TE) 
 
Rebate system for build 
time improvements (P, 
PS) 
Tangible (P, Product; T, Technology; PS, Process) Intangible (M, Market knowledge; TE, 
technical expertise; R: Reputation). 
 
Table 13 Complementarity in the exploration stage 
Similarly, for some cases where uncertainty in the market stalled 
progression through the exploration stage, partners would follow a cycle of 
negotiation to remove uncertainties, with the aim of starting joint initiatives in the 
future. For both examples of relationships stalling during the explorations stage, it was 
observed that individuals were critical to relationships progressing (RV theory) as 
compared to DSO theory which prioritises the properties of the relationship over 
individuals. Figure 33 illustrates complementarities in the 12 pairs of relationships during 
the exploration stage 
 
Figure 33 Complementarity in the exploration stage 
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Table 14 below attempts to combine and synthesise the findings from the radar plot, 
illustrating the scoring on each element of complementarity (i.e. Product, technology, 
process, market knowledge, technical expertise, reputation). 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Product 3.5 1 2 2 0 2.2 3.2 4 3.3 3.9 3 2 
Technology 3.5 2 2 2 0 2 2.9 3.5 3.6 3.9 4 2 
Process 3.2 2 1 1 1 2.7 2.9 4.2 3.8 3.3 2 1 
Market 
Knowledge 4.1 1 1 1 0 3 3 3.8 3.2 3.5 2 1 
Technical 
Expertise 4.3 1 2 1 0 2.8 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.9 2 1 
Reputation 3.5 1 0 2 0 3 3.2 4 3.3 3.2 3 0 
Table 14 Exploration stage complementarity scores 
The case studies show how the building of trust, mutual goals and social bonds is most 
important in the exploration stage. In the exploration stage, communication becomes 
more regular and information sharing more intense to gain deeper understanding of a 
partner’s goals and intentions. Communication openness is seen as formal and informal 
sharing of timely information of plans, goals and expectations (Smith and Barclay, 1997; 
Anderson and Narus, 1990; Anderson and Weitz, 1992).  It also sets out the testing ground 
where partners are to deliver on the complementarities offered in the awareness stage. 
The cases illustrate how the buyer and supplier started working on an informal basis with 
no formal contracts in place, to ensure the long-term trajectory of the relationship. 
Relationships were sought on the intention to develop long-term relationships through 
suppliers increasing their orders with the buyers. 
4.2.3 Expansion stage 
The expansion stage “refers to the continual increase in benefits obtained by exchange 
partners and to their increasing interdependence” … “The critical distinction is that the 
rudiments of trust and joint satisfactions established in the exploration stage now lead to 
increased risk taking within the dyad. Consequently, the range and depth of mutual 
dependence increase” (Dwyer et al. 1987: 18).  Furthermore, Scanzoni (1979: 791) state 
"The association has developed or evolved significantly from one characterized by 
probing, testing examination, and so on, to one characterized by continual enlargement 
of the kinds of rewards that partners supply one another, and thus increased 
interdependence."  
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Compatibility 
Despite the differences in culture, the partners made significant investments to overcome 
any incompatibilities. For example, the staff at the supplier in Case 1.1 made significant 
changes to their work patterns to cater for the time difference and demanding cultural 
expectations from their customer. However, some cases demonstrated that partners 
would follow a cyclical relationship trajectory like that suggested by Ring Van de Ven 
(1994): during the expansion stage, partners would make attempts to work together in 
new ways to reduce incompatibilities (Case 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3.3). When these initiatives did 
not bring the partners closer together, it would reinforce the doubts in partner capabilities 
and would introduce problems of trust within the relationship. 
For some of the OSW cases, a major challenge in developing the relationship during the 
expansion stage was due to the high levels of uncertainty faced in the market. For 
example, in several cases, the suppliers would win an order and deliver it to their 
customer; however, the customer, despite being happy with the supplier’s performance, 
would have to put any potential future orders on hold until political decisions were made. 
This made it harder for the partners to continue with the level of communication they had 
developed from previous work and to keep their customers committed to making future 
orders with them. Case 2.1 illustrated how the relationship with a supplier and buyer 
started with high levels of trust and two-way communication, and then after a year of 
no transactions, the partners found it difficult to continue with the same level of 
communication they had initially developed, which made the supplier less aware of any 
changes or new requirements the buyer had, as well as how the supplier’s resources could 
compliment the buyer. The lack of communication from the buyer had an impact on the 
supplier’s trust and saw the relationship move backwards rather than progress to the next 
stage. 
Cases that involved partners from different geographic regions of the world were 
observed to be more formal in the agreements and negotiations, compared to the cases 
where partners were both from the UK. For partners in the UK, the negotiations and 
communication between staff at both firms were informal, flexible, and two-way. This 
was particularly evident in case 1.2, 3.2 and 3.3 where executives from each firm shared 
the same vision and had a lot of mutual ground and goals where they were keen to see the 
UK manufacturing landscape grow and develop (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Bendapudi and 
Berry, 1997). Similarities in culture aiding informal governance was observed to work 
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very well for problem solving and introducing joint innovations together thereby 
enhancing commitment and building trust within the relationship (Saleh et al. 2019).  
For UK focal companies working with foreign partners, incompatibilities would quickly 
arise when working on joint initiatives, especially when it came to the working routines 
of each organisation. Depending on the foreign partner, there would be greatly varying 
expectations on deliverables, on timeliness of responses to queries, and the expected level 
of time commitments required in the partnership. This was particularly noticeable in Case 
1.1, where the UK supplier was fraught with customer demands and the requirement to 
cater to their every need within time frames that were not usual for the supplier; 
Participant 1-1-3: “This was difficult for our guys as that’s not the British way.” And 
Participant 1-1-2: “You will receive an email on Thursday reading that they will be 
visiting our facility on Monday for an audit, then we are like, oh shit”.  
During the expansion stage, compatibility between the partners’ values was seen as vital 
to building trust, developing a longer-term vision of the relationship and progressing the 
relationship towards the commitment stage. The steel suppliers in Cases 2.1, 2.2, and 3.1 
took sustainability and responsible sourcing very seriously and immediately found a 
better fit with the customers who shared the same values (Cases 2.2, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.2), 
while finding it harder to work with customers whose focus was on price (Cases 2.1, 3.3 
and 3.4). Incompatibilities between values made it harder to build trust and confidence in 
the long-term performance of the relationship. In some cases, the vast differences between 
the partners would lead to significant investment to reduce uncertainties; however, these 
were not always successful and resulted in making the relationship worse in terms of 
mutual trust and cooperation. A key factor which led to relationship decline was the lack 
of communication between partners as well as the lack of cultural understanding (Cases 
1.1). For some cases, where the geographic and cultural differences were particularly 
significant, partners would experience a ‘culture shock’ when beginning to work on joint 
initiatives together. However, the will of both of the partners to succeed long-term played 
a large role in overcoming these differences and adjusting to each other’s ‘ways of 
working’ and expectations and norms; Case 1.1, Participant 1-0-1: “We match our senior 
guys with their senior guys, and we match staff across both organisations.” Where only 
one of the partners was eager to form a long-term partnership, there were many issues 
with communication and trust. Relationships tended to stall in the exploration stage when 
the partners would meet less regularly. Table 15 outlines the compatibilities found in the 
expansion stage. 
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Expansion stage – Compatibility  
Case 1: MOCO 
(supplier/buyer) 
Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO (supplier) 
Efforts by buyer to resolve 
vast cultural differences 
(CU) 
 
Investment to strengthen 
bonds between staff at 
executive and management 
(PR) 
 
Increasing differences in 
values and quality 
expectations of suppliers 
(VA) 
Routines become more 
informal as well as 
having some formal 
aspects (CU) 
 
Bilateral idiosyncratic 
investments made in 
joint initiatives (PS) 
 
Training of partner’s 
employees (WR 
 
Supplier high 
idiosyncratic investment 
in product (P) 
Adaptions and convergence of 
company cultures; (CU) 
 
Increase in mutual risk sharing 
(PS) 
 
Increasing emphasis on investing 
in sustainability (VA) 
 
Relation-specific routines starting 
to develop (PR) 
 
Idiosyncratic time investments in 
adapting existing work routines 
made by supplier (WR) 
CU, Culture; VA, Values; PR, Personal Relationships, WR, Work Routines, Product (P), 
Process (PS) 
Table 15 Compatibility in the expansion stage 
For cases from the supplier’s perspective, the expansion stage involved the matching of 
values between the two partners. In particular, the UK suppliers all put strong emphasis 
on building UK manufacturing competence as well as ensuring that projects would 
involve UK content. This was illustrated in the offshore wind and steel cases, where both 
industries were highly politically charged and faced great uncertainty in the market. When 
the supplier’s customer shared the same values, the relationship progressed faster through 
the expansion stage and towards a long-term committed relationship, whilst, on the other 
hand, when customers did not share the same values on UK content and UK 
manufacturing, initiatives would tend to slow and become transactional in nature rather 
than relational, there would also be less trust between the partners; Participant 2-0-1: “UK 
content is becoming a hot potato now; our prospective customers are requiring us to 
provide a list of all components we source from the UK … Consequently, we were selling 
the UK, showing them the UK should be their manufacturing location rather than another 
country.”  Figure 34 and 35 below, illustrate compatibility and complementarity between 
cases in the expansion stage. 
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Figure 34 Compatibility in the expansion stage 
The significance of each element of compatibility was based on a scoring system out of 
five. The significance of the scoring and scale rating is illustrated in table 16 below. This 
scoring system is used for each relationship stage to follow in this thesis. 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Culture 2 1 2 2 0 2.5 4 4.5 4 4 3 2 
Values 2 2 2 2 0 2 4.4 5 4.2 4 4 2 
Personal 
Relationships 3 2 1 1 1 2.8 4.4 4.6 4.5 5 2 1 
Work 
Routines 3 1 1 1 0 2.7 3.8 4.7 4.5 4.4 2 1 
Process 3 1 2 1 0 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.5 4.4 2 1 
Product 3 1 0 2 0 3 4 4.4 4 4.5 3 0 
Table 16 Expansion stage compatibility scores 
Complementarity 
For Cases 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.3, it is observed that both suppliers and customers would 
invest in building up the relationship despite high market risk and political uncertainty. 
For example, the focal supplier in Cases 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.2 offered their customer 
resource complementarities in the form of extensive technical knowledge of product and 
procurement processes. This enhanced their customer’s performance and strengthened 
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the relationship between the partners. In Case 3.2, the supplier made significant 
investment in the relationship through responding to the buyer’s issues with product 
quality and delivery performance (Smith and Barclay, 1997). Staff from the higher 
levels of the supplier were involved in the relationship to explain just how dedicated they 
were to the buyer’s requirements, that helped build trust and led to a consecutive order 
larger than the previous one. Case 1.1 illustrated the efforts made by the supplier continue 
to suggest new ways of transferring their technical knowledge to the buyer; however, 
the joint initiatives could not take place due to the uncertain political situation. Table 17 
outlines the complementarities found in the expansion stage. 
Expansion stage – Complementarity  
Case 1: MOCO (supplier/buyer) Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO 
(supplier) 
market knowledge (buyer) 
 
Supplier reputation in the UK 
market and contacts helped buyer 
(M, R) 
 
Technical knowledge –quality 
standards issued by buyer (M) 
 
Suppliers offered market 
knowledge (M) 
 
Suppliers offered buyer 
technology, product and process 
expertise (P, T, PS) 
 
Joint product development 
initiatives (P) 
 
MOCO developed custom 
licensed product for buyer with 
opportunity to transfer IP (P, TE) 
 
market knowledge (buyer – 
government links, 
 
Suppliers offered technology 
and product knowledge 
 
Buyer offered technical 
expertise/ reputation 
late Exploration – one way, 
(TE, R) 
 
Buyer shared market 
information and increased 
supply chain visibility to 
TACO (M) 
 
Increase in relation-specific 
technology investments (T) 
 
Product quality improvements 
made by supplier (P) 
 
Joint initiatives on product 
innovations (P)  
Intense technical 
knowledge transfer 
(TE) 
 
Staff-exchanges/ 
secondments (TE) 
 
IP transfer (small-
scale) (P, T) 
 
Bilateral investments in 
technical knowledge 
exchange 
 
Bilateral idiosyncratic 
technology adaption 
investments (T) 
 
Joint-initiatives for 
technology innovation 
(T) 
Tangible (P, Product; T, Technology; PS, Process) Intangible (M, Market knowledge; TE, 
technical expertise; R: Reputation.) 
 
Table 17 Complementarity in the expansion stage 
The cases illustrated how suppliers who had strong technical knowledge in a product, 
process, or technology would be required to share this with their partners to continue their 
relationship. In Case 1.1, this involved intense knowledge transfer through the placement 
of staff in each other’s facilities. It is observed in all cases that partners pooling resources 
allowed each other to learn new and valuable capabilities, initiating and performing on 
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projects more effectively than alone (Hitt et al. 2000). It is observed that, in some cases, 
accessing complementary resources through market mechanisms was not always feasible. 
For example, in the offshore wind industry, no single company had the complete set of 
competences and resources to develop and deliver projects to fully absorb the magnitude 
of risk. It is observed that compatibility between companies via organisational cultures 
and capabilities created value and allowed new partners to realise the synergistic potential 
of a long-term alliance (Cases 2.2, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.2). Figure 35 below illustrates variances 
in complementarity between cases during the expansion stage. 
 
Figure 35 Complementarity in the expansion stage 
The significance of each element of complementarity was based on a scoring system out 
of five. The significance of the scoring and scale rating is illustrated in table 18 below. 
This scoring system is used for each relationship stage to follow in this thesis. 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Product 4 1 2 2 0 3 4.1 4 4.1 4.2 3 2 
Technology 4 2 2 2 0 3.5 4.2 3.8 4.2 4.1 4 2 
Process 3 2 1 1 1 3.5 4.1 4.4 4 4 2 1 
Market 
Knowledge 4 1 1 1 0 3 3.6 3.9 4 4 2 1 
Technical 
Expertise 4 1 2 1 0 4 4.6 3.9 4.5 4 2 1 
Reputation 3 1 0 2 0 3 4 4.2 4.5 4 3 0 
Table 18 Expansion stage complementarity scores 
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4.2.4 Commitment stage 
Commitment, the “enduring desire to maintain a relationship” (Moorman et al. 1993: 316) 
involves partners quitting the search for alternatives and short-term options, and taking a 
long-term perspective of a strengthening future relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987). From 
the cases, it is observed that a similarity in outlook and objectives rather than ownership 
agreements aided the success of an equity-based partnership. In the commitment stage, 
similar organisational values were observed to reduce coordination costs between 
partners and reduce risk via behavioural control and expectation management.  
Compatibility 
For the cases that reached the commitment stage (Case 2.3), the relationships were 
characterised by open communication and information exchange, where partners were 
accessible to each other, were keen to participate, and had a sense of involvement in the 
relationship. Through open communication, mutual benefits were realised, the 
relationship was more transparent and enabled partners to reduce uncertainty and 
misunderstandings by allowing the exchange of necessary information (Dwyer et al. 
1987; Zacharia et al. 2019). The cases where information sharing was open and 
reciprocated between partners highlighted their shared interests and lead to common goals 
being established, that further increased the quality of the relationship. Both partners 
made efforts to overcome the incompatibilities between them, by one buyer moving 
closer to the market and sending staff to work closely with their counterparts in the 
supplier’s company, while the supplier adjusted the way they worked to follow the pace 
of SACO. Figure 36 below illustrates variances in compatibility between cases during the 
commitment stage. 
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Figure 36 Compatibility in the commitment stage 
The significance of each element of compatibility was based on a scoring system out of 
five. The significance of the scoring and scale rating is illustrated in table 19 below. This 
scoring system is used for each relationship stage to follow in this thesis. 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Culture 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 4.6 4 4 3 2 
Values 0 2 2 2 0 1 0 5 4.2 4 4 2 
Personal 
Relationships 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 4.7 4.5 5 2 1 
Work 
Routines 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 4.8 4.5 4.4 2 1 
Process 0 1 2 1 0 1.2 0 4.4 4.5 4.4 2 1 
Product 0 1 0 2 0 1.1 0 4.4 4 4.5 3 0 
Table 19 Commitment stage compatibility scores 
The willingness to invest and create this specific “lock-in” relationship is partly due to 
the complementarity effect as well as the fact that both the supplier and buyer needed to 
demonstrate to the market that they had capability in developing newer and larger 
turbines. However, despite both parties’ efforts to increase compatibility, the relationship 
had to be terminated due to political uncertainty. Table 20 below details compatibility 
between focal case companies during the commitment stage. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Culture
Values
Personal Relationships
Work Routines
Process
Product
Compatibility - Commitment stage
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1
2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
214 
 
Commitment stage – Compatibility 
Case 1: MOCO (supplier/buyer) Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO (supplier) 
Attempts to reduce vast cultural 
differences (CU) 
 
Increasing the amounts of 
relationships spanning multiple 
levels (PR) 
 
Attempts to reduce differences 
in values and quality 
expectations with suppliers 
(VA) 
Time investments to increase 
compatibility in culture and 
working patterns (CU, WR) 
 
Investments in personal 
relationships to increase trust 
(PR) 
 
Supplier investing further in 
product and process 
innovations to please buyers 
(P, PS)  
Further investment in 
process technology 
compatibilities (PS) 
 
Further investment in long-
term personal relationships 
between staff (PR) 
 
Bilateral time investments 
Increase partner satisfaction 
(PR) 
 
CU, Culture; VA, Values; PR, Personal Relationships, WR, Work Routines, Product (P), Process (PS) 
Table 20 Compatibility in the commitment stage 
Complementarity  
During the commitment stage reached by partners in some of the cases, mutual 
expectations on continuing the relationship were sought (Anderson and Narus, 1990); in 
particular, it is observed that relationship-specific investments were made that not only 
aimed to increase commitment, but also to enhance the competitiveness of the alliance. 
This is seen in Cases 1.1 and 2.2 where suppliers invested in capital equipment to increase 
the effectiveness of the alliance, and also to demonstrate their reliability to the customer. 
For the buyer cases, commitment was built upon relationship specific investments in 
knowledge transfer and information exchange. Participant 2-0-1: “You want a 
relationship as consistent as possible; it’s how you keep injecting life into that relationship 
and making sure you maintain a high level of contact and discussions. If a customer was 
busy procuring a contract from another supplier, then naturally they would spend more 
time on that than with a supplier that wasn’t supplying.” Some of the relationships in focal 
case 1 and 2 are good examples of partners with incompatibility in culture, but 
technological complementarity drove efforts to overcome incompatibility. For example, 
the supplier in Case 1 offered technological complementarity through their ability to build 
prototypes for their customer. Figure 37 below highlights complementarities between 
cases during the commitment stage. 
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Figure 37 Complementarities in the commitment stage 
Table 21 below attempts to combine and synthesise the findings from the radar plot, 
illustrating the scoring on each element of complementarity (i.e. Product, technology, 
process, market knowledge, technical expertise, reputation). 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Product 0 1 2 2 0 2 0 4 4.1 4.2 3 2 
Technology 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 4.6 4.2 4.1 4 2 
Process 0 2 1 1 1 2 0 4.4 4 4 2 1 
Market 
Knowledge 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 4.5 4 4 2 1 
Technical 
Expertise 0 1 2 1 0 3 0 4.8 4.5 4 2 1 
Reputation 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 4.2 4.5 4 3 0 
Table 21 Commitment stage complementarity scores 
In the cases where there was reciprocal commitment of resources to a partnership (Cases 
2, 3), incentive structures were aligned and confidence was boosted, resulting in more 
stable long-term relationships. The reciprocal commitments of resources to the 
relationship helped reduce the threat of opportunistic behaviour, and also made the cost 
of relationship dissolution higher and showed strong intent by both parties to raise 
relationship quality. 
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“It’s a fine line for both the buyer and supplier; if you’re not too careful, you can revert 
back to the very early stages of the relationship and you forget what each other offers, 
requires in the relationship” (Participant 3-0-1, Case 2.2). Table 22 below outlines 
complementarities during the commitment stage. 
Commitment Stage – Complementarity 
Case 1: MOCO 
(supplier/buyer) 
Case 2: TACO 
(supplier) 
Case 3: BRCO (supplier) 
Market knowledge (buyer) (M) 
Contacts in OSW supply chain 
(R) 
 
Buyer reputation in market (R) 
High investment in product 
offerings (P) 
Suppliers offered buyer 
technology, product and 
process expertise (P, T, PS) 
Market knowledge 
(buyer – government 
link) (M) 
High investment in 
product offerings (P, T) 
Supply chain technology 
provided by buyer (TE) 
 
Buyer developed 
supplier’s quality 
standards (PS) 
Technical knowledge 
(supplier–- product 
knowledge, process 
knowledge) (P, PS, TE) 
Processing technology 
shared (PS) 
High investment in product 
offerings (P) 
Suppliers offer product and 
technology innovations (P/T) 
Tangible (P, Product; T, Technology; PS, Process) Intangible (M, Market knowledge; TE, 
technical expertise; R: Reputation.) 
Table 22 Complementarity in the commitment stage 
4.2.5 Dissolution stage 
According to Dwyer et al. (1987: 20) the dissolution stage “begins with an intrapsychic 
stage in which one party privately evaluates his or her dissatisfactions with the other party, 
concluding that costs of continuation or modification outweigh benefits. Subsequently, 
the relationship enters an interactive phase in which the parties negotiate their 
unbonding.” 
Compatibility 
Incompatibility in values was a major reason for relationship dissolution, especially in 
regards to personal relationships among staff. Firstly, there were value sets associated 
with the company, which in some cases would differ significantly, but attempts could be 
made to resolve these. However, the value sets of individuals were a contributing factor 
to resolving problems in the relationship. While incompatibilities on a firm level could 
be resolved, deeper issues on the individual level prevented relationships from resolving 
incompatibilities.  
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The dissolution stage saw a reduction in efforts by exchange partners to increase 
compatibilities within the relationship (cases 1.1 and 1.5). Investment in personal 
relationships and working routines would drop. The dissolution stage also illustrated that 
even though a relationship exhibited high levels of compatibility between exchange 
partners, one partner would not consider this enough to reignite the relationship or aim to 
move the relationship back towards the commitment stage. Sometimes, this was due to 
the high levels of market and political uncertainty that was out of the control of exchange 
partners. For some of the relationships studied, it is observed that information 
asymmetry led to power imbalances and ultimately opportunism, leading to relationship 
termination (cases 1.2 and 1.4). There were also issues in quality of product and process 
technology increasing the level of incompatibility in the relationship which played a large 
part in reducing trust and speeding up relationship dissolution (case 1.4). Figure 38 
below highlights complementarities between cases during the dissolution stage. 
Furthermore, suppliers making the same mistake twice in terms of not delivering to the 
expected quality standards in their product led to dissatisfaction from the other partner 
and played a big part in leading to relationship dissolution (case 2.1). 
 
Figure 38 Compatibility in the dissolution stage 
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The significance of each element of compatibility was based on a scoring system out of 
five. The significance of the scoring and scale rating is illustrated in table 23 below. This 
scoring system is used for each relationship stage to follow in this thesis. 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Culture 3 1 2 2 0 2 4 4.6 4 4 3 2 
Values 2 2 2 2 0 1 4.4 5 4.2 4 4 2 
Personal 
Relationships 3 2 1 1 1 0.5 4.4 4.7 4.5 5 2 1 
Work 
Routines 3 1 1 1 0 0.2 3.8 4.8 4.5 4.4 2 1 
Process 3 1 2 1 0 1 3.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 2 1 
Product 3 1 0 2 0 2 4 4.4 4 4.5 3 0 
Table 23 Dissolution stage compatibility scores 
Table 24 below details the scores of compatibilities between the 12 sets of relationships 
in the dissolution stage. 
Dissolution stage – Compatibility 
Case 1: MOCO 
(supplier/buyer) 
Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO (supplier) 
Distant buyer, vast 
cultural differences not 
being resolved (CU) 
 
Personal relationships 
span multiple levels 
(PR) 
 
Differences in values 
and quality expectations 
with suppliers not being 
resolved (VA) 
Less emphasis on increasing 
compatibility in culture and 
working patterns (CU, WR) 
 
Mutual trust reducing (PR) 
 
Lack of willingness to adapt 
to partner values to overcome 
incompatibilities (VA) 
 
Less emphasis by buyer to 
engage in joint-initiatives in 
alignment with shared values 
(PR, WR)  
Process technology 
compatibilities stalling (PS) 
 
Less attention paid to local 
sourcing requirements (VA) 
 
Long-term personal 
relationships between staff 
no longer providing value 
(PR) 
 
Reduced informal meetings 
between senior staff (PR) 
CU, Culture; VA, Values; PR, Personal Relationships, WR, Work Routines, Product (P), 
Process (PS) 
Table 24 Compatibility in the dissolution stage 
Complementarity 
Complementarities during the dissolution stage would often be reduced significantly, as 
either one party would be unable to offer new types of complementarity to reignite the 
relationship, or the types of complementarity already offered would cease to be useful for 
the other party.  
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Where one partner had offered complementarities in terms of market knowledge and 
reputation to the other partner in the previous stages of relationship development, these 
would tend to no longer have any use in the later stages, thus contributing to the 
relationship moving towards the dissolution stage (case 1.1). Furthermore, due to high 
levels of uncertainty in the market, the knowledge offered by one partner would tend to 
be a lot less useful thus reducing the need for partners sharing information and working 
together, leading to dissolution. 
The dissolution stage would typically see a massive reduction in investment by 
exchange partners on complementarities such as product, technology and process (cases 
1.1, 1.4, 1.5 and 2.1). This led to lower levels of information exchange as well as trust in 
the relationship. Figure 39 below highlights complementarities between cases during the 
commitment stage.  
 
Figure 39 Complementarity in the dissolution stage 
Table 25 below attempts to combine and synthesise the findings from the radar plot, 
illustrating the scoring on each element of complementarity (i.e. Product, technology, 
process, market knowledge, technical expertise, reputation). 
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2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
220 
 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Product 5 1 2 2 0 2 4.1 4 4.1 4.2 3 2 
Technology 4 2 2 2 0 0 4.2 4.6 4.2 4.1 4 2 
Process 3 2 1 1 1 0 4.1 4.4 4 4 2 1 
Market 
knowledge 4 1 1 1 0 0 3.6 4.5 4 4 2 1 
Technical 
expertise 4 1 2 1 0 0 4.6 4.8 4.5 4 2 1 
Reputation 3 1 0 2 0 0 4 4.2 4.5 4 3 0 
Table 25 Dissolution stage complementarity scores 
Table 26 below details the scores of complementarities between the 12 sets of 
relationships in the dissolution stage. 
Dissolution Stage – Complementarity 
Case 1: MOCO 
(supplier/buyer) 
Case 2: TACO (supplier) Case 3: BRCO (supplier) 
Market knowledge no longer 
needed (buyer) (M) 
Contacts no longer need in 
OSW supply chain (R) 
 
Buyer reputation in market 
less important (R) 
Lowering investment in 
product offerings (P) 
Market knowledge less 
important (M) 
Lower investment in 
product offerings (P, T) 
Supply chain technology 
provided by buyer (TE) 
 
Buyer stopped providing 
knowledge on supplier’s 
quality standards (PS)  
Reduction in technical 
knowledge (supplier–- 
product knowledge, process 
knowledge) (TE, P) 
Processing technology no 
longer shared (PS) 
Suppliers reduced product 
and technology innovations 
(P/T) 
 
Tangible (P, Product; T, Technology; PS, Process) Intangible (M, Market knowledge; TE, 
technical expertise; R: Reputation). 
Table 26 Complementarity in the dissolution stage 
Table 27 below highlights between case-comparison of governance mechanisms in 
chronological order.  
Case 1: MOCO (supplier/buyer) Case 2: TACO 
(supplier) 
Case 3: BRCO 
(supplier) 
From the start of the relationship (i.e. awareness stage) 
A five-year contract (F) 
 
Buyer conducting regular audits of supplier 
(F) 
 
Impromptu surprise formal visits from 
buyer (F) 
 
Six-month contracts renewed on informal 
basis (I) 
 
Yearly contracts (F) 
 
Formal tenders (F) 
 
Quarterly audit of 
suppliers to look for 
quality improvement 
with formal reports 
(F) 
 
Three-year contracts 
(F) 
 
Regular informal 
meetings at 
operational level 
(every month) 
management level 
(every two months) (I) 
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Regular informal meetings(I) 
 
Regular informal meetings with people of 
the team (I) 
 
Formal evaluation of performance and 
quality improvement plans (F) 
 
Formal contract in place (F) 
 
Regular performance evaluations from 
buyer (F) 
 
Formal meetings to evaluate the 
performance via performance criteria (I) 
Yearly audit of suppliers to look more 
formally at KPIs (F) 
Formal evaluation of 
performance and 
quality improvement 
plans (F) 
 
Regular meetings 
with people of the 
team (I) 
 
Buyers conducting 
regular auditing 
visits (F) 
 
Supplier organises 
open days for all 
buyers to discuss 
trends (I) 
Regular informal 
meetings with people 
of the team (I) 
 
Supplier organises 
special interest group 
with all buyers to 
discuss trends (I) 
 
Informal commitment 
from buyers (I) 
F, Formal Governance Mechanism, I, Informal Governance Mechanism 
Table 27 Between case-comparison of governance mechanisms in chronological order 
4.3 Cross-case synthesis 
The cross-case analysis of this research studies relationship stages qualitatively and 
longitudinally in order to analyse buyer–supplier from a dynamic perspective. It adds 
more depth compared to previous studies (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) by studying a 
larger set of relationship constructs and their impact on relationship stages. In particular, 
the cross-case analysis demonstrates the need for exchange partners to put more emphasis 
on relational constructs and exchanges during the earlier stages of relationship 
development.  
The cross-case analysis shows how the time spent in each relationship stage varies 
significantly, some relationship would spend years in one stage while other relationships 
would take months. Relationships in the cross-case did not use time as a measure of 
relationship development as relationship development was not seen as a linear process, 
as stated by Dwyer et al. (1987). In fact, the cross-case illustrated that relationships could 
move backwards and forwards in terms of their development as a result of increasing or 
decreasing levels of compatibility and complementary that then had an impact on the 
levels of trust, commitment and information exchange in the relationships. The movement 
backwards or forwards through stages was determined by the levels of compatibility and 
complementarity in the relationships. For instance, relationships with high compatibility 
in values and culture tended to move faster through the awareness stage in comparison 
with relationships that suffered from high levels of incompatibility. Whilst, where one 
partner could offer complementarities to the relationship in the early stages (awareness 
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and exploration), these relationships tended to progress quicker as compared to the 
relationships with lower levels of complementarities offered by the exchange partners. 
Where high levels of incompatibility existed, partners who made investments to increase 
the level of compatibility would often see the relationship progress to the next stage, in 
comparison to other relationships where investments were not made and incompatibilities 
remained, often these relationships would stall in the early stages for years. For 
relationships where complementarities enabled movement through the early stages, if 
these complementarities were not continued, or new ones developed, the relationship 
would stall in the mid stages. Thus, partners would need to invest and come up with new 
innovations in technology, products and joint initiatives in order to progress their 
relationship.  
Political and market uncertainty had a major effect on the development of relationships 
in their early stages and mid stages. Even though relationships would progress through 
early stages through high levels of compatibility and complementarity offered by 
exchange partners, the changing political and market landscape would often have major 
impacts on the decisions made by firms to progress the relationship further, this would 
lead to stagnation of the relationships where they would be stalled in the mid stages 
waiting for clarity in the market. The lack of clarity and continued uncertainty led to 
relationships breaking down, even though there were high levels of compatibility and 
complementarity that brought mutual trust between exchange partners. 
While previous studies focus on the effects of compatibility and complementarity on 
relationship dynamics and development, this cross-case analysis uses longitudinal case 
studies to provide a more in-depth theoretical analysis of how compatibility and 
complementarity are used to enhance trust and commitment and can be increased or 
decreased across the relationship life-cycle. Further, it extends previous studies on inter-
firm relationship life-cycle by providing insights on how managing (or mis-managing) 
compatibility and complementarity affects levels of information exchange, trust and 
commitment, and vice versa, thereby affecting the speed at which a relationship 
progresses or regresses through its life-cycle. 
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5. Conclusions 
Following the data collection and data analysis process, this chapter outlines the results 
and theoretical implications of this research. It begins by summarising the structure of the 
thesis and analyses the results of the data analysis. Then it discusses the results and 
provides answers to the research questions, as well as outlining the contributions this 
thesis makes to research, knowledge and practice. Finally, it outlines the managerial 
implications of this research, its limitations, and areas for future research. 
5.1 Thesis Summary 
There are abundant studies of inter-firm relationship formation using concepts such as 
compatibility, complementarity, and relationship life-cycle. This study is unique because 
it involves the formation of new inter-firm relationships within the context of high market 
risk and political uncertainty. It focuses on the OSW sector where customers are seeking 
innovative solutions from new (and existing) suppliers.  
Previous studies often only compare compatibility and complementarity using cross-
sectional studies, but the use of longitudinal case studies has allowed the theoretical 
understanding of how compatibility and complementarity could be enhanced (or 
decreased) along the relationship life-cycle. In addition, this study extends previous 
studies of inter-firm relationship life-cycle by revealing how managing (or mis-
managing) compatibility and complementarity could have an effect on trust, information 
sharing, and relationship development, and vice versa.  
This thesis makes contributions to existing research by highlighting the importance of 
dynamic relationship constructs, compatibility, and complementarity in five specific 
stages of the buyer–supplier relationship lifecycle. It goes further than previous research 
(Vanpoucke et al. 2014; Palmatier, 2008) by explaining why relationship stages vary in 
length, as well as examining the triggers that drive a relationship forward from one stage 
to another. 
The research aims to map relational constructs such as compatibility and complementarity 
to relationship stages set out by Dwyer et al. (1987). Similarly, it confirms that 
relationships follow distinct stages of development; however, these stages need to be 
analysed qualitatively and longitudinally in order to analyse buyer–supplier from a 
dynamic perspective. Further, this research not only confirms Dwyer et al.’s (1987) study 
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but adds more depth by studying a larger set of relationship constructs and their impact 
on relationship stages. This research also suggests that relational constructs and 
exchanges become active and are more effective earlier in relationship development, 
therefore firms should pay more importance to these early stages.  
The framework presented in this research provides a more comprehensive understanding 
of early-stage buyer–supplier relationship development as it comprises relational 
constructs that have been developed after the publication of Dwyer et al.’s (1987) 
framework. For example, compatibility and complementarity are relatively new concepts 
that have been included in this research’s framework but have been absent from earlier 
frameworks.  
This study agrees with the existing literature that time spent during one stage of the inter-
firm relationship varies greatly and it cannot be used as an accurate proxy for the success 
of the relationship. While all the relationships discussed in this case were in their very 
early stages, there was significant variation in the duration of stages for different 
relationships. Some of the relationships took three years to reach the start of the expansion 
stage, others spent the same amount of time but remained in the awareness or exploration 
stages, implying that different relationships have different growth speeds, even though 
many of the customers were equally unable to place an official order, owing to political 
uncertainty in the OSW market. We discover that the main reason for investing in the new 
relationships in the OSW market was to find innovation complementarity by exploring 
innovative solutions from new suppliers, as well as to learn new capabilities from other 
sectors.  
The study makes some contributions to existing theories. While the study shows favour 
to the RV relationship life-cycle theory that relationship stages may go back and forth, 
and are not necessarily as linear as first suggested, we also find that the life-cycle could 
be terminated (and re-ignited) at the exploration and expansion stage owing to market and 
political uncertainty. The greater the market uncertainty the greater the variance in 
relationship performance (as measured by the progression through all stages).  
5.2 Conclusions regarding the research question 
To answer the questions of how and why new inter-firm relationships are built in nascent 
industries with highly uncertain business environments, four underlying aspects were 
identified to help with the investigation.  
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1. What are the major triggers and barriers in the early stages of relationship 
development, leading to or preventing buyers and suppliers from moving 
towards a more committed relationship? 
Particularly, we discover some insights into trust during the early stage of an inter-firm 
relationship. Since customers attempted to find suppliers who could develop new 
innovative solutions that are more effective and economic, the progression of the 
relationship from awareness stage to the exploration stage required a lot of trust. While 
the relationship expansion stage was characterised by trust building and expectation of 
realising benefits through joint initiatives (Vanpoucke et al. 2014) and discovering and 
testing described by Jap and Anderson (2007), this paper found that these activities started 
much earlier in the life-cycle, where potential partners undertook trust-building exercises 
and gave expectations on shared benefits in the exploration stage. Instead, developing 
trust earlier enabled them to be more prepared for when the political situation became 
clear; this is supported by Narayarandas and Rangan (2004: 72) who found trust should 
be created first “to enable the parties to proceed to executing the informal commitments 
implicit in their psychological contract, which then set the stage for the establishment of 
formal commitments.”  
In the awareness stage, communication between key individuals of each firm was 
important in in forming the relationship and was seen as a major trigger that enabled 
partners to move towards the exploration stage. Furthermore, communication was an 
active relationship construct in all relationship stages, having a positive effect on 
satisfaction and trustworthiness between partners. This supports Palmatier’s (2008) 
findings that “communication appears to be the most universally positive antecedent in 
terms of strengthening initial levels of trust and commitment, as well as relating to 
positive growth rates in the future” (2008: 62). It was vital for suppliers to have key 
personnel in place that could communicate effectively with staff of the buyer firm; in 
particular, much importance was placed on the ability or competence of personnel to 
develop close social bonds and personal relationships (Kaufmann et al. 2018) with their 
counterparts, in order to build trust and look towards longer-term relationship 
commitment. 
A key dynamic that would ensure the relationship would be triggered from the awareness 
to the exploration stage was the ability of one partner to ensure that their counterpart was 
effectively attached to the goals and values of their partner; this finding supported the 
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study of Gundlach et al. (1995). On the other hand, where firms did not share the same 
values or goals, partners would need to show willingness to make efforts to increase 
compatibility in the relationship. 
During the awareness stage, the exchange of information, being both frank and two-way, 
led to relationships progressing much more quickly, compared to when information was 
shared one-way and was less open between partners. Information sharing, whether 
regarding knowledge of the market – especially in nascent industry such as OSW, as well 
as market demand pipelines, was observed to be a major factor in triggering the 
relationship from awareness to exploration, supporting the findings of Palmatier (2008) 
and Holdne and O’Toole (2004). However, in addition, this research found that the 
exchange of confidential and detailed information took place much earlier compared to 
the findings of Palmatier (2008), and was seen as more crucial to the speeding up of the 
relationship through early stages. 
Sharing information with a partner helped them to develop the perception that a longer-
term relationship was a possibility, whilst cases that displayed a low level of information 
sharing during the awareness stage tended to stall, as the one partner saw it as less likely 
that it would happen should the relationship progress further. Further, importance was 
paid to the quality of information shared; for instance, partners who shared confidential 
or private information on products and market demand with their counterparts built trust 
more quickly compared to relationships where partners only shared basic information. 
In the exploration stage, the relationship was triggered to expansion when the personnel 
involved in developing the relationship portrayed that their firm would act in the best 
interests of the other firm. While this confirms the study of Crosby et al. (1990) it also 
found that despite partners displaying loyalty to one another, the relationship did not 
always progress due to the high levels of uncertainty and sometimes opportunistic 
behaviour shown by the dominant partner. The research findings agree with Podsakoff et 
al. (1990), in that an important factor in developing a successful relationship during the 
exploration stage was the ability for one partner to have the willingness and confidence 
to rely on their counterpart. During the exploration stage, the supplier had to ensure that 
they could deliver on the expectations set out with the buyer, which was done by building 
the trust of the buyer through personal relationship development; this shared similar 
findings with Sirdeshmukh et al. (2002); however, this research places a lot more 
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emphasis on personal relationships being a major factor in building trust and progressing 
the relationship into the expansion stage.  
A major factor that helped relationship development during the exploration stage was the 
extent to which both parties would undertake joint initiatives with joint investment. 
Where the initiatives went well, the relationship progressed faster through the exploration 
stage and more toward a longer-term vision of a partnership, siding with Mohr et al.’s 
(1996) findings. Where a supplier could solve problems for the buyer, the level of trust 
and willingness to pursue a long-term partnership increased dramatically. This finding 
provides further detail to Vanpoucke et al.’s (2014) study, positing that collaborative 
projects took place in the expansion and commitment stages, while this research found 
that these types of joint initiatives actually took place earlier, in the exploration stage, 
highlighting the need to study in more detail how fast trust is built with the use of 
collaborative projects in the exploration stage.  
Another trigger during the exploration stage was when both parties would pool resources 
on a specific task or project. When both parties jointly invested, they showed more 
commitment to one another which built more trust. Relation-specific investments helped 
partners strengthen bonds and highlighted perceived costs associated with dissolving the 
relationship. This finding confirms Gruen et al.’s (2000) study, but furthers it by 
examining which relation-specific investments work better at building long-term 
relationships; for instance, whether it is investment in a particular technology, process, or 
product. The firms that undertook joint problem-solving tasks together developed closer 
relationships between staff members, which helped build trust and commitment and 
reduced the amount of time the relationship spent in the exploration stage. The cases 
where firms developed relational norms and common working routines tended to progress 
through the exploration stage a lot more quickly than firms who worked at arm’s length.  
Suppliers in the OSW industry were often dependent on the buyer and would take big 
risks by investing in the relationship speculatively in goodwill even when relationship 
satisfaction was low, in the hope that they could progress from the exploration to 
expansion stage. Suppliers would try their best to increase compatibility and offer 
complementarities to keep the relationship active, even when buyers were acting in 
destructive ways, due to the dominance of the buyer. 
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2. How are complementary resources valued by buyers and suppliers such that 
they are willing to invest in new relationship formation? 
Suppliers who provided complementary products and technology to their counterparts 
typically saw faster movement through the awareness and exploration stages. In the 
awareness stage, the perceived credibility and benevolence of the staff member involved 
in developing the relationship was of paramount importance for the relationship to be 
triggered into the exploration stage. This finding coincides with Doney and Cannon’s 
(1997) study but takes it a step further, by examining in more detail how staff members 
would build their credibility with their counterpart; for instance, by making sacrifices in 
their working life to satisfy the partner’s expectations. The cases that involved personal 
relationship communicating on an informal level tended to bond more quickly compared 
to relationships that had formal communication and procedures in place.  
Partners who had access to information that the other partner required tended to be in a 
good position to speed up relationship development. For many supplier cases, their 
knowledge and experience in their sector allowed them to gain a lot of credibility and 
respect from their partners helping progress the relationship to the next stage. Suppliers 
also gained a lot of complementary knowledge from buyers who had a wider knowledge 
base of the market; this helped the supplier build a higher level of trust with the buyer, 
especially when the knowledge shared to the supplier was confidential and considered 
private.  
The complementary resources offered by the buyers were often different from the supplier 
offerings. For instance, buyers in the OSW industry sometimes had greater experience in 
OSW and so were able to develop their suppliers by providing technical information on 
how the suppliers could reach the high-quality standards required by the OSW sector. The 
buyers would typically be dealing with OEMs who set the requirements for quality; thus, 
buyers would offer supplier complementarities in terms of process improvements, but 
also valuable market information that was not visible to the suppliers that helped them on 
planning how to set up their associated supply chains. Buyers could offer suppliers high-
level visibility on future orders, instruct them on how to improve quality processes, as 
well as provide them with consumer demand information that would enable them to 
develop new products in line with market demand.  
Complementary resources were one of the most important factors of relationship 
development in the exploration and expansion stage. Suppliers who offered high levels 
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of complementarities where there were few alternative sources of supply were able to 
move through early stages more quickly than suppliers who had fewer critical resources 
to offer and relied more on increasing compatibility in the relationship.  
Furthermore, suppliers typically would have to make high investments in terms of time 
spent communicating their offering effectively to highlight the complementary 
capabilities their firm could offer to the buyer, and why they were unique compared to 
other suppliers they were competing with. Investments also had to be made for staff to 
travel regularly to the partner firm, who was often geographically distant. Investments 
also had to be made by the supplier or buyer to make them ‘look the part’ i.e. had 
complementary knowledge, products, or technical expertise that could not easily be 
substituted and that, when pooled with their potential partner, could provide vast value 
for both firms.  
An important finding in the process of relationship development indicates that 
management in a buyer or supplier firm should be aware of increasing dependence on a 
partner leading to potential opportunistic and untrustworthy behaviour by the dominant 
partner. Where both partners bring complementary resources to the relationship, benefits 
are realised from both sides and mutual respect can be established. However, when one 
partner provides limited complementary resources compared to the other, there is little 
incentive to work with the weaker partner, which in many cases in this research were the 
suppliers. For example, many of the OSW suppliers had to accept the demands of the 
buyer due to the buyer’s power and dominant position.  
3. What are the major issues related to compatibility and how are incompatibilities 
overcome?  
Firms that had high compatibility, especially culturally and sharing similar values, could 
cope much better through uncertain times and would move through initial relationship 
stages faster than firm who had less in common with each other, who would typically 
spend more time in the initial stages (awareness, exploration, and expansion). 
Relationships with high compatibility from the beginning saw higher relation-specific 
investments from both sides and nurtured mutual trust faster, leading to speedier 
movement through early stages. 
This study confirms that high inter-firm compatibility improves performance and speeds 
up relationship development when uncertainty is high. Due to the high levels of 
uncertainty in the OSW sector, interpersonal trust and commitment were sought earlier 
230 
 
than previous studies suggest. Both were effective governance mechanisms that provided 
stability in the relationship, helping it progress more quickly. Further, with trust in place, 
partners had high compatibility; they engaged in more joint initiatives, increasing the 
investment in relation-specific resources in the relationship, and promoting relationship 
satisfaction and faster movement towards a mature stage. 
Once entering the exploration stage, partners’ assessments of each other’s values, 
particularly sustainable, were called into question; in the OSW cases, UK suppliers would 
expect their customers to share a similar culture in sustainability and responsible 
sourcing, whilst their potential customers did not always align their values, which would 
set out immediate incompatibilities between staff across all levels of both organisations. 
Furthermore, the cases showed how compatibility in culture and values from historical 
ties and geography, and emphasis on sustainability and the development of UK industry, 
would increase compatibility of the partners. This finding is supported by Awan (2019) 
who suggests relational governance has a key role in the continuation of a relationship 
and helps improve the social performance of a relationship by investing significant 
resources in the relationship and improving information exchange through cultural 
intelligence.  
Partners who found common ground, either through personal relationships or the values 
that both shared, triggered the exploration stage much more quickly, compared to partners 
who had less in common in terms of values and culture, who would typically spend much 
longer in the awareness stage trying to increase the level of compatibility and between 
the firms. This study found that compatibility in terms of personal relationships, shared 
goals, and culture had more significance in the exploration stage, compared to partners 
focusing solely on contract and price negotiations suggested by Vanpoucke et al’s (2014) 
study.  
4. What are the effects of high uncertainty on early-stage relationship 
development, and how can uncertainty be reduced? 
All cases in this study involved firms in highly uncertain environments, be it due to the 
nascence of the OSW market and the political effects. Firms would invest much effort to 
develop close relationships as quickly as possible to reduce uncertainty, and would often 
take big risks to speed up the bonding process and gain trust. This study observed that 
personal relationships were made much earlier in the relationship; in doing so, the 
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relationship would travel much faster through the awareness stage into the exploration 
stage.  
Most of the relationships studied saw partners experiencing high uncertainty throughout 
their relationship; this had a slowing effect in the exploration and expansion stage. The 
ability to build trust was a major issue that stalled many of the cases from ‘weathering the 
bad times’ together. Communication and information exchange were key to ensure 
relationships would not dissolve; in many of the cases it is observed that communication 
would break down, be one-way, and lead to dissolution. Personal relationship was vital 
to keeping relationships active and gauging the intentions of each firm. In particular, some 
relationships that were adversarial had transformed to collaborative through effective 
organisational trust repair, where interpersonal ties helped prevent initial 
interorganisational trust loss (Kaufmann et al. 2018). 
There are ways to reduce uncertainty during early stage of an inter-firm relationship 
(Moorman et al. 1993; Dwyer et al. 1987). This study discovers the importance of 
repeating and growing orders or transactions in order to make the initial relationships 
more stable. The repeated transactions between the two firms enhanced the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the interaction by creating mutual understanding of routines and 
processes (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Dealing regularly with each other enabled the teams 
of staff to develop efficiency-enhancing routines, that helped organise the partnership and 
develop methods for joint problem solving and conflict resolution. The two firms 
developed relational-specific absorptive capacity where regular knowledge transfer 
routines would take place, facilitating the learning process, which increased the level of 
compatibility and trust in the dyad. 
Further, partly due to the uncertainty faced in the UK OSW industry, knowledge and 
resource sharing initiatives between partners began earlier in the exploration stage, unlike 
in the commitment stage suggested by Vanpoucke et al. (2014). Further, whilst the 
exploration stage usually focuses on contract and price negotiations, this study found that 
collaborative activities also began earlier in this stage, rather than in the expansion or 
commitment stage. The results of this study explain why Palmatier et al. (2013) found 
that relationship age does not provide a clear indication of relationship development stage 
and that relationships move through stages at different rates. Hence, the role of the 
manager is not only negotiator but also project manager in the exploration stage. 
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For many of the cases studied, high uncertainty made progression through stages much 
more difficult; one way of reducing uncertainty was for partners to show their intentions 
upfront and behave in a manner supportive of relationship longevity (Fournier, 1998). 
This was sometimes done by making further investments in the relationship, although due 
to such a high and prolonged level of uncertainty, investment and good intentions were 
not always enough to keep the relationship progressing toward a longer-term partnership. 
The search for innovation complementarity required a lot more trust at the early stage of 
a relationship than previously taught. Such a trust, which is also essential for a lock-in 
situation for longer-term alliance (Main Anh et al. 2018), could be increased by working 
together to enhance compatibility and complementarity. While matching theory provides 
interesting concepts for analysing compatibility and complementarity, this study shows 
that firms attempting to seek innovation complementarity should be prepared to invest in 
building the relationship by sharing more information and showing more willingness to 
address incompatibility issues at the very beginning. These steps could also reduce risk. 
5.3 Theoretical Contributions of the Research 
This thesis has advanced the conceptual framework developed from the literature review 
in chapter 2. The advanced framework can be seen below in Figure 40.  
 
Figure 40 Theoretically advancing the framework 
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The framework has been advanced both through the buyer and supplier perspectives as 
well as advancing the dyadic and triadic interaction in more granular detail. The following 
contributions have been pinpointed and can be found below.  
• In the early stage of a new buyer-supplier relationship, the relationship develops 
following a non-linear interactive process, which may go forward and backward 
between stages, due to a constant (re-)assessment of the relationships and 
changing in expectations. 
This thesis critically evaluates two contradictory relationship life-cycle theories namely, 
Dwyer et al. (1987) who describe relationship development as a linear, discrete process, 
and Ring and Van de Ven (1994) who posit the relationship process as cyclical and 
iterative. My findings agree with Vanpoucke et al.’s (2014: 27) conclusion that both 
theories are “not so much incompatible as complementary in nature.” However, the 
findings of this research disagree with Vanpoucke et al. (2014) when they suggest 
relationships in the awareness and exploration stage follow a linear process and evolve 
into a cyclical process in the later stages. In fact, this study finds that under highly 
uncertain environments relationships in the awareness and exploration stage follow an 
iterative process that can be cyclical in nature, involving the constant negotiation, 
commitment and execution of tasks and initiatives. High uncertainty leads to partners 
initial agreements being dropped and expectations constantly changing. Thus, the cyclical 
process allows partners to continuously reassess their position and future intentions. 
Further, during the awareness and exploration stages relationships can move backward or 
forward on their own unique trajectory making them unpredictable in nature and requiring 
relentless evaluation and assessment, thus requiring a human element to relationship 
development much earlier in relationship development, in contrast to Vanpoucke et al. 
(2014) who suggest this happens only when the relationship reaches the expansion stage.  
Another contradiction with Vanpoucke et al’s (2014) study finds that relationships with 
positive developments are not most likely to continue the same growth trend into the 
future, instead, largely owing to market and political uncertainty, especially for the OSW 
cases, relationships that have positive beginnings can reverse or break down dramatically 
and do not follow a linear growth trend whatsoever, despite both partners best efforts. 
This research agrees with the findings of Vanpoucke et al. (2014) who find that RV 
cyclical theory is complementary to DSO theory, however, adding to Vanpoucke et al. 
(2014) this research finds that RV theory is not separately complementing DSO but 
234 
 
instead taking place within each relationship stage of DSO theory, and can take place 
many times within the same relationship stage.  
• The use of relationship age as a factor to explain relationship outcome is 
misleading, because various types of uncertainty can affect the time taken to 
develop compatibility and realise the potential of complementarity, and the time 
taken to develop relational constructs vary significantly under different 
circumstances.  
This research confirms the findings of Palmatier et al. (2013) who states that relationship 
age does not offer a good evaluation of relationship performance nor does it give a sign 
of the relationship development stage. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis support 
life-cycle theories (Dwyer et al. 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Vanpoucke et al. 
2014; Palmatier, 2008) that relationships move through stages at different speeds. This 
study provides a more in-depth analysis on how different types of uncertainty (i.e. 
political and market) can affect the speed of relationship development and progression 
through relationship stages. For instance, during the exploration and expansions stages, 
when market uncertainty was high, firms spent longer times in these stages, investing 
more heavily on relation specific activities in order to build more trust and “weather the 
storm” in order to be prepared for when it calmed. Due to high uncertainty faced by buyers 
and suppliers, more importance was placed on building trust in the exploration stage in 
contrast to Vanpoucke et al. (2014) and Palmatier et al. (2013) who state trust building 
took place in expansion and commitment stages.  
• Relationship constructs such as information exchange, personal relationships, 
goal compatibility and time investments have more importance in the awareness 
and exploration stages. 
In contradiction to Vanpoucke et al.’s (2014) study who state that formal mechanisms are 
used to govern relationships in their early stages, this research finds that some of the more 
successful early-stage relationships adopted informal governance mechanisms. This was 
mainly due to the fact that informal mechanisms gave partners more flexibility enabling 
them to cope better to market and political changes. The informal nature of personal 
relationships also enabled staff to spend more time innovating on products and processes 
that would be later set up and formalised into joint ventures. This finding differs from 
Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) study who suggest informal psychological contracts may 
compensate or substitute formal contractual safeguards as trust between parties increases 
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over time. This study found that informal dealings between companies would compensate 
formal contractual safeguards much sooner in the relationship, instead of waiting for trust 
to build over time.  
Information exchange in the early stages of the relationship was key to understanding 
each partners’ expectations and also gauging the benefits that be realised from each 
parties’ complementary resources offered. Due to the nascent and volatile conditions of 
the OSW industry, information exchange in the early stages was vital to establish 
common grounds and ways to circumvent challenges arising from market uncertainties.  
This study disagrees with Wagner (2011) who states relationship properties such as 
information exchange, goal congruence and idiosyncratic time investments are low in the 
exploration stage. The study found that facing high uncertainty, suppliers would take 
large risks investing time and resources into the relationship in the exploration stage in 
order to build the trust of the buyer and gain their commitment to doing business in the 
future. However, despite making investments speculatively and taking large risks to 
satisfy the buyer, the relationship did not necessarily progress to the expansion stage, 
mainly owing to ongoing uncertainty in the market.  
• Relationship constructs such as values and culture play an important role in 
resolving differences and tackling challenges exchange partners face in the 
early stages of relationship development 
In the exploration and expansion stages when suppliers could not offer a lower price 
compared to their competitors their alignment of values and culture had significant impact 
on the negotiation with the buyer. Suppliers were able to tackle this issue and progress 
through these stages by offering intangible benefits that would illustrate the long-term 
commitment they were willing to undertake should the buyer accept to purchase their 
product.  
This study contributes to relational theories such as Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and 
Dwyer et al. (1987) by providing detailed insights into how compatibilities in culture and 
values aids relationship development.  With high levels of compatibility between cultures 
of exchange partners, resolving issues in the relationship became much easier, the speed 
at which partners would negotiate, commit and execute activities would be much faster 
as compared to relationships exhibiting low levels of compatibility in culture. High 
compatibility in culture garnered more trust in the relationship which was seen as crucial 
for progressing through the early stages at a faster rate. Compatibilities in values also 
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sped up the early stage development process as trust would be established much quicker 
compared to relationships with high levels of compatibility in values. 
This study extends the work of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) by covering relational 
constructs in more detail and how they affect the cyclical process of relationship 
development. Specifically, this study looks at a more complex set of conditions that 
impact on the development process. For instance, the study of cases from a range of 
different nation states show how differences in culture (i.e. language and expectations) 
and values (i.e. responsible or sustainable sourcing over price) can significantly speed up 
or slow down the ability of partners to negotiate, commit to and execute joint initiatives. 
Relationships with incompatibilities in cultures found it very difficult, time consuming 
and frustrating in the initial formation stages, suppliers would typically take big risks and 
comprises in order to satisfy and build trust with their buyer, to win orders.  
• Compatibility and complementarity play as important roles as relational 
constructs in the development of new supplier-buyer relationship, in that they 
are key goals that drive the investment in the new relationship. 
This research reveals that suppliers who made buyers aware of the complementarities 
they could offer in product, technology, process and technical expertise would help them 
be seen as a feasible partner and would trigger the relationship into the exploration stage. 
This was particularly the case for the OSW suppliers who made strong efforts to improve 
the buyer’s performance. 
While Vanpoucke et al. (2014) state that relationships in the early stages focused 
primarily on cost, this is not true for some of the cases in this research. Partners were 
more concerned that their values and long-term goals aligned with one another, and would 
choose partners who were more compatible, despite them offering a costlier product than 
their competitors. When partners had high compatibility, they started joint initiatives in 
the exploration stage whilst studies suggest integration initiatives only start in the 
expansion stage (Vanpoucke et al. 2014). 
The results of thesis provide a unique contribution to the understanding of how 
compatibility and complementarity affect relationship life-cycle development as they 
suggest that the different constructs of compatibility and complementarity play an 
important part in early-stage relationship development. 
237 
 
Compatibility in values and culture are very important in the awareness and exploration 
stage, despite studies. Partners who were highly compatible moved through awareness 
and exploration stages much quicker than partners who had incompatibilities in values, 
culture and processes. These relationships spent more time in the awareness and 
exploration stage making efforts to increase compatibility. 
Product and technology complementarity was a major factor in triggering relationships 
from the exploration to expansion stage, particularly for suppliers hoping to win 
consecutive or larger orders from their buyers. If the supplier could effectively present 
their complementary product or technology to the buyer, they were more likely to 
progress through stages. Thus, communication between the partners was seen as vital in 
the early stages for communicating benefits of the proposed product or technology 
innovations. Another relational factor that was not studied by Vanpoucke et al. (2014) or 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) was complementarity in terms of a partner’s reputation. This 
study found that where relationships involved one established and one new entrant to the 
OSW sector, the reputation of the established partner would provide crucial to securing 
more commitment and trust from the other partner. 
• Differences in supplier and buyer perspectives affect the time spent on 
developing compatibility and complementarity and progress in relationship 
development. 
Previous studies on buyer-supplier relationship life-cycles have been bias towards the 
buyer’s perspective of the relationship (Vanpoucke et al. 2014; Palmatier et al. 2013; 
Wagner, 2011), while this study takes both supplier and buyer perspectives into account 
offering a more detailed account of relationship development and highlighting the 
differences between each parties’ efforts towards developing the relationship. 
Furthermore, this research has added to the findings of previous life-cycle studies by 
examining the different triggers according to the perspectives of both the supplier and the 
buyer. It has distinguished that buyer and suppliers have different triggers for each 
relationship stage, which has not been studied in detail before. 
Another important contribution to Dwyer et al.’s (1987) framework is that, though this 
research confirms the definition and characteristics of each relationship stage, it illustrates 
that firms should place more importance on the early stages, namely, the awareness and 
exploration stage. This research highlights that relationship constructs come into play a 
lot earlier than previous research suggests.  For example, it is observed that there is a need 
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for information sharing and communication to occur in earlier stages, due to the high 
uncertainty faced by partners, so that they can build trust in one another reducing the level 
of uncertainty.   
Research on relational dynamics also addresses a key gap noted by Lewicki et al. (2006: 
991), specifically, that little attention is paid to “conceptualising and measuring 
relationship development over time”; instead, most research “has taken a static ‘snapshot’ 
view” of relationships. Supply chain relationships are constantly changing over time, yet 
most research takes a snapshot of the level of relationship constructs (Palmatier et al. 
2013).  
This research contributes to previous studies by capturing dynamic relationship constructs 
longitudinally, that is insightful to buyer–seller relationship development and 
performance. Another interesting aspect of the framework presented in this essay is that 
it not only illustrates how a relationship evolves, but also shows how the constructs 
themselves develop over the course of a relationship. 
While many buyer–supplier relationship studies have been limited to the bright side of 
relationships (Vanpoucke et al. 2014; Vandenbosch and Sapp, 2010; Anderson and Jap, 
2005), this research goes further to include relationships that have moved towards 
dissolution. Thus, it provides insights as to why relationships go into dissolution and what 
measures managers can take to avoid it.  
This research contributes to previous studies (e.g. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) by 
applying numerous relational dynamic’s such as compatibility (values, culture, personal 
relationships and work routines) and complementarity (product, process, market 
knowledge and technical expertise) to the development of new interfirm relationships. By 
doing this, the research shares insights on how specific constructs affect each stage of 
Ring Van de Ven’s (1994) process framework (i.e. negotiations, commitments and 
executions). For example, in the negotiation stage this study finds that partners who have 
high compatibility in personal relationships and work routines are able to conduct more 
effective informal sense making and formal bargaining and enables partners to identify 
and reduce specific incompatibilities helping the relationship move faster towards the 
commitment stage.  
Progressing the research of Dwyer et al. (1987), the framework presented in this study 
provides a more in-depth understanding of the relationship formation process between 
buyers and suppliers in highly uncertain industries; in particular, how compatibility and 
239 
 
complementarity constructs influence the speed of relationship development from one 
stage to the next.  
5.3.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
Previous studies on buyer–supplier relationship development are mostly from a buyer’s 
perspective, while this research takes a more thorough approach to analysing relationship 
dynamics from a supplier’s perspective. Most supplier cases highlighted the importance 
paid by the supplier to satisfying the buyer to develop a successful long-term relationship, 
and illustrated the importance of compatibility and complementary relationship variables 
in the buyer–supplier relationship. Whilst Vanpoucke et al. (2014) focus on successful 
buy-sell relationships, this study contributes to knowledge by examining relationships, 
not only in the early stages but how relational constructs can help to reduce 
incompatibilities that bring relationships to dissolution. Furthermore, this research 
develops a dynamic approach to predicting behavioural changes within buyer-supplier 
relationships (Rabelo et al. 2008) as well as the conditions for required for successful or 
failing relationships. This research extends Vanpoucke et al’s (2014) work on sole 
suppliers in successful relationships by analysing cases, not only from the supplier’s 
perspective with multiple buyers, but also the buyer’s perspective working with multiple 
suppliers. Additionally, this study included multiple partners from different countries 
enabling increased generalisability by recognising wider cross-cultural issues within 
buyer-supplier relationship development (Cheung et al. 2010). 
This research builds on the study of Hennelly and Wong (2016) by examining a greater 
number of cases in more detail with a larger set of relational constructs, thereby increasing 
validity and generalisability.  
Palmatier et al’s (2013) study focuses on one governance mechanism in buyer-supplier 
relationships, namely rust, while this research develops a much more detailed theory of 
relationship dynamics by investigating other mechanisms that have different dynamic 
properties that can either substitute or complement trust (i.e. commitment, trust and 
information exchange). 
As Ring and Van de Ven (1994) point out that it is increasingly important to understand 
developmental processes in buyer supplier relationships facing heightened levels of 
uncertainty and complexity. This research contributes to existing theory by focusing on 
the forming of new relationships in the nascent OSW sector, both of these factors increase 
levels of uncertainty and uncover new insights as to how partners can build trust, reduce 
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conflict and incompatibilities and develop internal appropriate governance structures to 
manage them.  
The dyadic interaction between buyer and supplier is triggered by mutual trust and 
loyalty. Relational capital is accrued when there is strategic momentum to innovate or to 
compete on quality, design or technical specifications. The relationship is quickly reset 
and interrupted when the focus is re-oriented towards lowering cost or a price driven 
strategy. Once transactional economics starts to dominate the relational network there is 
evidently a rapid dissolution trigger.  
While DSO and RV theories offer useful insights into business relationship evolution, 
they do not cover in detail the specific factors that lead to changes in the perceptions and 
behaviours of actors involved in the relationship. This study contributes to and extends 
these life-cycle theories by diving deeper into relationship dynamics and how specific 
relational constructs affect trust, commitment movement, information exchange and 
governance structures which help move a relationship (forwards or backwards) from one 
stage to the next. Furthermore, this study explains how these relational constructs can be 
developed by partners to increase compatibility and complementarity in order to speed 
up relationship development as well as reignite failing or stalling relationships. 
5.3.2 Contribution to Methodology 
In its investigation of the impact of compatibility and complementarity on early stage 
buyer–supplier relationships, this study introduced the critical realist method to supply 
chain management research. Subsequently, it follows the call for more use of qualitative 
methods in supply chain management research. 
5.3.3 Managerial Implications  
Through the analysis of the impact of relationship dynamics, complementarity, and 
compatibility on early stage buyer– supplier relationships, this research contributes to 
practice, by providing insights on how relationship development can be speeded up reach 
a level of commitment that provides a strong indicator of future sales growth and long-
term relationship orientation. 
This research suggests that relationship age is not always associated with better 
performance (Reinartz and Kumar, 2000). For partners with previous ties, it is important 
to recognise when the relationship is stagnating and going into dissolution, in order to 
take appropriate action to re-establish growth. 
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On one hand, this research can help managers and executives in buyer firms when forming 
new relationships with suppliers, specifically what relational constructs to focus on in the 
awareness stage of the relationship. For instance, to engage in open and frequent 
information exchange in order to gain trust as well as make efforts to reduce any 
incompatibilities in values and culture and increase the compatibility of personal 
relationship between key staff across multiple hierarchies. On the other hand, this 
research also helps managers and executives in supplier firms who are initiating a new 
relationship with a potential buyer. Specifically, what complementarities are important to 
offer and make the buyer aware of from the start in order to progress from the awareness 
to exploration stage. For example, providing in-depth market knowledge or making the 
buyer aware of specific technical expertise that would complement the buyer’s operations 
and increase communication and information exchange between the partners. The radar 
plots are especially useful for managers as they can be used as a tool or mechanism to 
gauge which relational constructs are most important and effective in each stage of the 
relationship, thus providing a guide on where to invest their efforts in relationship 
development. 
Managers should realise the strong impact of complementary resources on relationship 
development and performance, as well as strategies to increase compatibility to improve 
performance. This study found that there is huge importance to be placed on the human 
aspects of buyer–supplier relationships in their early stages of development. It is observed 
that partners who are satisfied with their counterpart’s employee performance and their 
interpersonal treatment of each other i.e. ability to cater to their needs (especially buyer’s 
needs) enables partners to build trust and commitment more quickly, therefore allowing 
relationships to progress faster through early stages. Consequently, this finding has 
implications for training and development of staff of the supplier company, to recognise 
and cater to the needs of their partner and gain their commitment to a long-term 
partnership.  
This research illustrated that relationships do not always follow a smooth path towards a 
committed relationship; therefore, developing a relationship towards a committed stage 
involved continuous efforts and investments by both partners. Consequently, this research 
advises that managers experiencing difficulties in their relationship should not give up, 
and instead introduce new ideas for joint initiatives in order to reignite the relationship. 
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5.4 Limitations and Future Research 
As this research studied early stage relationship development, it was limited by the small 
sample size in the mature/ decline stage. Consequently, this had two significant 
implications. Firstly, it would be beneficial to conduct further research on the impact of 
compatibility and complementarity and relationship dynamics across all stages of the 
relationship life-cycle. Secondly, interpretations of the effects in mature and decline 
stages should be made with caution. 
While many of the cases involved both buyer–supplier perspective of the same 
relationship, some of the cases studied involved only the perspective of one partner, due 
to lack of access to the other. Future research should focus on both buyer and supplier 
perspectives of the relationship. 
Convenience sampling was used to identify relevant case which then led to snowball 
sampling of case companies; however, this was not the most efficient way to tease out 
findings of the cases. This could be improved in the future by using theoretical sampling. 
Another limitation of the sampling process was that the study only interviewed the focal 
firm rather than both partners, thus research could be improved in the future by dyadic or 
triadic data collection, especially for focal case 1. Furthermore, the research could be 
improved by collecting more cases and data from the buyer’s perspective. 
Whilst this study focused on forming new relationships in nascent industries, a limitation 
was that it focused on only one sector, i.e. the OSW sector. This research could be 
improved in the future by sampling relationship formation in multiple different nascent 
industries alongside OSW. 
Applying critical realism in the study did introduce some limitations as it was very 
difficult to deploy efficiently, due to the need for very high-quality data and it being a 
very time-consuming process as data would need to be revisited at multiple points over 
time. In order to improve external validity of the study, the critical realist approach could 
be enhanced by the introduction of short survey questions giving the participants the 
opportunity to rate the different relational elements of compatibility and complementarity 
as well as levels of tryst, commitment and governance per stage by themselves. This could 
then be revisited by the researcher in order to be clarified and validated. 
243 
 
When coding data, the researcher chose to manually code, the limitation to this was that 
it was time-consuming, however it enabled the researcher to avoid errors concerned with 
coding software and issues with trustworthiness of the data. 
Whilst research should aim for generalisability (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991), this study 
followed the research of Hennelly and Wong (2016) focussing on early stage inter-
organisational relationships and did not analyse relationships in the committed or decline 
stage. Another limitation is that the study uses retrospective data collection. While 
reliability was maximised through multiple data collection techniques, the study restricted 
the ability to gain a micro-level understanding of events and processes. Therefore, to 
further elaborate on this study, real-time research is suggested. One more limitation is 
that the study uses retrospective data collection. While reliability was maximised through 
multiple data collection techniques, the study restricted the ability to gain a micro-level 
understanding of events and processes. Thus, to further elaborate on this study, real-time 
research is suggested. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix one – Studies on relationship dynamics and life-cycle theory 
Refere
nce 
Empirica
l 
approach 
Definition of relationship 
stages 
Relational 
dynamics 
studied 
Relationship 
development 
Relational variables across life-cycle stages 
Dwyer, 
Schurr 
and Oh 
(1987) 
Conceptu
al 
Awareness exploration    
expansion commitment 
dissolution 
Trust, 
Bilateral 
communicatio
n, goal 
congruence, 
joint 
satisfaction, 
norms 
Inverted U1 Communication and development of norms develop trust, 
continued interaction, goal alignment and satisfaction. 
Relational constructs move in tandem through stages. 
Ring 
and 
van de 
Ven 
(1994) 
Conceptu
al 
Negotiation – agreement – 
execution –assessment – 
dissolution 
Trust, 
relational 
norms, 
idiosyncratic 
investment, 
communicatio
n, mutual 
dependence 
Inverted U 
with possible 
cyclical 
iterations 
“The developmental processes ... explain how cooperative 
[inter-organisational relationships] emerge, evolve, and 
dissolve over time” (p.112). Relational constructs move 
together through life-cycle stages. 
Heide 
(1994) 
Conceptu
al 
Initiation – maintenance – 
termination 
Bilateral 
relational 
governance, 
mutual 
dependence 
Inverted U 
shape 
“Governance is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, 
encompassing the initiation, termination and ongoing 
relationship maintenance between a set of parties” (p.72). 
Wilson 
(1995) 
Conceptu
al with 
ethnograp
hy 
findings 
Partner selection – defining 
purpose –settling 
relationship boundaries – 
creating relationship value 
– relationship maintenance 
Trust, social 
bonds, mutual 
dependence, 
satisfaction, 
cooperation 
Linear 
increase 
Relational constructs such as trust, social bonds, mutual 
goals and power/dependence issues are more important in 
the early stages. These constructs provide a foundation 
from which commitment, structural bonds and cooperation 
grow in later life-cycle stages. 
 
1 The authors find an inverted-U relationship between buyer and supplier over its evolution.  According to the model peak relationship performance is found at the 
maturity stage. Whereas this performance quickly declines away in the dissolution stage. 
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Lewick
i and 
Bunker 
(1996) 
Conceptu
al 
Stage 1 (calculus and 
deterrence-based trust) 
stage 2 (knowledge-based 
trust) 
Stage 3 (identification-
based trust) decline 
Trust, 
identification 
Stepped 
increase: ‘S- 
Shape’, 
decline may 
or may not be 
permanent 
“In professional relationships, trust develops gradually as 
the parties move from one stage to another” (p.124). 
Experience in working with partner allows trust to grow. 
Rousse
au et 
al. 
(1998) 
Conceptu
al 
Early stage (calculations 
and institutional trust) 
Middle/late stage 
(relational trust) 
Trust Trust 
increases 
linearly 
“Trust changes over time – developing, building, 
declining, and even resurfacing in long standing 
relationships” (p.395). 
Jap 
and 
Ganesa
n 
(2000) 
 Exploratory – build up – 
maturity – de line 
Relational 
norms, 
satisfaction, 
commitment, 
bilateral 
investments 
Inverted U 
shape 
“The contrast in results from the total sample to the phase-
by-phase analysis underscores the powerful effect of 
relationship context in determining key relationship 
outcomes, and highlights the need for tailoring 
interorganisational strategies according to the relationship 
phase” (p.241). The constructs move together through 
stages; however, impacts on commitment of bilateral 
investments, relational norms, and contracts differ across 
life-cycle stages. 
Hibbar
d et al. 
(2001) 
Cross 
sectional 
age/covari
ate 
Quartile 1 (age = 1-96 
months) Quartile 2 (97-160 
months) Quartile 3 (161-
236 months) Quartile 4 
(237+ months) 
Commitment, 
trust, 
communicatio
n, shared 
values, mutual 
dependence 
Part inverted 
U shape, part 
linear 
decreasing 
trend. 
The impact on relational performance of trust and 
communication follow an inverted U shape across life-
cycle stages. The impact on relationship performance of 
commitment and shared values follow a linear decline. 
Jap 
and 
Anders
on 
(2007) 
Cross 
sectional 
– age 
matched 
Compared Dwyer et al.’s 
(1987) with Ring and Van 
de Ven (1994) 
Information 
exchange, 
goal 
congruence, 
trust, harmony 
Inverted U 
shape, with 
possibility of 
cyclical 
interactions 
Most relationships follow Dwyer et al.’s (1987) 
predictions; however, relationships that cycle among 
stages have worse performance.  Relational constructs: 
trust, goal congruence, harmony, information exchange 
move in concert through life-cycle stages. 
Vanpo
ucke et 
al. 
(2014) 
Cross-
sectional 
Compared Dwyer et al.’s 
(1987) with Ring and Van 
de Ven (1994) 
Trust, 
knowledge 
exchange, 
interdependen
ce 
commitment 
Linear 
increase 
cyclical 
interactions 
Relationships follow Dwyer et al.’s (1987) linear process; 
however, “once the relationship develops from the 
expansion into the commitment stage, a cyclical process 
consisting of interactive stages, i.e., negotiation, 
commitment and execution for each of the integration 
practices started to guide the subsequent integration 
initiatives” (p.22). 
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Appendix two – Coding scheme for relationship life-cycle stages 
Pre-define life cycle stages1 Pre-defined characteristics Efforts or triggers to move forward2 
Awareness • Relationship begins 
• Limited confidence in partners’ capability and 
trustworthiness 
• Recognize each other as “feasible” exchange partners 
• Could already have orders but wanting deeper relationships 
• Information sharing and communication 
• Develop relation-specific routines 
• Build social bonding 
• Identify common goals 
• Seek common ground 
• Trust 
Exploration • Initial levels of trust and commitment are calculative 
• Take more risk 
• Trial purchase; no commitment to long-term relationship 
• Evaluation of partners’ capabilities and performance 
• Test goal compatibility 
• Fragile; can end easily 
• Exchange information (intensive) 
• Setup integration initiatives 
• Try to reduce uncertainty 
• Increase specific investment beyond trial purchase 
• Relation-specific investment 
• Initial levels of trust and commitment are 
calculative 
• Joint investment/ problem solving 
Expansion • Commit and structure resources 
• Growth after initial experiences are beneficial 
• Evidence for trustworthy judgments about partner 
• Increased confidence in partner  
• Growth after preliminary involvement seen as beneficial 
• Intense investment  
• Increased attachment and interdependence 
• Increased trust, satisfaction, and commitment 
• Satisfaction 
• Performance 
Commitment • Getting reasonable levels of satisfaction and benefits 
• Relational norms 
• Commitment 
• Relationship costs 
• Increased commitment 
• Knowledge based trust 
• Relational behaviours 
• Implicit/ explicit pledge of continuity  
• Loyalty 
Dissolution  • Conflict 
• Distrust 
• One-way  
• Direct / Indirect 
• Withdrawal 
• Negotiated farewell 
• State-of-the relationship evaluation  
• Fading Away 
Note: 1According to Dwyer et al. (1987); 2Allow triggers new to existing literature 
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Appendix three – Coding scheme for relationship analysis 
Indicator Pre-defined characteristics  Decision rules for ensuring objectivity, validity and reliability 
Information exchange • Directions: one-directional; bi-
directional 
• Willingness to share: Willing; not willing 
• Quality of information: 
Objectivity / transparency 
• For ambiguous characteristic (e.g. x vs. y), clear decision rules are 
defined.  
• All characteristics are recorded in excel spreadsheet for ensuring 
transparency (see appendix for summaries). 
 
Validity 
• All indicators & pre-defined characteristics are based on the theoretical 
framework & supplier- relationship management literature; 
• Mutual exclusiveness, independence and exhaustiveness of 
characteristics are ensured by the definite and indefinite categories show 
in this table; 
• Characteristic development is fine-tuned during the coding process 
when pre-determined categories were not exhaustive. More codes for 
resource bundling were later introduced. 
 
Reliability 
• Reliability of coding instrument is ensured by pre-defined decision rules 
& the use of multiple coding periods and two coders 
• Random cross-coding and systematic cross-coding by the two coders 
yielded minimal discrepancy  
Trust • Credibility 
• Benevolent 
• Good will 
• Personal 
• Competence 
Commitment • Loyalty 
• Long-term orientation 
• Continuation 
• Going ‘the extra mile’ 
• Satisfaction 
Relationship quality • Mutual goals 
• Cultural compatibility 
• Risk and reward sharing 
• Relationship satisfaction 
Compatibility • Values 
• Culture 
• Work routines 
• Processes 
• Personal relationships 
Complementarity • Product 
• Technology 
• Technical expertise 
• Processes 
• Market knowledge 
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Appendix four – Questions regarding relationship stage 
Relationship Stage Definition 
Awareness Stage Party A’s recognition that party B is a feasible exchange partner  
Exploration Stage Both firms are discovering and testing the goal compatibility, 
integrity, and performance of the other as well as potential 
obligations, benefits, and burdens involved with working 
together on a long-term basis.  
 
The relationship between my firm and this seller is just beginning 
to develop 
Expansion Stage Both firms are receiving increasing benefits from the 
relationship and a level of trust and satisfaction has been 
developed such that they are more willing to become committed 
to the relationship on a long-term basis. 
 
The relationship between my firm and this seller is expanding 
and growing stronger. 
Commitment Stage Both firms have an on-going, long-term relationship in which 
both are receiving acceptable levels of satisfaction and benefits 
from the relationship. 
 
The relationship between my firm and this seller is mature and 
relatively stable 
Dissolution Stage One or both members have begun to experience dissatisfaction 
and is contemplating relationship termination, considering 
alternative manufacturers or customers, and is beginning to 
communicate an intent to end the relationship. 
 
The relationship between my firm and this seller is starting to 
decline. 
(based on Jap (2001), Jap and Ganesan (2000) and Dwyer et al (1987) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
273 
 
Appendix five – Interview guide  
General questions regarding business environment (Adapted from Vanpoucke et al. 2014) 
• What are the competitive challenges that your business is facing today? 
• What major changes in competition have you undergone in the last years? 
 
Industry turbulence (Adapted from Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008) 
• The industry in which our firm operates is very volatile and uncertain. 
 
Questions about customer/ supplier base (Adapted from Vanpoucke et al. 2014) 
• How many customers/ suppliers do you have? (All customers/ suppliers versus 
key suppliers) 
• Give some examples of ‘close or integrative’ relationships and a ‘not close’ 
relationship and additional examples of relationships that might fall between the 
two extremes. 
• Does your company have a specific strategy for buy–sell relationships (or the 
broader base of suppliers/ customers)? Are there any policies? 
• Why do you work with some suppliers/ customers closer together? What are 
determining factors? What are the trade-offs involved in these decisions? 
• How are other managers in your company involved in creating supplier 
relationships? 
 
Relationship age (years) (Adapted from Palmatier, 2008) 
• On average, how long have employees at your firm had relationships with this 
seller? 
 
Compatibility (Adapted from Sarkar et al. (2001)) 
• Executives from both firms involved in this project had compatible 
philosophies/approaches to business dealings  
• The goals and objectives of both firms were compatible with each other  
• The chemistry was right between the two firms 
• Operational Technical capabilities of the two firms were compatible with each 
other  
• The organizational procedures of the two firms were compatible 
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• Employees of both firms had similar professional or trade skills  
• The organizational values and social norms prevalent in the two firms were 
congruent 
 
Complementarity (Adapted from Sarkar et al. (2001)) 
• The resources contributed by both firms were significant in getting the bid  
• Resources brought into the venture by each firm were very valuable for the other 
• They contribute different capabilities to the relationship.  
• They have complementary strengths that are useful to their relationship.  
• They have separate abilities that, when combined together, enable them to achieve 
goals beyond their individual reach 
 
Supplier Trust in the Representative (Adapted from Jap (2001)) 
• This representative has been frank in dealing with us,  
• makes reliable promises,  
• does not make false claims,  
• is honest about problems that may arise,  
• has made sacrifices for us in the past, cares for us,  
• has gone out on a limb for us in times of shortages,  
• is like a friend, and has been on our side. 
 
Information Exchange Norms (Adapted from Heide and John (1992) and Dwyer and Oh 
(1987))  
• In this relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other 
party will be provided to them 
• Information is informally exchanged in this relationship 
• It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that may 
affect the other party 
• Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently 
 
Bilateral Idiosyncratic Investments (Adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992)) 
• We have made a substantial investment in personnel dedicated to this supplier’s 
product line 
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• We have invested a great deal in building up this supplier’s business 
• If this relationship were to end, we would be wasting a lot of knowledge regarding 
this supplier’s products and procedures 
• If either company were to switch to a competitive buyer or supplier, they would 
lose a lot of investments made in the present relationship 
• This supplier has invested a great deal in this relationship 
 
Questions about the buy-sell relationship (Adapted from Vanpoucke et al. (2014)) 
• What type of products do you exchange? 
• What kind of relationships do you have with this supplier / customer?  
• Which type of information do you share with the supplier/ customer?  
• Do you use structural ways of working together?  
• What are the idiosyncratic assets (i.e., specific for buy–sell relationship e.g., 
specific procedures, technology, human assets, investments) in the relationship? 
• What action plans did you do together during the last three years? 
• Who was involved in these changes (e.g., cross-functional teams)? 
• What was the trigger for implementing changes?  
• Did you start up pilot projects? With whom did you start these up?  
• Why with these partners? 
• How did the buy–sell relationship evolve?  
• When did the relationship start? 
• How did it evolve? 
• What was the reason for starting up the relationship?  
• What was the initial intention of the relationship?  
• What were the difficulties in setting this up? Are there disadvantages?  
• How do you see this evolving in the future? What are your expectations? 
• In which year did you (or your partner) do idiosyncratic investments in the 
relationship? Did it require a lot of negotiation? Contractual difficulties? 
• What type of idiosyncratic investments did you engage in? 
• What factors are involved in deciding to invest in these specific assets? What type 
of analysis was involved? 
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• How did this change the relationship in terms of trust, commitment, formality, 
standardization, communication (operational and strategic level), conflict 
resolution techniques? 
• How often do you communicate? Are these communication efforts formal or 
rather informal? Did this change over time? 
• Who initiated the decision to do the investment (initial and decision to invest) 
further? What was the motivation? How did one party convince the other party to 
participate? 
• On what initiatives do you work together in the different stages? 
• Are there differences in culture? Does that effect the relationship? How is it 
different to work with international versus local suppliers? 
• How did this relationship help you to improve performance? 
• What are the future perspectives? 
 
Supplier development (Adapted from Wagner (2011)) 
• Our firm has undertaken supplier development with Supplier X through … 
• Giving manufacturing related advice (e.g., processes, machining process, machine 
set up) 
• Training of employees from Supplier X 
• Giving product development related advice (e.g., processes, project management) 
• The transfer of employees to Supplier X 
• Giving technological advice (e.g., materials, software) 
 
Performance improvement (Wagner (2011)) 
• Improve our delivery reliability.  
• Reduce time-to-market.  
• Reduce production downtimes.  
• Increase the satisfaction of our customers.  
• Improve the reliability of our products.  
• Improve the quality of our products. 
• Offer more innovative products to our customers. 
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Appendix six – Data collection schedule 
Participant Participant job role Date Duration/location 
1-0-1 Director 03/06/13 One hour five minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  03/05/14 44 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
-  -  17/09/14 31 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
1-1-2 Key account manager 03/06/13 One hour 36 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  10/11/13 One hour 27 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  06/03/14 58 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
-  -  02/07/14 One hour 15 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
1-1-3 Key account manager and 
supply chain director 
03/06/13 One hour 45 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  10/11/13 One hour 32 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  10/09/14 58 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
-  -  06/03/14 48 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
1-1-4 Technical product manager 10/11/13 One hour 42 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  06/03/14 One hour 13 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  03/09/14 38 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
1-2-1 Director - UK offshore wind 
Industrial Strategy UK 
Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills 
30/04/13 20 minutes (in person at 
OSW conference, UK) 
-  -  26/06/13 34 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
1-2-2 Consultant - UK 
Manufacturing Advisory 
Service 
10/11/13 60 mins (in person at Leeds 
University campus) 
1-2-3 OSW consultant  11/13/13 38 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
1-2-4 Director - Team Humber 
Marine Alliance  
16/04/12 15 minutes (in person at 
OSW conference, Denmark) 
-  -  12/02/14 22 minutes (in person at 
OSW conference, UK) 
1-2-5 Deputy Head of Renewable 
Energy at Department for 
International Trade 
30/04/13 16 minutes (in person at 
OSW conference, UK) 
-  -  19/11/13 36 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
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1-2-6 Market Intelligence 
Manager - Renewable UK 
20/11/13 26 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
1-2-7 Information Manager - 
Renewable UK 
03/12/13 47 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
1-2-8 SICO Business 
Development Manager UK 
16/04/12 12 minutes (in person at 
OSW conference, Denmark) 
-  -  30/04/13 16 minutes (in person at 
OSW conference, UK) 
1-2-9 Director - Concrete gravity 
foundation supplier 
15/10/13 36 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
-  -  08/01/14 48 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-0-1 Offshore wind operations 
director 
12/09/13 One hour 47 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  13/02/14 46 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
-  -  11/08/14 One hour 22 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  12/12/14 57 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-1-2 Key account manager 12/09/13 One hour 38 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  13/02/14 One hour 14 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  11/08/14 One hour 11 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  12/12/14 47 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-1-3 Technical product manager 12/09/13 One hour 55 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  13/02/14 One hour 32 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  11/08/14 48 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
-  -  11/12/14 36 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-1-4 Political representative 08/10/13 34 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
-  -  12/03/14 29 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-1-5 Council leader for North 
Lincolnshire Council 
(business and trade) 
10/10/12 One hour 36 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  03/09/13 19 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-1-6 Danish HQ representative 15/05/13 41 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
-  -  11/09/13 17 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-1-7 UK steel market expert 23/10/12 One hour 42 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  14/08/13 55 minutes (in person) 
279 
 
-  -  14/11/13 26 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
2-1-8 SICO Business development 
manager – UK OSW market 
30/04/13 15 minutes (in person at 
OSW conference, UK) 
-  -  11/12/13 18 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
3-0-1 OSW operations director 16/01/13 One hour 42 minutes (in 
person) 
-  -  19/09/13 One hour 38 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  17/12/13 One hour 19 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  12/02/14 56 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
3-1-2: Key account manager 16/01/13 One hour 36 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  19/09/13 One hour 28 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  17/12/13 One hour 42 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  04/02/14 43 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
3-1-3 Technical product manager 16/01/13 One hour 58 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  19/09/13 One hour 11 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  04/02/14 27 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
-  -  17/12/13 One hour 39 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
3-1-4 Concrete centre director 11/02/13 43 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
3-1-5: ABCO Business 
development manager 
04/06/13 One hour 58 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  18/07/13 One hour 32 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  15/08/19 One hour 14 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
3-1-6 ABCO Director 04/06/13 48 minutes (in person at 
work premises) 
-  -  18/07/13 One hour 21 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  15/08/13 One hour 14 minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
3-1-7 OSW supply chain 
consultant  
20/03/13 One hour five minutes (in 
person at work premises) 
-  -  12/06/13 (telephone interview) 
3-1-8 GRCO commercial director 06/06/13 20 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
-  -  27/03/13 28 minutes (telephone 
interview) 
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Appendix seven - Summary of case companies
Case 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Focal firm MOCO TACO BRCO 
Relationships SACO VICO COC
O 
SKCO OTCO SICO WTC
O 
MAC
O 
GRCO STRCO SKANC
O 
BAMC
O 
Country South 
Korea 
Czech 
Republi
c 
UK Swede
n 
Germany Germany UK UK UK Austria Sweden UK 
Sector OSW OSW OSW OSW OSW OSW  OSW OSW/ 
Steel 
OSW OSW OSW OSW/ 
Steel 
No. of 
employees 
11,897 
(2015)  
965 
(2013) 
250 
(2014) 
48,593 
(2014) 
800 
(2014) 
50,000 
(2012) 
50 
(2014)  
1,000 
(2012)  
1092 
(2013) 
76,100 
(2014) 
5,500 
(2016) 
20,370 
(2014) 
Revenue £10bn 
(2014) 
€288mn 
(2015) 
£190
mn 
(2015) 
7.8bn 
SEK 
(2014) 
€680mn 
(2015) 
$16.15bn 
(2012) 
<£1mn 
(2013) 
£40mn 
(2015)  
£369mn 
(2013) 
€12.38b
n (2010)  
£1.678bn 
(2016) 
€6,976
mn 
(2016)  
Perspective Supplier Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Supplier - - - - - - 
Relationship 
length 
(years) 
4 6 6 10 7 4 2 4 5 3 4 3 
Life-cycle 
stage 
Early  - - - - - - - -  - - - 
New / 
Previous 
relationship 
New - - - - - - Prior 
ties 
New - Prior ties New 
Sole 
supplier/ 
buyer 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No 
Political and 
market 
uncertainty 
High 
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